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ABSTRACT 
Geographical human migration, including international, interregional, and interstate 
moves, is a very important form of human capital investment, and it has been receiving 
major popular and professsionai attention. We observe relatively high geographical mi­
gration rates near the time individuals complete their formal schooling. Also, significant 
migration follows episodes of unemployment and plans to retire from the workforce. Fre­
quently individuals return to the area where they were bom, especially in retirement. 
These attributes of geographical migration suggest that finite human life, economic un­
certainty/imperfect information, and wage and quality of life of a home location weight 
into individual/family migration/emigration decisions. 
This study focuses on re-migration, where individuals return to their place of birth 
after living in a new location for several years. The objectives of the study are (1) 
formulate a multiperiod finite-life utility majcimization model of an individual's migra­
tion decisions, given incomplete information about wage rates and quality of life in 
new locations, (2) provide econometrics evidence about the contribution of personal 
and local-area attributes to the hazard rate for re-migration of Puerto Rican bom male 
householders living on the U.S. mainland and returning to Puerto Rico during the 1980s, 
and (3) provide econometrics evidence on structural differences/changes in wage/eaming 
equations between and within major U.S. ethnic/racial groups in the 1980s. 
The following is accomplished. First, a highly stylized five period life-time model 
of individual decision making is developed where utility depends on the wage and/or 
quality of life and retirement always occurs in the fifth period. Re-migration is triggered 
xiii 
by unfulfilled wage or quality of life expectations, unemployment, and approaching re­
tirement. Second, the U.S. PUMS data set for Puerto Rican male householders, age 18 
to 64 in 1990, bom in Puerto Rico but residing on the U.S. mainland and re-migrating 
to Puerto Rico during the 1980s is the sample for fitting a hazard rate model of re-
migration. We find a strong quadratic effect of an individual's age, which supports the 
finite-life conceptual model. Also, males having English proficiency, less schooling, and 
working disability are less likely to re-migrate. A higher predicted job growth rate for 
Puerto Rico (U.S. mainland) and unemployment rate for the mainland (Puerto Rico) 
have positive (negative) effects on the hazard rate. The Puerto Rican real minimum 
wage is negatively related to the hazard rate, which is an obvious public policy instru­
ment. Third, the 1980 and 1990 PUMS for U.S. male householders provides the data 
set for testing for significant change in wage structure within and across major U.S. 
racial/ethnic groups (Hispanic, black, and white) between 1980 and 1990. We find that 
the cohort effect (year of immigration) was the only part of the return on personal at­
tributes that has changed significantly during the 1980s. There is, however, evidence 
of significant change in contributions of local labor market conditions to earnings of 
all groups during the 1980s. Test of structural equality across racial/ethnic groups are 
rejected. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The factor price equalization theorem implies that there is no incentive for interna­
tional migration because all individuals can earn the same wage rate when measured in 
the same currency. However, trade barriers, transportation cost, heterogeneous workers, 
and technology frequently cause the theorem to fail. On the other hand, workers have 
concerns about wage rates and local quality of life, including climate, education system, 
political system, public infrastructure, etc. Hence, international migration continues. 
Immigration has been an important source of changes in labor supply for many 
countries; moreover, it has been the single most important contributor to the changes in 
the labor supply for some countries recently. The United Nations (1989. p. 61) estimated 
that there are approximate 60 million people, or 1.2 percent of the world's population, 
now living in a country other than where they were born or in host (or foreign) countries. 
Over half of all immigrants go to the United States. Canada, or Australia. Table 1.1 
shows the size of the immigrant population in selected OECD countries in 1981 and 
1991. The U.S. has the largest immigrant population but Luxembourg has the highest 
immigrant share. Other countries with significant proportions of foreign born persons 
are Australia. Canada, and Switzerland. 
Immigrant policies differ greatly across countries. Eligibility for immigration in 
Canada and Australia is based on skill qualifications, but in the U.S. it is based on 
kinship ties. Also, all individuals born in the U.S. are automatically granted citizenship. 
The U.S. has experienced a rapid increase in the size of immigrant flows and major 
changes in the national-origin composition of the immigrant population over time. These 
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Table 1.1 Immigrant Population in Selected OECD Countries 
1981" 1991^ 
Countries 
Total immigrants 
(1000s) 
% of total 
population 
Total immigrants 
(1000s) 
% of total 
population 
.\ustralia .3.00.3.8 20.6 3,753.3 22.3 
Belgium 885.7 9.0 922.5 9.2 
Canada .3.843.3 16.1 4,.342.9 16.1 
France 3.714.2 6.8 3.596.6 6.3 
Germany 4.629.8 7.5 5.882.3 7.3 
Luxembourg 95.4 26.1 109.1 28.4 
Switzerland 909.9 14.3 1,163.2 17.1 
U.S. 14,079.9 6.2 19.767.3 7.9 
Source: OECD. Trends in International Migration (1994). 
"It is 1982 for France and 1980 for the U.S. 
^It is 1990 for the U.S., France, and Luxembourg. 
changes are partly due to changes in the U.S. immigration policy. Other factors are 
changes in political and economic conditions in other countries, for instance. Cuba and 
Mexico. Before 1965. the U.S. immigration policy was based on the national-origins 
quota system, which favored Europeans. After the national-origins quota system was 
eliminated in 1965, U.S. legal immigrant flows shifted in favor of Asia. Furthermore, the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) gave amnesty to 2.7 million illegal 
aliens, and the 1990 Immigration Act permitted an additional 150.000 legal immigrants 
annually. 
Table 1.2 shows the contribution of immigrants to U.S. population growth during 
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Table 1.2 The U.S. Immigrant Flow from 1931 to 1990 
Immigrant 
Flow 
1931 
to 
1940 
1941 
to 
1950 
1951 
to 
1960 
1961 
to 
1970 
1971 
to 
1980 
1981 
to 
1990 
Total (1000s) 528.4 L035.0 2,515.5 3,321.7 4.493.3 7.338.1 
% of Europe 65.8 60.0 52.7 33.8 17.8 10.4 
% of Asia 3.1 3.6 6.1 12.9 35.3 37.3 
% of America 30.3 34.3 39.6 51.7 44.1 49.3 
% of Canada 20.5 16.6 15.0 12.4 3.8 2.1 
% of Mexico 4.2 5.9 11.9 13.7 14.3 22.6 
% of .Africa 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.8 2.4 
% of Oceania 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 
% of change 
in population 5.9 5.3 8.7 13.7 20.7 33.1 
% of population 
that is foreign-born 
at end of decade 8.8 6.9 5.4 4.7 6.2 7.9 
Source: Adapted from Borjas 1994. 
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1931-1990. Immigrant flows do not exceed 8.7 percent of the total population for 1931-
1960, but their shaje of population growth increased to 20.7 percent for 1971-1980 and 
a larger 33.1 percent for 1981-1990. As to country or region, during 1931-1960 over 
two-thirds of legal immigrants entered the U.S. from Europe or Canada, less than 6 
percent from Asia, and less than 10 percent from Mexico. However, during 1981-1990 
only 12.5 percent of legal immigrants admitted originated in Europe or Canada, 37.3 
percent originated in .Asia, and 22.6 percent originated in Mexico. 
What are the economic effects of immigrant flows on the U.S.? First, they increase the 
supply of labor. Huffman (1995) estimated that immigrant flows (both legal and illegal) 
accounted for approximately 26 percent of net growth of the U.S. population during 
1961-70 and 39 percent during 1981-90. Second, new immigrants increase the rate of 
growth of the demand for U.S. goods and services. Immigrant flows (Huffman 1995) 
accounted for about 8 percent of the growth in aggregate demand for U.S. nontradeable 
goods and services in 1960 and 14 percent in 1990. Although immigrant flows do not 
affect the aggregate demand for pure public goods, they do cause a disproportionately 
large increase in the demand for impure public goods. Third, immigrant labor slows the 
rate of growth in the U.S. real wage. Even if a change in immigrant flows does not have 
significant long-run wage effects, they do affect the national average real wage rate of 
U.S. low-skilled workers in general. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992) estimated that 
they can account for 30 to 50 percent of the decline in real wage of high school dropouts 
for the 1980s. The other major cause is increase of U.S. trade. Hence, immigration is 
an increasingly important component in the economy of the United States. 
One question of interest is how an individual makes a decision to emigrate to the 
host country or to re-migrate to the home country. Hicks (1932) argued that wages 
are the main cause of migration, but Galor (1986) demonstrated that the incentives for 
international migration are the differences in time preferences across countries. Galor 
and Stark (1987) emphasized that internationcil migration is induced by technological 
5 
differences between countries. The above studies are based on a full information assump­
tion. .A.S we know, a potential migrant generally has incomplete information about the 
relevant variables especially for unfamiliar foreign countries. McCall and McCall (1987) 
showed that more variability in the relevant variables increases the attraction of a coun­
try. Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt (1991) illustrated that when incomplete information 
exists, migration can occur even among identical countries. 
Literature Review 
Several studies have tried to model the economic decisions facing potential migrants. 
In the last few decades, international labor migration has been given significant consid­
eration. On the other hand, empirical research on immigration has been an important 
topic. The first part of this section presents a review of search theory as applied to mi­
gration decisions. The second part discusses selected international migration theories. 
Search Theory 
Search theory is an important part in the economics of information and uncertainty. 
It is useful for sequential decision models where a decision maker must acquire and 
use information to take rational action in an ever changing and uncertain environment. 
The theory originally was developed in labor economics to help explain unemployment 
duration, searching on the job, and the allocation of the working life between market 
work and alternative activities (Mortensen 1986). 
In the full information earnings analysis, earnings differences can be attributed to 
different human capital investments, differences in labor force participation, as well as 
other variables such as gender, race, and the non-pecuniary advantage and disadvantage 
of jobs. However, these factors fail to explain all wage differences, i.e.. earnings seem 
to differ across similar quality workers at the same job. It is natural to use incomplete 
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iaformation to describe earnings differences. The idea is that firms find it costly to 
evaluate workers' reservation wages even holding worker quality constant; similarly, given 
an evaluation of working conditions, it is difficult for workers to know the best offer 
firms are willing to make for a given job. Hence, information gaps may exist in the labor 
market. 
When we analyze how workers search for jobs and choose among job offers, the 
workers are assumed to know the distribution of wage offers and attempt to choose the 
best job offer, given the search cost. The worker is assumed to continue to search for 
new offers as long as the marginal benefit of extra search exceeds the marginal cost. 
Stigler in his pioneering articles (1961, 1962) formulated the job search problem as one 
of an optimal sample size. In his model, the job searcher not only knows the distribution 
of wage offers, but also is able to search and accumulate job offers. Hence, the decision 
problem for the worker is to choose the sample size so as to maximize the expected net 
return to search. 
However, if a job seeker receives an extraordinarily high wage offer relative to the 
wage offer distribution, it may be more efficient to accept this offer without incurring 
additional search cost. Subsequent search models, developed by Gronau (1971), Mc-
Call (1970), and Mortensen (1970), are based on this argument. In this model, the 
worker samples a wage in a fixed distribution in one period and decides whether to 
accept employment at the observed wage or to wait, sampling further during the next 
period. Therefore, the worker's optimal policy is to choose a reservation wage and to 
accept the first offer exceeding this reservation wage. This strategy generally dominates 
the optimal sample size strategy in the sense that it has higher maximal expected present 
value of future income (Mortensen 1986). Moreover, when a sequential strategy is used, 
the random sample size can be interpreted as a distribution of lengths of the random 
search spells which provide a way to empirically implement search models. 
.Assume that (1) workers maximize expected presented value of income over an infinite 
I 
horizon, discounted at a constant rate r; (2) the income flow of searching job per unit 
period, net of search cost, is a constant 6 over time: (3) offers arrive according to a Poisson 
process with parameter 6, called the offer arrival rate; (4) a job offer is characterized by-
wage rate w and the job will last forever when accepted; (5) once rejected, an offer cannot 
b e  r e c a l l e d ;  ( 6 )  j o b  o f f e r s  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  d r a w s  f r o m  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  F (  w ) ,  
k n o w n  t o  t h e  w o r k e r s  a n d  i n v a r i a n t  o v e r  t i m e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  d e n o t e  p { n .  h ) , n  =  O A , . . . .  
to represent the probability that the worker will receive n offers during a period of 
length h .and let G{w. n) be the probability that the best of n offers is less than or 
equal to w for ra > 1. 
Let V { w )  be the present value of accepting the best offer received, w .  and V5 be the 
value of searching during the next period of length h. given the worker's information. 
Then, V5 can be written as: 
V's = b h ^  e-'* 
or equivalently, 
00 /•OC y\ p { T i ,  h )  f max{Vs, V { i v ] } d G { w ^  n )  —  p ( 0 .  h ) V s  
.n=i •'0 
( 1 . 1 )  
(1 — e V s  =  b h  ^  e  ^  p { n .  h )  f maxfO, V { w )  —  V s } i G (u.'. n )  J o  ( 1 . 2 )  
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1.1) is the net cost of job search during 
a period of length h, while the second term is the expected present value of job search. 
The fixed-point theorem for contraction mappings^ guarantees that there always exists 
a unique solution for Vs in equation (I.l), provided that the mean of the wage offer 
distribution is finite (Denardo 1967). The reservation wage, w'. is uniquely determined 
by V{w') = Vs. Furthermore, the Poisson process implies: 
and Um = 0 for n  >  2 .  
h-O h h~0 h ~ 
^Let / : S —> S be a function from a metric space (S. d )  to itself. The function / is called 
a contraction of S if there is a positive number c < 1 such that <i(/(x), /(y)) < cd{x. y) for all 
X, y € S (-A.postol 1974, p. 92). 
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Hence, dividing both sides of the equation (1.2) and taking h 0. we obtain: 
(1.3) 
rV's is represented as the imputed income, derived from V's per unit time period. 
With assumption (4), V { w )  =  w  /  r .  Hence, the reservation, wage, w ' ,  is obtained 
by solving 
The left-hand side of equation (1.5) represents the marginal cost of rejecting an offer, 
w'. The right-hand side is the marginal expected return from continued search using 
reservation wage w'. Therefore, the reservation wage w* is the wage rate such that the 
marginal benefit of search equates with the marginal cost of search. It can be shown 
that w' is negatively related to r, while positively related to 6, 6, and the mean of the 
wage offer distribution (Devine and Kiefer 1991, p. 16). 
The sequence of a worker's reservation wage is the central part of theoretical search 
models. Because a reservation wage can not be directly observed, the empirical research 
is based on responses to a question such as "What is the lowest wage you would be 
willing to accept?". Kasper (1967) hypothesizes that reservation wages decline with 
duration of a spell of unemployment because of decreasing marginal utility of leisure 
as leisure accumulates, and increasing marginal utility of income as assets dissipate. 
His sample consists of unemployed workers who respond to the question "What wage 
are you seeking?" (Minnesota Department of Employment Security between April and 
September 1961). The regression result shows a 0.3 percent decline in the asking wage 
when the length of unemployment increases one month. 
(1.4) 
or equivalently, 
(1.5) 
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Miller and V'olker (1987) performed a empirical analysis of the youth labor market 
in Australia. The sample drawn &rom the 1985 interviews of the .A.ustraJian Longi­
tudinal Survey comprised workers, aged 19-24, who were seeking a fuU-time job and 
responding to the question "What is the lowest weekly pay you would accept to work 
in any (full-time/part-time) job?". They reported following the regression results: (1) 
the reservation wage declines initially, but changes little thereafter; (2) male workers 
with a university degree have about a 50 percent higher reservation wage, but no such 
education effect appears in females; and (.3) there is no significant effect of labor market 
e.xperience in the reservation wage. 
The above two studies focus on testing the constant reservation wage hypothesis. 
Warner, Poindexter, and Fearn (1980) are interested in how the reservation wage is 
affected by the unemployment benefit, the offer distribution, and methods of search, 
keeping the constant reservation wage assumption. Their data come from workers in 
four U.S. cities (Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland), collected in the 1970 Cen­
sus of Employment, who experienced unemployment in the year preceding the survey 
and responded to the question "lowest acceptable hourly wage". The regression results 
show that the mean of the offer distribution and the unemployment benefit are sig­
nificantly positively related to the reservation wage (p-value < 0.001). consistent with 
search theory. The methods of labor market search, in the Census survey, consist of 
newspapers, private employment agencies, state employment agencies, direct applica­
tions to employers, friends or relatives, and unions. Their study indicated that the use 
of friends or relatives and unions has a significantly positive effect on the reservation 
wage. 
Empirical studies report that the reservation wage of unemployed workers fails over 
time. This suggests that we should extend the search model to allow non-constant 
reservation wage rates. One approach is to impose a liquidity constraint to assume 
that the worker can self-finance the out-of-packet cost of search ordy for a finite time 
10 
period (Mortensen 1986). 
Search, theory also has implications for the distribution of the duration of a completed 
speU. Denote A to be the instantaneous probability of exiting search or the hazard rate. 
Then. A can be written as: 
A  =  S ( l -  F ( w ' ) ) .  ( 1 . 6 )  
The first term is the probability of receiving an offer at an instantaneous moment. 
The second term is the conditional probability that once an offer is received, it wiU be 
accepted or equivalently that the offer is larger than the reservation wage. w'. Hazard 
rate A is positively related to r and the mean of the wage offer distribution, but negatively 
related to b (Devine and Kiefer 1991. p. 18). 
For constant 6 and w'. the completed duration has an exponential distribution with 
parameter A and expected duration 1 / A. If one wants to specify a non-constant hazard 
rate, for instance, increasing hazard rate for constant 6 and decreasing w'. one way to 
modify the model is to specify the distribution of duration as a member of the family of 
WeibuU distributions (see Chapter 3). 
Lancaster (1979) focuses on the use of data on the duration of unemployment to 
make inferences about behavior in search theory. He pointed out that since reservation 
wage sequence is not observable, we can approach the econometric specification of a 
search model using duration data by modeling the variation in the hazard function. 
He considered both exponential and WeibuU specification of the duration distributions 
and used a sample of 479 British, unskiUed, unemployed people. coUected by PoUtical 
and Economic Planning in 1973. Furthermore, Lancaster argues that we shall attempt 
to aUow for the specification error in the systematic sources of variation of the hazard 
function due to the omitted relevant regressors. He suggests a gamma mixture model 
to capture unobserved heterogeneity*. 
^Detail e.xpIana.tion can be found in Chapter 3. 
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Feridhanusetyawan (1994) applies search theory on internal migration, viewing mi­
gration decisions as sequential decisions made over time under uncertainty. He studies 
the migration behavior of male householders, aged 19-45 in 1968, for 20 years, based 
on an individual data set from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The empiri­
cal analysis consisted of estimating a probit model based on the point-in-time discrete 
choice model, and two types of hazard rate models, constant hazard and time-dependent 
hazard models, based on the search theory. For the time-dependent hazard model, he 
considers several procedures to treat left-censored migration starting time problems: 
remove all left-censored observations: utilize all spells with perfertly observed length: 
and predict the unobserved spell lengths. Feridhanusetyawan concluded that the search 
theory model performed better than the point-in-time standard discrete choice model in 
explaning migration behavior. 
International Migration 
The Gittins-index theory can be used to derive optimal migration policies for the 
multi-armed bandit (MAB) model of international migration. The MAB model of inter-
nationed migration can be characterized as follow: 
1. a migrant has. in each period, to choose only one of .V countries to live in and 
then, receives a bounded reward, 
2. these countries depend on the state space and transition probabilities which control 
the state transition from one period to another. 
3. the objective of the migrant is to choose the sequence of countries to live in by 
maximizing his/her expected discounted reward, 
4. the state of the country in which the individual is living at time t is the only one 
which wiU change from period — 1) to the next; hence, the states of remaining 
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countries are kept frozen during period [t.t  -r 1). 
The optimal migration strategy is to assign each country a Gittins index and then, 
at each decision time point, choose that country with the largest index. One way of 
formulating the Gittins index is to compute the value of a fallback position which would 
make the migrant indifferent to living in country j with state sj E. Sj one further period 
and then proceed with an optimal strategy, and retiring from this decision problem with 
a terminal payment Zj G R. The main advantage of the Gittins-index method is that 
it collapses an extremely complicated iV-dimensional problem into :V relatively simple 
one-dimensional problems. 
Let Vj{Zj,Sj) be the bounded expected present discounted value of being in state sj 
o f  c o u n t r y  j  a n d  f o l l o \ v i n g  a n  o p t i m a l  s t o p p i n g  r u l e  w h e n  t h e  t e r m i n a l  p a y m e n t  i s  Z j .  
Then, we have the following functional equation 
= max{z,-, U j { s j ) 3 ,  J (1.7) 
where 3j 6 (0,1) is the discounted factor, Uj{sj) is the migrant's per period utility 
functions for country j with state 3j, and ^j{Bj\sj) is the migrant's subjective proba­
bility that the state of country j will be in Bj 6 during period t. given that the 
state of country j was Sj during period f — 1. Xote that we have only to compare the 
value of stopping immediately with the value of continuing at least one further period. 
The Gittins index, Zj(sj) € R, is the value of Zj such that the migrant is indifferent 
to staying for a further period or retiring from the decision problem. Hence, we get a 
mapping Z* : Sj R where Zj{sj) is given by 
Z ] { s , )  =  V { Z ^ { s , ) , s j )  =  U j { s j ) ^ 3 j I  V j { Z ] { s j ) , Y ) ) ^ { d Y j l s , ) .  (1 .8 )  
The fixed-point theorem for contraction mappings guarantees that there always exists 
a unique solution for the equation (1.8). Therefore, Zj{sj) is well-defined and can be 
^6(Sj) denote the (X-algebra of all Borel subset of Sj 
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calculated in principle from the equation (1.8). Roberts and Weitzman (1980) and 
Ross (1983, pp. 131-41) demonstrated that the optimal migration strategy is moving to 
country j if 
Z]{sj)=max Z^isi). (1.9) 
tSA 
In other words, the migrant will move in each period into the country which has the 
largest Gittins index. This is an application of a corresponding theorem by Gittins (1979) 
and Whittle (1980). 
McCall and McCall (1987) applied the Gittins-index method for describing migration 
decision behavior in the MAB fc^amework. They assumed that individuals have incom­
plete information about city attributes and must incur cost to learn the true values, 
wage rates for each city are, however, known. The study showed that more variability in 
the non-pecuniary return increased the attraction of a city, and thus, cities with larger 
in-migration also have larger out-migxation since the distribution of the city attributes 
is symmetric about zero. Furthermore, this also implied that re-migration, which may 
be part of the optimal migration policy, is negatively related with information prior to 
migration because more variability means less prior information. 
Berninghaus and Seifert-Vbgt (1991) generalized the McCall's model by assum­
ing that a potential migrant has incomplete information on both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary aspects of life in foreign countries associated with more complicated subjective 
transition probabilities. The economic implications are similar to McCall's model. 
It is intuitively clear that observed migration behavior will not only be the result 
of individual migration decisions but also depend on opportunities the labor market 
offers to individuals; furthermore, all economic implications of aggregate migration be­
havior should be based on an underlying equilibrium concept. Galor (1986) utilizes a 
two-country overlapping generations (OG) framework in a dynamic general equilibrium 
model, and focuses on steady-state equilibria. .A.11 agents are supposed to have com­
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plete informatiou. He demoastrated that migration is induced by differences in the time 
preference rate of the households. The steady-state welfare implications of international 
labor mobility suggests that non-migrants in the source country are at least as well 
off, but the population of the host country is worse off. However, bilateral migration 
improves each country's welfare. 
Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt (1991) use a two-country OG framework in a temporary 
equilibrium model, which isolates a particular period and asks for equilibrium during this 
period in a dynamic model. Their model is different from that of Galor by assuming that 
migrants are incompletely informed about the relevant variables in the foreign country, 
and by ignoring all goods markets. The main results are that migration can be induced 
by incomplete information for potential migrants even in identical countries, and that 
more uncertainty over the relevant variables in the foreign country might increase the 
incentives for migration. 
The self-selection model (or called the Roy's model), developed by Borjas (1987), 
tries to characterize the immigrant flow. The author argued that immigrants may be 
systematically different from people who decide not to migrate and thus, the immigrant 
flow is not randomly selected from the population of the source country. He introduced 
three types of selection: positive selection implies that immigrants have above-average 
earnings both in the source and the host countries; negative selection means that im­
migrants have below-average earnings both in the source and the host countries: and 
refugee sorting suggests that immigrants have below-average earnings in the source coun­
try and above-average earnings in the host country. The empirical analysis revealed that 
immigrants in the United States were relatively less skilled, or negatively selected, in 
the 1970s, partly due to the 1965 elimination of the national-origins quota system. The 
other reason may be the source countries having a relatively higher rate of return to 
skills than the United States, seen for example in Mexico and Puerto Rico. 
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The Roy's model can also be extended to characterize return migration flows. 
Ramos (1992) studied persons who moved between Puerto Rico and the U.S. mainland. 
Although Puerto Elico is a territory of the United States, migration between the island 
and the mainland is more similar to international migration than internal migration 
because of different cultures and languages. He used the data drawn from 1980 U.S. 
Census Public Use Samples for Puerto Rico and the U.S. to test the self-selection model. 
The empirical analysis indicated the following results: Puerto Ricans who migrated 
to the mainland were relatively unskilled or negatively selected; and re-migrant flow, 
including both U.S.-born and Puerto Rico-born Puerto Ricans, was characterized by 
positive selection. This is consistent with the facts that a lot of displaced workers, 
because of minimum wage policy, migrated to the U.S., and that the island has relatively 
unequal earning distribution compared to the mednland. 
Immigration policies are centered around the potential adverse effect on the host 
country's labor market (immigrants compete with natives in the labor market, take jobs 
away from them, or bid down wages), and immigrant adaption to the host country. 
Theoretical predictions of the impact of immigration on wages of natives, discussed by 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995), depend on whether the host country is an open or closed 
economy. 
When the host country is a closed economy, immigrant flows will lower the price 
of perfectly substituted factors, have an ambiguous effect on the price of imperfectly 
substituted factors because substitution and scale effects are opposite, and raise the 
price of complementary factors. For example, if immigrants are unskilled workers, then 
the wage in the host country for unskilled workers will fall while it is ambiguous for 
skilled workers. 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin open economy model, if countries' factor endowments are not 
too different such that the factor price equcilization theorem holds, then immigrant flows 
will not affect factor prices and will only cause the host country to export more labor in 
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the form of goods. When, countries' factor endowments are quite different such that at 
least one country is specialized and thus, differences in factor prices exist, the impact of 
immigration on wages of natives is the same as in the closed economy. 
These models do not directly predict unemployment resulting from immigration. In 
a closed economy, if the wage is made rigid by institutional arrangements such cls unions, 
immigrant flows will be accompanied by increasing unemployment rather than declining 
wages. 
In the efficiency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), the equilibrium unemploy­
ment rate is negatively related to wages. Immigration, increasing the size of the labor 
force in the host country, allows firms to lower wages and increase employment. How­
ever, unemployment rates will increase because of lower wages. Hence, immigration may 
result in a rise in the host country's unemployment rate. 
The study by Borjas (1990) indicated the following impacts of immigrant flows on the 
United States. First, immigrant flow has little impact on the wage rates and employment 
opportunities of natives, but it has a significant effect on foreign-born persons already 
residing in the U.S. The empirical result showed that a 10 percent increase in the number 
of immigrants decreases the average wage at most 0.2 percent for natives, while at least 
2 percent for foreign-born persons. Second, more recent immigrant waves are relatively 
unskilled, characterized by less schooling, lower earning, lower labor force participation 
rates, and higher poverty rates. As a consequence, more recent immigrant cohorts have 
a relatively slower cissimilation than earlier cohorts, revealed in the empirical evidence 
that more recent immigrant waves will remain economically disadvantaged throughout 
their working lives. 
Borjas (1995) stresses a positive theory of immigration policy, based on a benefit-
cost analysis. The major benefit to the host country from immigration is production 
complementarities between immigrant workers and other factors of production. The 
more difference between immigrants and the stock of native productive inputs, the more 
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the host country gains from immigration. The cost in the host country consists of 
structural unemployment and social welfare expenditures etc. For example, less skilled 
workers are inclined to qualify for and participate in public assistance programs and 
thus, increase the fiscal cost of immigration. He indicated that in order to increase the 
immigration surplus, U.S. immigration policy should attract a more skilled immigrant 
flow. 
Statement of the Problems 
The search theory and the Gittins-index method are powerful approaches in describ­
ing individual migration behaviors. However, the assumption that potential migrants 
have infinite life causes problems in illustrating re-migration behavior. For instance, it 
fails to reflect the fact that re-migrants contain a significant share of persons who are 
retired or near retirement. They may prefer their home country's quality of life and old 
family friends and relatives to the host country because of cultural and language differ­
ences. The reason for emigration in their early life is attraction to the host country's 
employment opportunities or higher wage rates. Hence, in later life, they may find the 
optimal strategy is to re-migrate and retire. In making the decision to re-migrate or 
not, they may know that their working life has, or almost has, ended and their expected 
remaining life is not too long. 
On the other hand, in an uncertain world, re-migration is always a part of optimal 
migration strategy throughout the potential migrant's life given incoming information, 
for example, suffering a layoff or living in an unsteady political situations in the host 
country etc. The infinite life assumption is clearly not suitable when potential migrants 
decide whether to move during their later life. Therefore, a plausible model in describing 
re-migration behaviors should abandon the infinite life assumption. 
In empirical research, most studies have focused on the impacts of immigrant flows in 
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the host country and how immigrants have adapted to the host country. Borjas (1994) 
provided an excellent survey of the empirical results in this area. But a few papers have 
studied return migration. The objective of these limit empirical studies was to test the 
Roy's model: Ramos (1992) studied Puerto Ricans moving between Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. mainland; Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) focused on how return migration affected 
the average earnings of the remaining immigrants in the U.S.; and Bratsberg (199.3) 
was interested in the different return migration rate of foreign students in the U.S. 
Nevertheless, none of them provides an empirical analysis of how social and economic 
factors influence re-migration behaviors. Because of finite life assumption, we expect a 
quadratic life-cycle effect on our empiriccd re-migration analysis. 
Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this work follow 
1. Present a consistent sequential decision framework for individual migration de­
cisions under incomplete information. We applied a life-cycle model where indi­
viduals migrate only when they expect to have greater utility in a new location. 
The model tries to explain how immigrants make decisions to re-migrate in face 
of incoming information and finite life. 
2. Provide a econometric analysis of how socicd. and economic factors affect return 
migration behavior. The hazard rate approach, the instantaneous re-migration 
probability given that an immigrant has lived in the host country for t years, will 
be used in the empirical analysis. We estimate the conditional probability that 
Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rico re-migrated during the 1980s, given that they 
have already lived on the U.S. mairdand for several years. 
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3. Provide econometric evidence on structural differences/changes in wage equations 
between and within major ethnic/racicd groups in the 1980s. 
Organization of the Study 
The outline of this study is as follows: Chapter 2 develops the sequential decision 
framework for individual migration decisions under incomplete information. This model 
focuses on describing re-migration behaviors. A return migration econometric model 
will be discussed in chapter 3. We are interested in the conditional probability of re-
migrating, given that the immigrant has already lived in the host country for several 
years. Chapter 4 describes the pattern of return migration for Puerto Ricans on the U.S. 
mainland, and the microdata used in this study. The empirical results of the hazard 
function for re-migration are presented in chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the fitted wage 
equations. The last chapter summarizes and concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE SEQUENTIAL MIGRATION MODEL 
This chapter will present a consistent model of how a potential migrant makes a 
migration decision under incomplete information. The potential migrant's objective is 
to make a decision on where to live in each period in order to maximize his/her expected 
life-time utility in a two-country world, the home country and the host country. We 
assume that an individucd's life-time can be well approximated by five periods, and 
he/she retires at the beginning of the last period. Furthermore, because of incomplete 
information about future states of both countries, the potential migrant will gather 
information through time and revise his/her decision with new information at each 
decision time point. 
First, we will introduce a general framework for sequential decision-making over a 
five-period planning horizon. The key factors influencing the subjective well-being of 
an individual are the wage rate and the quality of life. We assume that the potential 
migrant has fuU information about his/her home country, but incomplete information 
about the host country; he/she can become well or at least better informed only by 
spending some time living in the host country. Then, the optimal migration strategy for 
the individual at each decision time point is to choose the country that provides him/her 
the greater expected life-time utility. Finally, some economic implications are presented. 
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Description of the Model 
We consider a two-country model, the home country and the foreign country. Suppose 
that a potential migrant has five periods of life and that he/she retires at the beginning 
of the last period. The potential migrant's objective is to choose a place to live in 
each period in order to maximize his/her expected present value of utility over the 
expected future life span, discounted to the present at a constant discount rate 3 £ (0.1). 
Therefore, the action space is given by A = {^, /}. 
Let S j (  t )  represent the state of information in country j  in period t  for j  =  h .  f  and 
t = 1, 2,.... 5. The state space for the decision process is then given by 
S = S'' X 
where "x" is the Cartesian product, and the state space of country j, S-'. is a subset of 
some finite or infinite dimensional vector space depending on the economic interpreta­
tion. We assume that the state space S is a complete, separable metric space. Given 
a state of information s[t) G S at decision time point t. which describes the state of 
information of both countries, the potential migrajit will take an action in A according 
to a decision rule. Then, the state of information s{t) might change from period t to 
period i 1 according to a stochastic transition law, and the individual has to take 
another action in A based on the state of information s{t — I). 
Suppose that the state of information of all countries may change from one period to 
another according to a Markovian decision process. In other words, the stochastic law of 
motion is given by a sequence of transition probabilities {Pt(-|-)}f=25 where Pt(5i5. a(5)) 
denotes the probability that the state of information will be in B G S(S) ^ during period 
t, provided the system was in the state of information s G S during period t — I and 
action 0(5) 6 A has been taken during this period. Since the state transition probability 
will primarily be based on subjective probability assessments of the potential migrant. 
^S(S) denote the tr-algebra of all Borel subset of S 
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it seems reasoaable to assume that only the state of informatioa of country j  that 
the individual lives in can change because he/she gains no information about another 
country. Furthermore, this work only deaJs with a homogeneous Markov process, so the 
time index t  can be omitted, say P(-|-)- We assume that P : S V ( S )  is continuous 
w.r.t. the weak topology on •P(S) where •P(S) denotes the set of all probability measures 
on the measurable space (S,0(S)). 
It is obvious that both pecuniary aspects and quality of life are key factors influencing 
the migration behavior. The quality of life contains all factors influencing the subjec­
tive well-being of an individual except the pecuniary aspects, e.g., the cultural climate, 
working conditions, the education system, and acceptance by the local inhabitant etc. 
Suppose that the state of information of country j (without uncertainty) in period t can 
be interpreted by the real wage rates, denoted by wj, and the quality of life , denoted 
by Xj. For simplicity, we assume that the quality of life can be represented by a real 
number, in the sense that the quality of life can be interpreted as compensated wage 
rates, and that the state of information of country j for the last period only depends 
on the quality of life by postulating that both countries provide no pension or the same 
amount of pensions after people retire. Therefore, the state of information for country 
j (without uncertainty) at time t can be represented by the vector 
{Wj.ij) € R^. X R for t = 1,2..3,4, and, 
Xj g R for f = 5. 
Because of uncertainty about future states, the potential migrant wiU be modeled 
as the agent who gathers information and then makes the decision between the options 
migration and non-migration according to the expected utility maximizing approach. 
Let Uj : Sj R represents the migrant's individual preferences about the possible 
states S j { t )  in country j .  This specification implies that the potential migrant may feel 
differently in different countries. If we consider the state of information Sj{t) to be 
a probability distribution over {wj^Xj), a nature candidate for the per period utility 
= 
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function U j { - )  over the states in country j would be the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
expected utility 
where U(-) is the indirect utility function over wage rates and quality of life. Then, the 
bounded reward function U{-) of the Markovian decision process can be constructed by 
r : S X A R where U { s . j )  = U j ( s j )  for j  G A. Hence, the objective of the migrant 
can be restated by finding a migration strategy, a sequence of action a { s ( t ) )  € A, to 
maodmize the expected discounted total reward 
where the state of information s { t )  evolves according to the stochastic transition law 
P(-]5(£ - l),a(5(£ — 1))) in time for t = 2,3,4,5. 
It is reasonable to assume that the potential migrajit has full information about 
his/her home country, but is only partially informed about the pecuniary aspects and the 
quality of life in a potential country before migration. The potential migrant can become 
well or at least better informed only by spending some time living there. Let's assume 
si represents the potential migrant's no-information state for host country attributes at 
the beginning of the first period, but he/she does have his/her own personal subjective 
probability distribution about Wf and Xf. The migrant will be completely informed 
about the wage he can earn in the host country after being there one period to search 
for the best employment offer, and about the quality of life in the host country after 
one further period of living there. We assume that the migrant only cares about the 
wage rate during the second period of residence in the host country, .\fter works for 
one peiod, he/she is then concerned the quality of life as well as the wage rate. Denote 
kj G R_. which is assumed to be known to the agent, as the migration cost for moving 
from country i to country j. Both kf and kh. are generally different, because kf contains 
(2 .1 )  
( 2 .2 )  
24 
the search cost and the moving cost but Ar/, only includes the moving cost. Note that if 
an individual decides to stay in his/her home country at the beginning of the first period, 
he/she wiU not migrate to the host country in his/her subsequent periods because of 
the learning cost and finite life assumptions. We assume further that there are constant 
probabilities ph and pf. known to the agent, of being unemployed in the home country 
and the host country respectively in the fourth period. To simplify the model, we assume 
that the immigrant is not allowed to migrate to the host country after he/she re-migrates: 
this is because we are mcunly interested in one-cycle re-migration behavior. 
According to the model structure, the state spaces for the home country and the the 
host country can be regarded as the subsets: 
S'' C (R_ X R) J R, and 
c {s^o} - R- - (R- =< R) - R" 
That is, the state of information for the home country wiU be (wh, Xh) € R- x R until 
the last period when it reduces fo ih G R: moreover, if the individual decides to stay 
in the home country at the beginning of the first period, his/her state of information 
for the host country will be frozen at Sq. However, if he/she decides to emigrate to the 
host country at the beginning of the first period, the migrant's state of information for 
the host country will change from si to Wf G R^., and then, the state of information 
will change from a*/ € R_ to (wf.Xf) € R_ x R, provided the migrant decides to stay 
one more period in the host country: after the agent retires, his/ her relevant state of 
information reduces to R. Furthermore, the time-dependent action space for the 
potential migrant can be described by 
Ai = {/i. /}. and 
{/i} when s { t )  €  S'' 
A, = for t  =  2. .3.4.5. 
{ h .  / }  w h e n  s ( t )  G  
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Finally, the individual's per period utility function U j  : S-* R for country j  with the 
state of information s^{t) can be defined by 
—kf for f = 1 
Wf for i = 2 
and 
ri(/(i)) = 
Wf -r Xf for t  =  Z A  
Xf for i = 0 
Wh — Xfi for t  =  1.2,3,4 
Xh for t = 5. 
If the migrant re-migrates to his/her home country at the beginning of period t ,  then 
the utility function for the individual at the beginning of period t in the home country 
is defined by il\ — Xh — (or x/, — Ar/i). 
The Optimal Migration Strategy 
We have already introduced the basic structure of the model in the previous section. 
What is the optimal migration strategy for the potential migrant? The basic assumption 
is that the individual at each decision time point chooses the country which provides the 
larger expected presented value of remaining life-time utility. We will apply the general 
backward solution to solve this migration problem, i.e., solve the re-migration problem 
at the beginning of period i 1 first, and based on this solution solve the re-migration 
p r o b l e m  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  p e r i o d  t .  
Because an individual can not emigrate to the host country except during the first 
period, we will only consider the re-migration behavior for the last four periods. Denote 
V/ and to be the migrant's life-time utilities in the foreign country and the home 
country in period t. respectively. Re-migration is the optimal strategy at the beginning 
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of period £ if and only if 
RMt = -V/ >0 t = 2,3,4,5. (2.3) 
is satisfied. Therefore, RMt can be interpreted as the net benefit from re-migration in 
period £, given emigration in the first period. Similarly, emigration is an optimal choice 
at the beginning of the first period if and only if 
M i  =  V / - \ f > 0  (2.4) 
is satisfied. Hence, Mi is the net benefit from emigration in the first period. To complete 
t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  m i g r a n t ' s  s t r a t e g y ,  w e  h a v e  t o  f i n d  f o r  j  —  h . f  a n d  t  =  
1,2,...,5. 
The individual is forced to retire at the beginning of the fifth period: hence, the key 
factor influencing his/her well-being is the quality of life. Therefore, we have 
= {Xh- kh), and (2.5) 
VJ = Xf. (2.6) 
Here, we try to capture the phenomena of re-migration near the retirement point. 
If the immigrant re-migrates at the beginning of the fourth period, he/she must 
retire in the home country. However, if he/she decides to stay in the host country in 
the forth period, he/she has a choice to stay or to re-migrate in the next period. It 
can be shown, however, that re-migration is not a rational strategy at the beginning of 
the forth period if the agent does not suffer a layoff. The reason is that the migrant 
knows aU relevant information at the beginning of the third period, and hence, if the 
host country can provide a larger remaining life-time utility, it should also have a larger 
remaining life-time utility in the fourth period, provided he/she is not unemployed. 
Proposition 2.1 The immigrant will stay in the host country during the forth pe­
riod (the year before retirement) if he/she is not unemployed, provided he/she has lived 
in the host country during the third period (previous year). 
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Proof: See Appendix A. 
Because the immigrant faces the uncertainty of being unemployed in the fourth period, 
his/her presented value of remaining life-time utility for both countries at the beginning 
of the fourth period can be written as: 
Xf — 3 max{x/i — kh, Xf} if unemployed 
{ w f  X f )  ~  3  max{z;, — k^, X f }  otherwise 
xf^3{xh — kh)~ J(—iJiV/s)" if unemployed 
(2.7) 
( w f  X f )  - r  3  ( x h  —  k h )  - r  3 { — R M 5 ) ~  otherwise 
=  ' (1  -  ph)wh -Xh -  kh]  -  3xh-  (2 .8)  
We define (-Y)~ to be max{X, 0}. The max{i;, — kh, x/} in captures the fact that 
the agent can stay or re-migrate in the next period if he/she decides to live in the host 
country in the current period. According to proposition 2.1, the agent will re-migrate if 
and only if he/she suffers a layoff and — [xf 3{xh — kh) -f 3{ — RMs)~' > 0, since 
— {wf -r Xf) ~ 3{xh — kh) ~ 3( —RMs)~] is always negative. Therefore, the net value 
of re-migration in the fourth period (the year before retirement) is defined by 
iZiV/4 = - [x/ ^3{xh - kh) - 3{-R^h)^ . (2.9) 
Note that even though the agent is unemployed, he/she need not re-migrate because 
the host country may still provide a higher remaining life-time utility. Thus, the model 
describes why some immigrants choose to stay in a host country but others decide to 
re-migrate when they are unemployed in the foreign country. 
At the beginning of the third period, the immigrant knows the quality of life x/: 
he/she has all relevant information about the host country. Then, the expected life-time 
utility at the beginning of the third period is described by 
V/ = { w f ~ X f ) ^ 3  (1 - P f ) [ { w f  -  X f )  - Jmax{x/, - kh, x/}] 
—P/max|x/ — ,imax{x;, - kh, Xf}, 
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= { w f - ^ X f ) ^ 3  ( I  -  pf )  [ {wf^Xf )  ^ 3 {xh  -  kk)  -  3{ -RMsr)  
- P f V , ^ ^ P f i - R M , r  and (2.10) 
V3 = (Wh^ X, ,  -  kh) i-3[{1 - ph)wh ~ Xhl-r S'^Xh- (2.11) 
V3'' represents the value for an individual who will stay in the home country for the rest 
of his/her life. On the other hand, V/ represents the value when the immigrant decides 
not to re-migrate. He/she continues to live in the host country if he/she does not suffer 
a layoff in the fourth period, and the value of remaining life-time utility is 
( W f  ~ X f )  - r  3 { X h  -  k h )  -  . 3 ( - R M 5 ) ^ .  
If he/she is unemployed in the fourth period, he/she will choose a country that provides 
a higher remaining life-time utility, and the value is represented by 
v,^ + {-R.\ur. 
Theoretically, there exists a reservation quality of life, x*f which is determined by ^3'' = 
V/, such that the immigrant will re-migrate if x/ < x). 
The migrant only has the information about the wage rate Wf and his/her own 
personal subjective distribution function oi Xf at the beginning of the second period. 
Denote G{xf) as the migrant's subjective cumulative distribution function oi Xf given 
Wf. Therefore, we can define the expected remaining life-time utility at the beginning of 
the second period by 
V 2  =  W f  ^  3  f  maxfVg'', V ' ^ }  d G { x f )  
JR 
=  W f ~ 3 V ^  —  3 f  {  —  R M z ) ~ d G { x f ) ,  and (2.12) Jr 
V;'* =  [ w h  ^  x h  -  k h )  ~  3 { w h  +  X h )  ~  3 - [ { l  -  p h ) w h  ~  X h ]  ~  3 ^ i h  (2.1.3) 
where max{V3'', V'/} in V/ represents the options of the individual living in the host 
country in the current period to stay or return in the next period. Moreover, because of 
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uncertainty about Xf. we use the mean of max{V3'', V/} to represent the future utility of 
the host country. Consequently, we can find a reservation wage, w'f which is determined 
by V2 = V/, such that the individual will re-migrate if a'/ < w'^. Therefore, we can 
show that some immigrants re-migrate because the wage rate and/or the quality of life 
in the host country are not good enough. 
Finally, the potential migrant has no information about the host country at the be­
ginning of the first period except his/her own personal subjective distribution functions 
of Wf and Xf. Define F{wf) to be the conditional distribution function of Wf given Sq. 
Hence. and V/ are given by 
V/ = max{V;''. V'/}(fF(u7) 
=  — k f  —  S V ^  —  s f  ( — R M ' , ) ~ d F { w f ) .  and (2.14) 
3 
^ - J/.) - i^[(l - - Xh; - (2.15) 
t=i 
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) are similar to (2.12) and (2.13) e.xcept maxlF,'*, V / }  illus­
trates options to a potential migrant if he/she emigrates in the first period. The mean 
of max{F,'', V/} represents the future life time utility in the host country because of 
uncertainty about Wf. 
Suppose the potential migrant is at the beginning of the decision process. His/her 
optimal migration strategy can be summarized by the migration decision tree in Fig­
ure 2.1. The H and F represent a decision to live in the home country (H) or the host 
country (F) in period t. He/she wiU re-migrate if the net values of re-migration is posi­
tive, except for the first period, where he/she will emigrate if the net value of emigration 
is greater than zero. Note that once the migrant has returned to the home country, 
he/she wiU stay there for the rest of his/her life. 
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First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Period Period Period Period Period 
H H H H (if M-i < 0) 
H 
(if/JM, > 0) H H H 
r H 
(if RMz > 0) 
(if .VA > 0) 
(if RM^, < 0) 
H H 
(if RMz < 0) 
H 
(if R\U > 0) 
(if R\U < 0) 
H 
H 
(URMs > 0) 
(if RMs < 0) 
Figure 2.1 Migration Decision Tree 
Some Economic Implications 
Let f l y .  = J  W f  d F { w  f )  and =  J  X f  d G ( x f )  be the expected wage rate and expected 
quality of life, respectively. For analytical convenience, we assume that Mi == 0 and 
RMt 7^ 0 for i = 2.3,4,5. Table 2.1 shows the outcome of the comparative static 
analyses with the re-migration model. 
We can see that the net present values of the emigration decision is increasing in ph, 
or fix, but decreasing in pf. kh, kf, Wh, or Xh. These results are intuitively reasonable. 
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Table 2.1 The Comparative Static Effects of ph, Pf, kh. kf, n-'h, and 
Xh on the Net Value of Emigration aind. Re-migration 
Net Values Exogenous Variables" 
of Migration ph Pf kf Wh Xh 
Ml -r — — — — -r — — 
RM-> — — — 0 0 — — — 
R M z  — — — 0 0 0 — -i-
R\U - 0 — 0 0 0 — — 
R M s  0 0 — 0 0 0 0 — 
''Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix A. 
For increasing moving cost or kf, the host country should be less attractive because 
the expenditure on emigration goes up, but increasing in p^. or px-, or decreasing in pf 
wiU inflate the expected life-time utility of the host country residency at the beginning 
of the first period. Moreover, the expected life-time utility of living in the home country 
at the beginning of the first period will decline when p/,, Wh. or Xh increases. The table 
also shows that the net value of re-migration is decreasing in pht kh, or px, but increasing 
in Pf, Wh, or i/,. These results seem also to be intuitively plausible. The argument is 
similar to the one above. When increases px or decreases pf, the expected life-time 
utility from being in the host country at the beginning of period t will increase, but if 
Ph or kh increases, the expected life-time utility of the home country at the beginning 
of period t will decrease. The same argument can also be applied to Wf and x'f. 
Proposition 2.2 1. The reservation wage Wf is an increasing function of Xh- li'h, o r  
P f ,  b u t  a  d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  k h ,  p h ,  o r  p x -
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2. The reservation quality of life x'^ is an increasing function of or pf, while 
a decreasing function of kh, or p^. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proposition 2.3 Suppose F{-) )^mps F( - )  ^  a n d / o r  G(-) >-mps G ( - ) .  ^  D e n o t e  t h e  
corresponding net values of migration by Mi, RM2, and Mi, RMi, respectively. Then, 
we have 
M l  >  M l ,  a n d  
RM. < RM2. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The interpretation is that an increase in the variability in the Wf and/or Xf distribu­
tion increases the attraction of the host country. This result is based on risk neutrality 
and the characteristic of the sequential decision problem so that the decision-maker can 
revise a decision when outcomes become bad. Therefore, greater variability may improve 
his/her expected payoff. Berninghaus and Seifert-Vbgt (1991) showed that this result 
is stiU valid if the degree of risk-aversion of migrants is small in a well defined sense. 
Hence, we may conclude that a country becomes more attractive if less information is 
known about it before migration. This might help explain immigrant flows from Eu­
rope to the U.S. during the past centuries. On the other hand, this may imply that 
countries with high immigration rates may have high emigration if the attractability 
of a country is based on a large "mean preserving spread". This result can be found 
in many empirical studies on internal migration (e.g. Greenwood 1975). However, no 
empirical study of international migration has been found that supports this economic 
implication. The possible explanation is that there are many institutional restrictions on 
>-MPS y means that x has a larger ' 'mean preserving spread" than y.  
^In other words, F( - )  and/or G(- )  display more variabili ty than F( - )  and G(- ) ,  respectively.  
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internatioaal migration or that the potential migrant may generally choose the country 
which is objectively superior to the home country to emigrate. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF 
INDIVIDUAL RE-MIGRATION DECISIONS 
The econometric model will capture the re-migration decision of immigrants, who 
have lived in a host country for several years, then return to their home country. The 
interesting question is what is the conditional probability that the immigrant will re-
migrate given that he/she has already lived in the host country for n years. 
We will first introduce a discrete-time version of the econometric model, which is 
directly derived from the theoretical model presented in chapter 2. Then, a continuous-
time version of the model, called the hazard rate approach, wiU be presented. The 
hazard rate approach in which decision making is at a random interval rather than once 
each period is essentially the same as the discrete time version model, but frequently 
more appropriate in the empirical analysis. Hence, this work will use the hazard rate 
approach. Usually, the covariates included in the model can not completely control 
heterogeneity across individuals; the mixture model will be used to treat heterogeneity 
situations. Finally, we will discuss time dependent covariates. 
The Discrete Time Version Model 
Let's assume the key factors influencing re-migration behavior are the wage rates 
and the quality of life. Denote Wht and Wft to be the wage rate in the home country and 
the host country at time t. respectively, and Zt (which is interpreted as the net value of 
the quality of life) to be the quality of life that the immigrant may experience in the 
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host country at time t. Therefore, the state space at time t is given by 
S ( t )  =  S ' ' ( f )  X  s H t )  
where s ^ ( t )  =  G S ^ ( t )  and s ^ i t )  = { w f t ,  Cj} £ S ^ ( t )  for i = 1,2. • • • T .  
Assume that the immigrant is completely informed about Wht and tv/t, t = 1,2. • • • T, 
in the sense that he/she can forecast them based on personal characteristics and/or 
local market conditions, denoted by X. Let {~t}f=i be a sequence of realizations, that 
the immigrant may e.xperience in the host country, of a sequence {Zt}f-i of stochastically 
independent, identically distributed random variables Z having c.d.f. G( -: or), which is 
supposed to be known up to a parameter vector a. 
Denote U { w h t )  ( C { i V f t ^  : t ) )  to be the immigrant's period t  utility function if he/she 
re-migrates (stays in the host country). Then, we have the life-time utility of living in 
the home country starting in period t 
T 
C\^  = Tr,'-T{wf,i) (3.1) 
and the life time utility of living in the host country starting in period t 
C/ = riwft,:t) -T] J a) (3.2) 
where 7 E (0,1) is the discount factor and Vi(5) = max{C'/', C'/}. Hence, there is a 
sequence of reservation quality of life indices such that the immigrant will re-
migrate in period t if and only if where the is determined by the equation 
r . I-
XI'7' ~ n I a). (3.3) 
i=t •' 
.\ccording to the equation (3.3), it is a function of .Y. (3. and a where /3 is a unknown 
coefficient vector. Let n denote exactly the number of years the immigrant plans to 
stay in the host country before re-migrating to his/her home country. We describe n 
as realizations of a random variable X  £  N. Then, the conditional probability that the 
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immigrant has lived in the host country exactly n years and then, re-migrates in the 
next year is given by 
n 
Pr( iV  = n) = (.3.4) 
t=i 
=  h { n ,  X ,  l 3 .  a ) .  (3.5) 
Therefore, given a random sample of size m, the likelihood function can be constructed 
by 
m 
L { 0 ,  a  !  •  . . X m . . n i , n 2 , . .  . . r i m )  =  J J  1 ^ '  
i=l 
Then, we can maximize equation (3.6) w.r.t. /3 and a to find the maximum likeli­
hood (ML) estimators of /3 and a. 
The Hazard Rate Approach 
The previous econometric model is a discrete time version which is essentially the 
same as a continuous time version where decision making is at a random interval rather 
than once each period. However, two arguments favor continuous time models over 
discrete-time models (Heckman and Singer 1986). First, most economic models do not 
have a natural decision period in which agents make decisions and take actions. Hence, 
it is natural and analytically convenient to model the agent who makes decision and 
takes action in continuous time. Second, even though there is a natural time unit, there 
is no reason to presume that the discrete periods are synchronized across agents or that 
the natural time periods correspond to the typical form (like annual or quarterly) data 
are available for empirical analysis. Fortunately, continuous time models are invariant to 
the time unit used to record the available data, and are moreover often mathematically 
simpler. Empirically the actual data are collected for discrete time intervals (years). 
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Let r be the duration of a completed spell*^ of immigration, with c.d.f. F { t )  and p.d.f. 
f{t). Then, the hazard function for re-migration, or the limiting probability that a spell 
will be completed in a short time period h, is defined by 
I -  P r ( i  <  T  <  >  0  f i t )  f i t )  
where A(i), called the instantaneous re-migration probability or the hazard rate at time 
t. can be interpreted as the rate at which a spell will be completed at duration t, given 
that it lasts until time t. and Sit) = Pr(T > t) is the survivor function. The integrated 
hazard function is defined by 
\ i t )  =  [ ' X i v ) d v .  (3.8) 
Jo 
.Although A(f) does not have a conventional interpretation, it is a useful function in 
practice. Note that A(f) is also equed to —dlaSit)/dt; by differential equation, we have 
5(0=exp^—y A(v) = exp(—A(f)). (3.9) 
The hazard function provides a convenient definition of duration dependence. Posi­
tive (negative) duration dependence, d\it)/dt > 0 (< 0), means the probability that 
a spell will end shortly increases (decreases) when the spell increases in length. For 
example, decreasing hazard functions are commonly found in data on unemployment 
duration, but in some models of employment duration the shape of the hazard function 
rises to a peak before starting to fall (Lancaster 1990). Furthermore, if we know A(f) 
for all t, then we wiU know Sit) via equation (3.11); similarly, A(f) could be derived 
from Sit) because A(t) = —dlnSit)!dt. Thus, A(i), fit), and Sit) are alternative ways 
to describe the distribution function of a completed spell over the time axis, i.e., if we 
know one. we can deduce the other. 
spell is complete if the time when the spell began and ended can be observed from the data. 
When the beginning time is not observable, it is called left-censored. Similarly, when the ending time 
is not observable, it is called right-censored. 
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We are mainly interested in the effect of the regressors X on the hazard rate and the 
duration. Hence, the hazard function can be written as 
k  =  1 - F ( t . x . 0 )  
where 1 3  i s  a .  unknown coefficient vector. Then,the corresponding survivor function can 
be written as 
S(^..Y./3) = Pr( r  >  t \ X . ( 3 )  =  e x ^ ( ^ -  J \ ( v , X . / 3 ) d v ^  . (3.11) 
and the conditional density function for duration is given by 
f { t \  .Y . /3 )  =  A( i . .Y . /3 )5 ( i .X . /3 ) .  (.3.12) 
The next question is how the explanatory variables affect the distribution of the duration 
or the hazard rate. 
Covariates can affect the distribution of durations or the hazard rate in many ways. 
The sign of a coefficient of a covariate indicates the direction of the effect of the variable 
on the conditional probability of completing a speU. Nevertheless, the coefficients of 
explanatory variables, generally, do not have clear interpretations as a partial deriva­
tive (analogous the linear regression model) of the hazard rate. The interpretation of 
the coefficients depends on the specification. In two special cases, the coefficients can be 
given partial derivative interpretations. The proportional hazard model, which is pop­
ular and simple to interpret, specifies that the effect of covariates is as a multiplicative 
effect on the hazard function. On the other hand, the accelerated lifetime model, which 
has been less used in economics but is also easy to interpret, is characterized by the 
multiplicative effect of regressors on time rather on the hazard function. 
The hazard function in the proportional hazard model is specified by 
X { t .  X . / 3 ]  =  X o { t ) o { X . ( 3 )  (3.13) 
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where Ao(i) is a "baseline" hazard function corresponding to an agent for whom 
o(-Y, /3) = 1. In practice, we can measure the covariates such that o(X, /3) = 1 at the 
mean value of the covariates; then. Ao(t) can be interpreted as the hazard function for 
the mean individual in the sample. The baseline hazard is a function of time only and 
its functional form is determined by the distribution of the spell. The corresponding 
survivor function is given by 
5(f) = exp{-Ao(i)o(X./3)} (3.14) 
where Ao(f) = fg •^olv) dv is the integrated baseline hazard. 
A general specification of 0 ( X .  0 )  is 
o ( X ,  ( 3 )  =  e x p  ( — .  ( 3 . 1 5 )  
This specification does not impose restriction on /3 because ©(A",/3) is nonnegative, 
a n d  t h e n ,  e s t i m a t i o n  a n d  i n f e r e n c e  a r e  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .  M o t e  t h a t  g i v e n  o ( X ,  ( 3 )  =  
exp(—-Y'/3), Xo{t) must be nonnegative and Ao(0 has to diverge to obtain a proper 
distribution of the duration." This implies that each individual must eventually complete 
his/her speU. Hence, we assume that every immigrant will eventually re-migrate. The 
partial derivative of In A(i, X. /3) w.r.t. X is 
d l n X i t ,  X , ( 3 )  
dx 
= -(3 (3.16) 
so (3 can be interpreted as the (negative) constant proportioned effect of X on the hazard 
rate, or on the conditional probability of completing a spell. Furthermore, it exists as 
the linear model interpretation by changing variables £ = lnAo(0 - X'0 (Kiefer 1988); 
then, the model can be rewritten as: 
lnAo(0 = (3.17) 
^If F(-) is a proper distribution function, then Unit—oo F ( t )  =  1, or equivalently, limt—* 5(<) = 0. 
Hence, it requires Xo{t) = oc by equation (3.14). 
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where £ is the error term, with type 1 extreme value distribution.^ Note that the propor­
tional hazard model postulates no direct relationship between covariates and duration 
itself. 
The accelerated lifetime model is the class of log-linear model for T (Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice 1980, ch. 2). Suppose that InT and covaxiates X has a linear relationship by 
\nT = X'^-W (.3.18) 
where W is a random term with p.d.f. f\v{u^)- This specification assumes that the effect 
of the covariates is to accelerate (or decelerate) the time to complete a spell. Taking the 
exponential of equation (.3.18). we have T = exp (X'jSj Y where Y = exp(pr) > 0 has 
a hazard function Ao(i/) which is independent of A'. Then, the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of T can 
be written in terms of Y' as follows: 
f r i t .  X ,  ( 3 )  =  f r i t  e x p ( - X ' / 3 ) )  e x p ( - X ' ( 3 ) ,  and (3.19) 
FT(t,X./3) = Fritexvi-X'^)). (.3.20) 
Hence, the hazard function for T in the accelerated lifetime model can be written in 
terms of Ao(-) as follows: 
X , .  V  f T ( t , X . P )  f r i t  e x p i - X ' P ) )  ^  X ( t .  X . f 3 )  = = — ——— exp -A /3) 
1-Fr(i. A, / 3 )  I  -  Fr(i exp( -A/3 ) )  
= Ao(f exp(-A'/3)) exp(-A'y9). (3.21) 
The corresponding survivor function is 
/  j-tcxpi-x's) \  
S ( t ,  X .  /3) = exp (\ o ( v ) d v j  .  (3.22) 
With exp(—A'''/3) = o(A', /3), we have 
\ ( t , X . ( 3 )  =  Ao(io(-Y,/3))o(A,/3). and (3.23) 
/  r t o ( X . 3 )  \  
S ( t ,  X . / 3 )  =  exp(-y^ Ao(i')^^^'"j • (3.24) 
'The p.d.f. for • is g(£) = e.xp{i - exp(i)}, -oc < s < x. 
41 
Furthermore, the convenient interpretation of the coefficients can be given by 
5lni ^ 
-^=/3. (3.25) 
That is, /3 is the constant proportional effect of the covariates on the time of completing 
a spell. 
The exponential distribution is frequently used for duration data. Its corresponding 
hazard function and survivor function are 
\ { t )  = ol.  and (3.26) 
S ( t )  = exp(—af). (.3.27) 
We see that the hazard function is independent of time so that no duration dependence 
exists. In other words, the conditional probability of completing a spell in a time interval 
of specific length is the same regardless of how long the spell has been. This is referred 
to as the "memoryless"' property. Let a = exp(—X'^). Then, we obtain a proportional 
h a z a r d  m o d e l  b y  l e t t i n g  o ( X ,  j 3 )  =  a  =  e x . - p ( — X ' ( 3 )  a n d  A o ( i )  =  1 .  B e c a u s e  X o i t )  =  t .  
we have a linear model interpretation as: 
lnt = X'(3-z (3.28) 
Which is exactly the same as the linear model interpretation of the accelerated lifetime 
model. Hence, the exponential regression model is both the proportional hazard model 
and the accelerated lifetime model. The advantages of the exponential regression model 
are its simplicity to work with and its interpretation. Frequently, it is an adequate model 
for duration data when duration has little variation. The main disadvantage is that if 
the sample contains both very long and short durations, it is unlikely to be an adequate 
description of the data because the family of distributions obtained by varying the one 
parameter a is not very flexible. 
In the two-parameter Weibull distribution, a scale parameter a > 0 and a shape 
parameter p > 0 maintain simplicity but add some flexibility: this is widely used as 
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a model for duration data. For the Weibull distribution, the hazard function and the 
survivor function are: 
\ { t )  = and (.3.29) 
cr 
S [ t )  = exp|—(at)'l (3.30) 
where j = p- The partial derivative of \ ( t )  w.r.t. t  is 
d \ { t )  1 / 1  X  J .  
This result means that the hazard rate is constant, increasing, or decreasing over time 
as <T = 1, cr < 1, or (T > 1, respectively. 
The WeibuU-based model can be extended to a regression model by allowing a and 
cr to depend on covariates. If we let a depend on X, a = exp(—X'/3), and <r is a 
proportional factor, then the partial effect of X on lnA(f, X. (3) is 
=-(?)•  
Hence, (3 is the (negative) constajit proportional effect of X on the hazard rate. The 
only difference between equation (3.32) and equation (3.16) is that the partial derivative 
is re-scaled by the parameter a. In other words, the marginal effect of covariates on the 
hazard rate is smaller (bigger) when the hazard rate is decreasing (increasing) over time. 
It is obvious that the Weibull regression model is a proportional hazard model if we 
note that 
p(X,/3) = a' = [^exp -Y/3)j" , and (3.33) 
\ o { t )  = - t - - K  (3.34) 
cr 
Nevertheless, it is also an accelerated lifetime model because 
6 { X .  1 3 )  = Q = exp|—XySj, and (3.35) 
Ao(fo(-Y./3)) = -(fa)- ^ - (t exp \ (3.36) 
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Actually, the VVeibuli (exponential is a special case of VVeibull vnth <t = i) regression 
model is the only model belonging to both the accelerated lifetime model and the pro­
portional hazard model(Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980, ch. 2). We can also see this from 
the linear model interpretation. The corresponding linear model interpretation from the 
proportional hazard model is given by 
InAo(f) = -Ini = ~X'I5 -  -z. (3.37) 
cr a-
Equivcdently, 
\nt = X'0^(TE (3.38) 
which is exactly the same as the linear model interpretation from the accelerated lifetime 
model by letting vj = as. 
Once the family of duration distributions under consideration has been specified, 
say the VVeibull distribution, the parameters /3 and a that are of interest can be esti­
mated by maximum likelihood (ML) method. The ML estimators often have several 
desirable properties, like invariance, consistency, asymptotic normality, and asymptotic 
efficiency. If a sample of m independently completed speUs and the corresponding 
explanatory variables are available, the log-likelihood function is constructed as 
usual: 
m 
a) = Xi, (3, cr). (3.39) 
i=l 
In other words, the likelihood function is the joint distribution of the sample as a function 
of parameters (3 and cr. 
When a spell is right-censored at duration t,, the only information available is that 
the spell was at least ti. Therefore, the contribution to the likelihood function from 
this observation is the value of the survivor function 5(i,, A',-,/3, a), the probability 
that the duration is longer than t^ . Let 5,- = 1 if the ith spell is completed and 5,- = 0 
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other\vise. Then, the log-likelihood function for a sample of m independent spells 
with corresponding covariates is given by'' 
m m 
lnZ(/3,<7-) =  ^  S i l n f i t i ,  .Y,-,  (3, cr) -r ^(1 — ^Jln5(i,-, X,-, /3,  <t ).  (3.40) 
t=i t=i 
That is, completed spells contribute to the density term f { t , X . f 3 . c r )  and censored spells 
contribute to the probability S(t.X,l3.cr). Based on the fact that the density function is 
the product of the hazard function and the survivor function, the log-likelihood function 
can be rewritten as: 
m 
ln£(/3. (t) = ^  ;^,lnA(f,, A',, /3,  <t) -i-  ln5(if, .Y,, cr)\.  (3.41) 
1=1 
-' ' The ML estimator ir = ((3 . a) can be found by maximizing the equation (3.41). 
The necessary condition is 
(91n£(7r) ^ ^  / ^InA(t,-, .Y„ tt) ^ (9ln5(^, .Y,, tt)\ 
diT 7^1 \ dTT 
These equations are generally nonlinear in tt so iterative procedures will be used to find 
the maximum of the likelihood function. 
The Fisher information matrix is defined by 
(9^ In Z(7r) 
I(7r )  = -E 
dTrdir' 
(3.43) 
„ " I 
If certain regularity conditions are satisfied," the ML estimator tt = (/3 . <t) is consistent, 
asymptotically normal with mean tt and variance (I(7r))~^. and asymptotically efficient. 
•^There is another way to construct likelihood function via the log-linear regression model (Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice 1980, ch. 3.6). Let W = (InT — A" IS)/^. Then, the p.d.f. for InT can be written as 
<T~^ fiv{w). Hence, the log likelihood function is given by 
m 
lnI(/3. 0-) = ^  6,cr~^ lafvviw^) -i- (1 - 5.) lnSw(it^)l 
1 = 1 
where Sw{ti-') = /J° fw{i')dv. 
®Roughly speaking, TT is an interior point, L { i r )  is thrice difFerentiable, and certain boundedness 
conditions on the third derivatives are satisfied. 
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i>revertheless. if some spells are left-censored, the likelihood, function we have con­
structed can be applied only to the exponential distribution. It is not correct for Weibull 
distribution or any other distribution. The reason is that the distribution of duration 
before and after the beginning of the study period are different, except for the expo­
nential distribution (Heckmaji and Singer 1985). We can ignore the duration before the 
beginning of the study period when the distribution of completing a spell is exponential 
because of its "memoryless" property. If we solve the left-censored problem by assuming 
that the distribution of T is exponenticil. Heckman and Singer (1985) showed that the 
corresponding ML estimator is biased and inconsistent when this assumption is false. 
Some expedients will be discussed in the empirical specification. 
Heterogeneity and Mixture Models 
In the parametric methods discussed so far, we have assumed that the hazard func­
tion and the survival function are homogeneous across individuals, or that explanatory 
variables included in the model can completely control heterogeneity. Economic data, 
however, are seldom homogeneous. They generally consist of measured, and possibly 
unmeasured, systematic differences between economic agents. When we include explana­
tory variables in the econometric model, it is not only to find the value of interested 
parameters, but also to control for heterogeneity. If we do not control for heterogeneity, 
the results will generally base the estimates of the hazard function toward negative du­
ration dependence (Heckman and Singer 1985). Lancaster (1985) found that the effect 
of heterogeneity in the Weibull model causes the ML estimator a to be biased upward, 
i.e. to bias downward the estimated hazard function duration dependence, and the ML 
estimator /3 is biased toward zero. 
There are several arguments which lead us to consider models with heterogeneity, 
called mixture models (Lancaster 1990. ch. 4). First, we may record the duration, the 
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realization of a random variable T ,  with, error. Second, there may exist a measure­
ment error in covariates X. Third, if the covariates X fail to account fully for the true 
differences among people, omitted regressors will cause heterogeneity. 
The following mixture model was suggested by Lancaster (1979). Let's assume the 
effect of heterogeneity is represented by a positive random variable V. which is inde­
pendently distributed with X and T. multiplying the hazard function. Let's consider 
the Weibull version of the model with a = exp(—.Y'/3). Then, the conditional hazard 
function and the conditional survivor function, both depending on X and K are written 
as: 
\ ( t .  X .  /3, (T, t,') = V — l^exp /3)] ' ! and (3.44) 
S { t .  X ,  l 3 ,  a ,  v )  = exp t' exp( —A''/3)j " | . (.3.4.5) 
The three arguments discussed above can be verified by this modification (Lancaster L990, 
ch. 4). Consider the first case of error in recorded durations. Suppose that the true or 
correctly measured duration 5 differs from T by a random multiplicative measurement 
error Z which is distributed independently of 5, i.e., T = S y. Z. Then, we have the con­
ditional hazard function expressed in equation (3.44) when V = Z~. If error in recorded 
regressors occurs, then assume X = A'l -r Z where Xi is the true covariate vector and 
Z is the measurement error vector distributed independently of Xi. The corresponding 
conditional hazard function is the same as equation (3.44) when V = exp(Z'/3). Finally, 
let X' = A' -r X2 where A'* is the regressors accounting fully for the true differences 
among individuals, A' is included covariates, and X2 is omitted covariates. We will have 
the desired conditional hazard function by letting V = exp(—A'2/32). 
If V  is distributed as gamma with unit mean,® the mixture survivor function 5m(-), 
®The unit meaji is not necessary. If we do not have the unit mean instead of the finite mean, we 
can always assimilate the deviation from the unit mean into the rest of the hazard function (Lan­
caster 1990, ch. 4). 
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depending only on X ,  is given by 
S m { t ,  X ,  /3, a, 0) = J S { t ,  X ,  /3, cr, v) fv[v)dv 
= [i exp(-X'/3)j') ' (3.46) 
where 9  is the variance of V .  The mixture hazard function Am(-), depending only on X ,  
is derived by differentiating — lnS,„(-) w.r.t. t giving 
X,/3. cr. 0) = [exp(-.Y'y9)]' (.3.47) 
= X ,  1 3 ,  cr, e )'f X i t ,  X ,  /3, <7) (3.48) 
Another way to find the mixture hazard function is given by 
X .  0 ,  a ,  d )  =  y  A ( f ,  X ,  /3, a .  v )  f v { v  \  T  > t )  d v  
= A(i, X, (3, cr) J V  f v { v  \  T  >  t ) d v  
=  \ { t ,  X ,  /3, a )  ^ (3.49) 
1  —  9 [ t  exp( —-Y'/S)]' 
where 
f v ( v \ T > t )  X exp |-y -f-[i exp(-.Y'/3)]'^1 . (3.50) 
Hence, the mixture hazard function at t  can be interpreted as the mean of the cond.itional 
hazards at t, average with respect to the distribution of V over the survivor to that 
date (Lancaster L990, ch. 4). Furthermore, 9 can be interpreted to capture the sensitivity 
of the hazard function to heterogeneity. Note that 
lim A^(f, X, /3. (T, ^) = (^) [exp(-X'/3)]' = \ { t .  X. ( 3 .  a )  (3.51) 
which is the hazard function with homogeneity. Moreover, if 9  increases, then the 
deviation of mixture hazard function from the hazard function with homogeneity is 
greater. Therefore, the effect of heterogeneity is larger when 9 is further away from 
zero. We have already identified the mixture hazard function and the mixture survivor 
function, both depending only on X. from the mixture model. Hence, the Likelihood 
f u n c t i o n  c a n  b e  c o n s t r u c t e d  t o  f i n d  t h e  M L  e s t i m a t o r s  / 3 ,  a ,  a n d  9 .  
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Time Dependent Covariates 
An appropriate way to specify the hazard function ought to depend on what is mean­
ingful and interesting for the phenomenon under study. The hazard rate approach we 
discussed so far assumed that the covariates -Y are constant over speUs. This is true, for 
example, with sex and race, but it is not appropriate for age and the predicted rate of 
unemployment. .A.ctually, most economic covariates vary over time. The interpretation 
o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  / 3  f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  h a z a r d  m o d e l  w i t h  6 { X ( t ) ,  ( 3 )  =  e x p (  — X ( t ) ' / 3 )  
is that it measures the negative effect on the log hazard rate of a unit change in 
the value of covariates at time t. Similarly, f3 for the accelerated lifetime model with 
o(X{t), (3) = ex'p(—X{t)'(3) measures the effect on the log duration of a unit change 
in the value of covariates at time t. Nevertheless, if we include time dependent covari­
ates into the econometric model, it tciises computational problems. Consider a hazard 
function conditional on the time dependent covariates \(t, X(t). ^ ). The corre­
sponding survivor function is given by 
S ( t ,  -Y(0, /3) = exp A(i', fi) i v ^  
which does not have a closed-form expression, except the special time path of the co­
variates, and requires numerical integration to evaluate it. 
One of two expedients is often adopted to overcome this difficulty. 
1. Replace covariates X { t )  by X { t )  =  X ( v }  d v ,  the average o {  X ( t )  within a spell. 
2. Use the beginning of spell values A'(0) instead of X ( t } .  
The likelihood function for these two cases is the same as derived in equation (3.41), 
except X(t) or X'it) replaces X. However, the first treatment X(t) often results in 
undesirable effects of building spurious relationships between duration length and re-
gressors; for example, X{v) = c — dv implies X{t) = c^dt. causing a linear dependence 
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between X { t )  and t  (Heckman and Singer 1985). The second treatment X(0) ignores 
the time heterogeneity in the environment (Heckman and Singer 1985). 
We will approximate the hazard function by step-functions (Petersen 1986), i.e., the 
time dependent covariates are assumed to be constant within each period, but may 
change from one period to the next. Figure 3.1 plots the relationship between time de­
pendent covariates axid step functions. The solid line is the true values of an explanatory 
variable. The horizontal dash lines represent the step function used to approximate the 
time dependent explanatory variable. 
True Covariate 
Step Function 
o 
in 
o 
2 4 6 0 8 10 
Time 
Figure .3.1 The Relationship between Time-Dependent Covariates and Step 
Functions 
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The likelihood, function is formulated as foUow: let's partition the time interval O.fj 
into k non-overlapping periods, say 0 = to < h < • • • < tk. The covariates are assumed to 
stay constant within each period. Let A(f, Xj, /3) be the hazard function from time 
to tj. Then, the corresponding survivor function can be written as: 
S { t ,  Xfe, /3) = exp I - ^ ' A( X j ,  /3) (/y I . (3.52) 
Hence, the log-likelihood function for individual i  is 
In L i ( ( 3 )  = 6 i  In A(f. X ^ ,  0 )  I n  S i t .  X ^ ,  /3) 
r t  
= 5.lnA(^.Yfc,^)-V r A(i'..V„/3)rfr (.3.5.3) 
''h-i 
where Si = 1 if the ith spell is completed and 6i = 0 otherwise. We believe that this 
method is better because it contains more information and is closer to the theoretical 
econometric model. 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL 
SPECIFICATION 
Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States. However, migration between the 
island and the mainland resembles international migration in the sense of different cul­
tures and languages. It is different from international migration in that individuals born 
in Puerto Rico carry a U.S. passport. Puerto Ricans can legally move between Puerto 
Rico and the U.S. mainland, so migration flows can, in effect, be attributed entirely 
to differences in social and economic factors. Our work focuses on the re-migration 
behavior of Puerto Ricans from the U.S. mcdnland during the 1980s. 
Our empirical re-migration analysis wiU be based on a data set drawn from the 1990 
5-percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. mainland. We restrict our sample to the male Puerto Rico-born householder of age 
18 to 64 who resided on the U.S. mainland or resided on Puerto Rico but re-migrated 
from the U.S. mainland during the 1980s. 
The empirical specification for the hazard rate model will be discussed. Also, the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) allowed approximately 2.7 miUion 
persons to legally work in the U.S. The new workers legalized under IRCA were largely 
Spanish speaking (about 74-percent from Mexico). Hence, IRCA might have impacted 
Puerto Ricans residing on the U.S. mainland, for instance, increasing the competition 
in the mainland labor market. One possibility is that IRCA changed the wage structure 
for Hispanics on the U.S. mainland. To pursue this issue, data drawn from the 1980 and 
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1990 1-percent samples of the PUMS for the U.S. wiU be used. 
Puerto Rico 
Puerto Rico is a small island of 3,435 square miles, roughly 55 percent of the island's 
surface lies between sea level and altitudes up to 500 feet. San Juan is its capitol city. 
The island was a Spanish colony for 405 years, from 1493 to 1898. The Spanish-American 
War brought Puerto Elico to the U.S. in 1898. Furthermore, Puerto Rico was the first 
Latin American property obtained by the U.S. since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (in 
which the United States declared no more European intervention was to occur in Latin 
America). 
From 1898 to 1917, Puerto Rico changed from a Spanish to an American colony. 
The people of Puerto Rico wanted U.S. citizenship, self-government through statehood 
or territorial status, and free trade. Puerto Rico was shut out of the L^^.S. market by 
U.S. protective tariffs (Perusse 1990, p. 15). The 1917 Jones Act gave Puerto Ricans 
L'.S. citizenship and more local self-government, but they cannot vote in L^.S. elections, 
including the presidential election, unless they have legal residence on the mainland. 
The people of Puerto Rico could not elect their own governor until the 1947 Crawford-
Butler Act. The 1950 Public Law 600 enabled the people of Puerto Ricans to form 
their own government under their own constitution. In 1952, Puerto Rico was granted 
a new type of government and renamed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, equivalent 
to the Associated State formula granted former British colonies (Baver 1993. p. 1). The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico increased the degree of local self-
government in Puerto Rico, but fundamental political and economic relationship with 
the L^.S. remained unchanged (Perusse 1990, p. 35). Moreover, Puerto Ricans are exempt 
from federal taxes and most revenue derived from L'.S. customs and excise taxes. 
During much of the twentieth century, a major issue to the island has been the 
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nature of the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico. The choices are: full 
integration into the U.S. as a state, a continuation of the present relationship, or complete 
political independence (Morris 1995, p. 7). Even through more than half of the Puerto 
Rican politicians have used the words "nation" or "nationality" rather than "state" in 
describing Puerto Rico, most Puerto Ricans ajre not seeking independence; for instance, 
no candidate who advocates independence has acquired more than 12.5 percent of the 
vote in the last thirty years and the independence option obtained just 4.4 percent of 
the vote in a 1994 ballot on the island's future (Morris 1995, p. 15). 
Economic Performance 
The island has a large share of fertile land. In pre-colonial day, the Indians of Puerto 
Rico raised corn, yucca, sweet potatoes, yams, peanuts, pineapple, guava. tamarind, 
papaya, and other exotic products. The key crops now are sugar, coffee, tobacco, and 
fruit. The island's natursd beauty attracts majiy tourists, especially since U.S. restric­
tions were imposed in 1962 on travel to Cuba. Tourist facilities are centered in and 
about San Juan, the capitol. In the late 1960s, the income of tourism was more than 
200 miUion dollars, even exceeding that of agricxilture (Hauberg 1974, p. 6). 
Puerto Rican industrialization started in 1947. Under the island's industrialization 
strategy called Operation Bootstrap, the public sector factories were sold to private in­
vestors and tax exemption was provided to attract private investment. In the Puerto 
Rican post-war industrialization process, it is possible to identify three stages (Santi­
ago 1992). 
The first stage, 1947 to the late 1950s, is labeled the phase of "resource extractive 
surplus labor", and is characterized by extracting the redundant agricultural labor pool 
from rural areas. Light manufacturing activities grew rapidly because of low wage labor, 
and emigration to the U.S. mainland reduced population pressure (Santiago 1992). 
The second stage, roughly the 1960s, is labeled the phase of "resource expansive 
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capital growth."', and is characterized by increasing the output of capital-intensive fac­
tories. The island's government tried to reduce the cyclical sensitivity of the island 
economy to changing conditions on the mainland. Emigration to the U.S. continued, 
but at a far less rapid rate than during the 1950s. The labor force is characterized by 
increasing education attainment, augmented skill, increasing productivity, and raising 
real wages (Santiago 1992). GNP increased from S755 million in L950 to S.3.7 billion in 
1968 with a growth rate of 9..3 percent per year. Per capita income was S279 in 1950 
and grew to §1,129 in 1968. 
The third stage, starting in the early 1970s and continuing to the present, is labeled 
the phase of "marginalized labor sluggish growth"'. Puerto Elico suffered during the 
recession of the mid-1970s, due to oil shocks and experienced a negative growth rate 
roughly of —2.4 percent in 1974 and 1975. .A. major factor was a reduction in private 
investment. The unemployment rate rose from 12.3 percent in 1974 to 20 percent in 
1976. partly due to the return of Puerto Ricans affected by the recession on the mainland 
after fiscal 1972. The 1978 Incentive Act was designed to encourage specific types of 
capital-incentive and knowledge-incentive firms to reinvest in the island economy. As a 
consequence, the output of labor-intensive factories fell from 63 percent in 1970 to 31 
percent in 1980, while the capital-incentive output rose from 35 to 67 percent. 
Puerto Rico experienced another economic downturn during the 1981-1983 period, 
even more severe than that of the mid-1970s: the unemployment rate reached 23 percent, 
the labor force participation rate dropped to 41 percent, and approximately 142.000 peo­
ple migrated from the island to the mainland between 1983 and 1984. The reasons seem 
to have been the mairdand recession associated with President Reagan's New Federalism 
and significant cuts in federal funds to the island (Baver 1993. p. 39). The economy be­
gan an upturn with a 5.5 percent growth rate in 1987. primarily due to economic revival 
on the mainland. Other factors were the 30 percent decline in oil prices, a dramatic 
reduction in interest rate, and the 1987 act that maintained tax e.xemptions at a 90 
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percent maximum rate for the entire exemption period, reduced the tollgate tax. and 
the smedl fee paid on corporate profit repatriated to the State. Nevertheless, a high 
unemployment rate, low labor force participation, and declines in real investment still 
caused fundamental problems for Puerto Rico. 
Migration 
For the past four decades, migration has been a critical ingredient in Puerto Rican 
economic development and it has had some impacts on the mainland. Santiago (1992) 
points out that migration to the U.S. mainland provides a "safety valve" to island 
population pressures including surplus agricultural labor. Castillo-Freeman and Free­
man (1992) indicate that migration has been a key factor in the long-run growth of 
real earnings in Puerto Rico because it increased the average qucdity of workers and 
reduced the labor supply in Puerto Rico. The annual average of outflow was 45.800 in 
the 1950s, 27,300 in the 1960s, and 24,300 in the 1970s: moreover, one-third of native 
Puerto Ricans, aged 20-64, resided on the mainland in the 1980 (Ramos 1992). 
There are several reasons why there exists a large immigrant flow to the U.S. main­
land. First, the birth rate is high. In 1980, the total population of the island was 3.1 
million and 2 million Puerto Rican persons resided on the U.S. mairdand. The pop­
ulation density was over 900 people per square mile on the island which poses severe 
socioeconomic pressure on the island's resources. Thus, overcrowding in Puerto Rico is 
one push factor behind migration to the U.S. mairdand. 
Second, the Puerto Rican government has promotions to ease the problem of over­
population. The Migration Division of the Commonwealth Labor Department estab­
lished nine offices in eastern and mid-western .A.merican cities. They provide services 
such as negotiating contract which guarantee a fixed minimum wage, decent working 
conditions, and round-trip air fare to the mainland (Hauberg 1974. p. 103). 
Third, there is no legal restriction on migration because of .American citizenship. This 
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is in contrast to the more stringent immigration quotas and qualifications on immigrants 
of other neighboring countries, like Mexico and those in Latin America. 
Fourth, the minimum wage policy has been unsteady. Empirical study (Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman 1992) found that imposing the U.S.-level minimum wage on 
Puerto Rico altered the earning distribution by creating marked spikes in the distribution 
of earning in the area of the minimum wage, and that most migrants from Puerto Rico to 
the mainland have been disemployed. Their regression results, based on time series data 
for the period 19-51-1987, show: (1) the minimum wage has had a significantly negative 
effect on the employment-population rate, and the short-run elasticities of employment 
to the minimum wage range from —0.15 (standard error 0.07) to —0.1 (0.05). suggesting 
that the U.S.-level minimum wage resulted in massive job losses: (2) the unemployment 
effects of the minimum wage are positive, but not significant with range from 0.21 (0.14) 
to 0.27 (0.2), because some workers may leave the island after displacement caused by 
the minimum wage. 
The final strong pull factor is the familial tie. The family in Puerto Rico often 
sends the first member to discover opportunities. He/she lives with friends, learns the 
conditions of the country, and saves some money. Later other family members follow. 
These networks undoubtly help explain the high population of Puerto Ricans living in 
the N'ew York area. 
Return migration is also an important phenomenon in Puerto Rico. Re-migration 
generally takes place during periods of high unemployment on the L'.S. mainland, for 
instance, in the late 1980s, and general economic recession, for example, in the mid-
1970s. 
Table 4.1 shows Puerto Rican population figures in Puerto Rico and on the mainland 
in 1980 and 1990. There were 2.7 (2) million Puerto Ricans residing on the mainland 
in 1990 (1980), 41.6 (46.2) percent born in Puerto Rico and 55 (50.4) percent born on 
the meiinland. The total population in Puerto Rico in 1990 (1980) was 3.5 (3.1) million 
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Table 4.1 Puerto Rican Population Living in Puerto Rico and in the U.S. 
in 1980 and 1990 
Total Born in Born in 
Population Puerto Rico The U.S. Other 
Puerto Ricans 
Living in the L'.S. in 1980" 2,014,000 930.600 1.014,500 68.900 
Percentage" 100.0 46.2 50.4 3.4 
Population of Puerto Rico in 1980" .3.196,520 2.881.641 199,524 70.768 
Percentage" 100.0 93.3 5.7 1.0 
Persons 5 years old and over 
residing in the L'^.S. mainland 
more than 6 consecutive 
months during the 1970s .395,708 283,223 112.485 
% of total population 
of Puerto Rico in 1980 12.4 9.8 3.4 
Puerto Ricans 
Living in the U.S. in 1990^ 2,727.754 1,134.746 1,500,265 92.743 
Percentage'' 100.0 41.6 55.0 3.4 
Population of Puerto Rico in 1990 3,522,037 3.200,940 229,304 91.793 
Percentage 100.0 90.9 6.5 2.6 
Persons 5 yeaxs old and over 
residing in the U.S. mainland 
more than 6 consecutive 
months during the 1980s 398,143 292.516 105.62 7 
% of total population 
of Puerto Rico in 1990 11.3 9.1 3.0 
Sources: Census of Population and Housing, 1980 and 1990. 
"Adopted from Table 2.1 of Ramos (1992). 
''Estimate from 1990 l-percent sample of PUMS for the U.S. 
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persons, of whom 3.2 (2.9) million were born in Puerto Rico. Moreover, .398 (396) 
thousand persons, who are 5 years old and over, have ever resided in the U.S. mainland 
6 or more consecutive months during the 1980s (1970s), of whom 293 (283) thousand 
were natives of Puerto Rico. In other words, about 11.3 (12.4) percent of the population, 
or about 9.1 (9.8) percent of natives of Puerto Rico in 1990 (1980) have lived on the 
U.S. mainland for 6 or more consecutive months during 1980s (1970s). 
What is the pattern of re-migration for Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rico? Table 4.2 
and Figure 4.1 show statistics for Puerto Ricans, who are 5 years old and over, born 
in Puerto Rico, re-migrating to Puerto Elico from the U.S. mainland during 1970s and 
1980s. The re-migration flows were relatively stable during the 1970s with a range 
between 21.802 and 29,928 persons per year. Nevertheless, the range of re-migration 
flows in the 1980s grew to between 18,946 and 52,671 after 1986. This is indicated by 
the vertical dotted line in Figure 4.1. The flows increased to above 35,000 individuals 
per year and reached 52,671 in 1989. Part of the reason for the increased re-migration 
flows after 1986 might be the large Hispanic immigration flow (legal and illegal) and the 
impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 
Census of Population and Housing 
The U.S. census of population begcin in 1790. and it has been performed every 10 
years in the years ending in "0", as required by the Constitution, adopted in 1787, 
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective number...". Since the 
purpose of the 1790 census was to enumerate population, the first census was very simple 
and only asked the name of the head of the household and the number of persons in 
each household with some description. Because the Nation's needs and interests shifted 
through years, the questions included in censuses have greatly increased both in number 
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Table 4.2 Puerto Rico-Born. 5 Years Old and Over, Re-Migrated to Puerto 
Rico from the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s 
Year 
Number 
of Years Male Female Total 
1970-1972 3 .34.404 31.000 65.404 
1973-1974 2 24.496 22.565 47.061 
1975 1 14.652 13,747 28.399 
1976-1977 2 27.460 26.619 54.079 
1978 1 15.176 14.752 29,928 
1979-1980'' 2 28.318 24.675 52,993 
1980-1982" 3 26,831 25,535 52.366 
1983 1 9.598 9,348 18,946 
1984 1 11.796 10,835 22,631 
1985 1 15.718 14.738 30.456 
1986 1 14.258 13.043 27.301 
1987 1 17.864 17.773 .35.637 
1988 1 18.989 17.969 36,958 
1989 1 27,858 24.813 52,671 
Source; Census of Population ajid Housing, 1980 and 1990. 
"Note that 1980 appears twice in this table. 
- Male 
Female 
-- Total 
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Figure 4.1 Puerto Ricans, 5 Years Old and Over Born in Puerto Rico, 
Re-Migrated from tiie U.S. Mainland during the 1970s and 1980s 
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and type. A full-fledeged housing census was first taJcen in the 1940 census. 
The first nine censuses were conducted by marshals of the U.S. judicial districts. 
Then, marshals and their assistants were replaced by specially appointed agents to collect 
technical data, supervisors, and enumerators in 1880. The census organization was 
temporary from the 1840 through the 1900 censuses; a temporary office was established 
before each decennial census and disbanded after the work was finished. A permanent 
Bureau of the Census was established in 1902 in the Department of the Interior and later, 
moved to the new Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903. When the Department 
of Labor was split off in 1913. the Bureau of the Census continued in the Department of 
Commerce. Since then, the census of population has been supervised by the Bureau of 
the Census. The legal provision of the Census of Population and Housing was made in 
the .Act of Congress of .August 31, 1954 (Title 13. U^.S. Code). The individucd is required 
to answer the census questions and no one can see the information which may identify 
an individual under any circumstances except Census Bureau employees for 72 years. 
The data of the Census of Population and Housing come from two primary ver­
sions of questionnaires, a short-form questionnaire and a long-form questionnaire. The 
short-form questionnaire, consisting of a limited number of basic population and housing 
questions, was asked of all persons and housing units, often referred to as the 100-percent 
questions. The long-form questionnaire, containing both the 100-percent questions and 
a number of additional questions, was asked of a sample of housing units; a sampling 
procedure was use to choose which housing units received the long-form questionnaire. 
Since the 1970 census, the Bureau of the Census not only published population and hous­
ing census data in several series of reports, either on paper and/or computer summary 
tapes (CD-ROM in 1990), but also issued 5-percent and 1-percent Public L'se Microdata 
Samples (PUMS) on computer tapes (CD-ROM in 1990), which consist of records for a 
sample of long-form housing units, with information on the characteristics of each unit 
and each person in it. 
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PUMS 
The PUMS provides a wide variety of information at the household and the individ­
ual level. The sample is stored in a hierarchical file structure in which household and 
individual information make up each household unit record. Most importantly, the U.S. 
sample consists of information about when the individual came to the U.S. mainland; 
the Puerto Rico sample contains information about the individual's residence on the 
U.S. mainland (for more than 6 consecutive months during 1980s), and if the individ­
ual has done so, then it gives how long he/she had stayed and which activity he/she 
performed. With the duration and activity information on an individual residing on 
the U.S. mainland and the information about personal characteristics, we can fit the 
empirical hazard rate models. 
The data we utilize in the empirical re-migration analysis are drawn from the 1990 
5-percent samples of the PUMS for Puerto Rico and the United States. We restrict 
our sample to Puerto Rican male householders, 18 to 64 years of age in 1990. born in 
Puerto Rico, residing on the U.S. mainland or residing in Puerto Rico, but who had re-
migrated from the U.S. mainland at age 18 to 64 during the 1980s. We further excluded 
those people in the armed forces, self-employed, and enrolled in school. Each record wiU 
include personal characteristics (age, education, etc.), local market conditions, how long 
the individual has lived on the U.S. mainland, and when he re-migrated to Puerto Rico 
etc. 
The sample for this study consists of 12,108 observations, 2.544 from the Puerto Rico 
sample and 9,564 from the U.S. sample. If we could know the starting time point of the 
spell for each individual, we would have 2,544 completed spells and 9,564 right-censored 
spells. Then, the likelihood function introduced in the previous chapter can be used to 
locate the ML estimators of the parameters. Unfortunately, some individuals do not 
record when a migration spell began. Our sample contains 1,896 left-censored obser-
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of Completed and Censored Observations from the 
Sample of Size 12,108 Records 
vations. Figure 4.2 shows that there are 1,682 completed spells and 862 left-censored 
spells (from the Puerto Rico sample) and 8,530 right-censored spells and 1,034 both left-
and right-censored spells (from the U.S. sample) in our data set. 
However, we are only interested in the working speUs of individuals, so we exclude any 
period in school. We assume further that the individual can perform a full time job only 
if he is older than age 18 and has completed his education. More precisely, the duration 
of the spell is defined to be nain{r*, (ENDAGE — 6 — ED), (END.-\.GE — 18)} where 
T' is the duration recorded in the sample. ED is the years of formal schooling completed, 
and ENDAGE is the age in 1990 for the U.S. sample and the age when the last migration 
spell was complete for the Puerto Rico sample. After adjustments, we still have 1.183 
left-censored individuals, 808 from the Puerto Rico sample and 375 from the U.S. sample. 
Figure 4.3 contains more detciiled information; the sample consists of 1.736 completed 
64 
i ' r~ 9,189 (75.89%) ^^ 
I I ^ • 
I i ! 
i i ! 
i ! ! 
; ' ; 1,736 (14.34%) ^ I 
I I i 
• ? ^ 808 ( 6.67%) ' 
I i 
i ; 
i ? ^ 375 ( 3.10%) 1 ? 
1980 ^ 1990 
Year 
Figure 4.3 Distribution of Completed and Censored Observations from the 
Sample of Size 12,108 Records after Adjustment 
spells and 808 left-censored spells (both from the Puerto Rico sample), and 9,189 right-
censored spells and 375 both left- and right-censored spells (both from the U.S. sample). 
Empirical Specification for Hazcird Function 
The main endogenous variable is the duration of the working spell on the U.S. main­
land. The theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2 indicates that the wage rate is one 
of the key factors expected to influence a immigrant's re-migration behavior. Since the 
wage rates are not truly exogenous variables, the predicted wage rates will be considered 
instead of the actual wage rates. However, some Puerto Ricans have lived in the U.S. 
mainland more than forty years. It is clear that the coefficients of the wage equations 
in both the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico are not constant during this period. We 
do not have enough information to estimate them. Hence, the predicted wage rates are 
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replaced by a set of variables which are used to forecast the wage rates. By applying 
this methodology, we can solve several problems. There is, however, no free lunch and 
the price we pay is that we can not get the direct impact of the wage rate on the hazard 
rate for re-migration. 
The reduced-form hazard function for individual i with spell is specified as a 
function of personal and local characteristics. Denote these explanatory variables as 
Xi{ti). Therefore, the hazard function and the survival function for the WeibuU model 
with homogeneity, for instance, are: 
where a is the time dependence parameter and the hazard rate is constant, increasing, 
or decreasing over time as <t = 1, < 1. or <7 > 1, respectively. 
Education represents the general human capital that not only affects the individual's 
earning, but also influences the likelihood of migration. Empirical studies have shown 
that people who have more education have higher wage rates on average. Education 
impacts the hazard rate through wage effects in both the U.S. mainland and Puerto 
Rico. The non-wage effects of education are due to acquiring and processing informa­
tion (Huffman 1985). Age is used to capture individual and family life-cycle effects and 
the amount of potential experience. Investment in human capital often continues for 
much of an individual's work life so it is suitable to distinguish separately the wage ef­
fects of education and experience. On the other hand, given that life is finite, when the 
individual's age increases the time period remciining to capture returns from migration 
shrinks. Hence, age can affect the likelihood of migration directly and indirectly. We 
further allow for the non-linear effect of age by adding the square term. 
Other personal characteristics expected to be of significance include an individual's 
English proficiency and disability status. English proficiency is a form of human cap­
and (4.1) 
(4.2) 
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ital and poor English proficiency is a disadvantage for working on the U.S. mainland. 
Disability status is expected to affect the size of earning differences associated with 
migration variables. Individuals with disability are less likely to migrate. VVe do not 
include family status in the model because it is not clearly exogenous to the decision to 
migrate (Sandefur and Tuma 1987). 
Labor market conditions on the mainland and Puerto Rico may affect migration 
decision. We focus on the employment growth rate and the unemployment rate. Pre­
vious studies (Tokle and Huffman 1991, and Topel 1986) suggest that economic agents 
respond to expected values of local variables rather than actual values. The predicted 
employment growth rate (unemployment rate) measures the anticipated equilibrium em­
ployment growth rate (unemployment rate). We model the annual employment growth 
rate and the annual unemployment rate for both the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico 
as stationary autoregressive (.-VR) processes. In other words, the stochastic process {yt} 
with constant mean /i, say the U.S. annual unemployment rate, is generated by 
{yt - ^^) = Oiiyt-i - /i) - 02(yt-2 - ii) - OpiVt-p - fi) ^ Ut (4..3) 
where Uj is white noise with zero mean and finite variance cr^, and the roots of 
1 — Oi- — Oor' - ... — OpZ^ = 0 are outside the unit circle. Then, the predicted values are 
constructed by the one-step-ahead predicted values. The corresponding coefficients are 
estimated by the maximum likelihood method, bcised on the annued data for 1945-93 in 
the U.S. mainland and for 1950-93 in Puerto Rico.^ Furthermore, the order of these AR 
processes is chosen by minimizing the .A.kaike information criterion (AIC). 
Table 4.3 shows the summary of AR models for these four series. The job growth 
rate for the U.S. mainland and the unemployment rate for Puerto Rico are represented 
by .AR of order 2, while the other two series are generated by .A.R of order 1. Xote that 
we implicitly assume that the processes of the annual employment growth rates and 
^The data in Puerto Rico are not available fro 1941-49. 
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Table 4.3 Summary of AR Models for the Annual Employment Growth 
Rates and the Annual Unemployment Rates for the U.S. Main­
land and Puerto Rico 
Mean Order Oi 02 
Job growth rates 
for the U.S. mainland" 1.697.5 2 0.2280 -0.2604 
Unemployment rates 
for the U.S. mainland" 5.58.37 1 0.9783 — 
Job growth rates 
for Puerto Elico^ 1.6238 1 0.1081 — 
Unemployment rates 
for Puerto Rico^ 15.2128 2 1.2726 -0.2792 
"Contain the annual data for 1945-1993. 
''Contain the annual data for 1950-1993-
the annual unemployment rates in both the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico are weakly 
stationary and time invariant. 
As we mentioned before, the minimum wage policy has a strong impact in Puerto 
Rico. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) indicated that imposing the minimum wage 
on Puerto Rico created marked spikes in the distribution of earnings in the area of the 
minimum wage, and most migrants from Puerto Rico to the mairdand have been disem-
ployed. Hence, we include the real minimum wage in Puerto Rico into our model. Fur­
thermore, the minimum wage policy is one of the reasons for higher unemployment rates 
in Puerto Rico (Ramos 1992, and Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 1992). Reynolds and 
Gregory (1965) and Castillo-freeman and Freeman (1992) also found that the minimum 
wage resulted in substantial employment loss. Therefore, we also add the interaction 
between the predicted unemployment for Puerto Rico and the real minimum wage in 
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Puerto Rico into the model. 
Some explanatory variables vary over a migration spell. One approach to accommo­
date this factor is to approximate the hazard function by step-functions, i.e., the time 
dependent covariates are assumed to be constant within each year, but may change from 
one year to the next. 
The empirical hazard function A(-) is formed by specified Xi(ti)'/3 as follow: 
X , { t i ) P  =  J o  -  3 i  A G E i i t i )  ~  A G E S Q i i t i )  ^  3 ^  E D i  ^  3 ^  E N G i  -  i s  D I S A B i  
- r  i e  P J R U S i i t i )  ^  3t P U R C r S i i t i )  ^  3 s  P J R P R i ( t , ]  -  3 s  P C R P R d U )  
~  J i o  P R M I N i i U )  -  3 n  P R M I N U R i ( t i ) .  ( 4 . 4 )  
This specification implicitly assumes that ED, ENG. and DISAB are constant over the 
migration spells. The definition and sample mean of the variables in equation (4.4) are 
presented in Table 4.4. Sample means are derived from two groups, re-migrated during 
1980s and remained in the U.S. mainland at the end of the study period (1990). The 
re-migrating sample consists of completed and left-censored spells, while the remaining 
group contains right- and both right- and left-censored speUs. Note that sample mean for 
variables of the re-migrating group is based on the year when the individual re-migrated, 
but the mean for variables of the remaining group is calcidated from the value in 1990. 
Economic theories and previous studies provide some indication of expected signs of 
the parameters. We expected age to have a negative effect on the the hazard rate to 
re-migrate, since time periods over which to capture the discounted returns from migra­
tion shrink as individuals age and this negative effect with age decreases. Hence, the 
expected sign of 3\ and 3^ is positive and negative respectively. Education represents a 
prior investment which affects economic returns. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) 
demonstrated that for Puerto Rico-born men, the economic return of weekly earnings on 
schooling in Puerto Rico is higher than that in the U.S. mainland in 1970 and 1980: more­
over, the gap was increasing from 1970 to 1980. On the other hand, people with higher 
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Table 4.4 Variable Definitions and Sample Means for the Hazard Function 
Variable Description 
Sample Mean 
Remaining Re-migrated 
T Duration of the spell 
AGE Age. in years. 
AGESQ Square of .AGE divided by 100. 
ED Highest grade of school completed. 
ENG 1 if respondent reported speaking 
English well or very well; 
0 otherwise. 
DISAB 1 if reported a health condition 
that limited the kind of work 
or amount of work he would do; 
0 otherwise. 
PJRUS Predicted job growth rates 
for the U.S. mainland. 
PURUS Predicted unemployment rates 
for the U.S. mainland. 
PJRPR Predicted job growth rates 
for Puerto Rico. 
PURPR Predicted unemployment rates 
for Puerto Rico. 
PRMIN Real minimum wages on Puerto Rico 
in 1990 doUars 
PRMINUR Interaction of PURPR and PRMIN 
20.28 
4.3.29 
19.95 
10.4.3 
0.82 
0.14 
1.64 
5.31 
1.53 
14.49 
3.80 
55.07 
5.12 
.38.56 
16.41 
9.44 
0.49 
0.18 
1.59 
7.08 
1.78 
18.35 
4.11 
( 0 . (  I  
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education are likely to migrate because of the efficiency in acquiring and processing in­
formation. Both wage and non-wage effects suggest that education has a positive effect 
on the conditional probability to re-migrate. Furthermore, the study by Ramos (1992) 
found that Puerto Ricans who return to Puerto Rico tend to be more skilled than those 
who remain on the U.S. mainland and supports a negative J3. Because less English pro­
ficiency is a disadvantage for work on the U.S. mainland, individuals with good English 
ability will reduce the hazard rate to re-migrate. Hence, we expect a positive J4. Indi-
viducils having disability status are less likely to migrate, so the expected sign of J5 is 
positive. 
A higher net predicted job growth rate and/or lower net predicted unemployment 
rate for the U.S. mainland means the U.S. mainland is a more attractive labor market. 
Therefore, we will expect a positive dg and a negative J7. Similarly, a higher net predicted 
job growth rate and/or lower net predicted unemployment rate for Puerto Rico should 
raise the conditional probability to re-migrate. Hence, We expect a positive effect of the 
predicted unemployment rate for Puerto Rico on the working spells of Puerto Rico-born 
men on the U.S. mainland, while a negative effect of the predicted unemployment rate 
for the U.S. mainland on the duration. 
Time Dependent Hazard Model 
The time dependent hazard model requires that all spells be either completed or 
right-censored to construct the true likelihood function. Unfortunately, our data drawn 
from the PUMS for Puerto Rico and for the U.S. do not provide enough information to 
complete spells for some individuals. There exist 2.111 left-censored spells in our data 
set. If the duration of completed spells is exponentially distributed, i.e.. we have a con­
stant hazard rate or time-independent hazard model; we can treat the left-censored (or 
both right- and left-censored) spells to completed (or right-censored) spells by ignoring 
the period from the starting of the spells to when we begin to observe them. This is de­
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rived from the "'memoryless" property of exponential distribution. We would have 2.544 
completed spells and 9.564 right-censored speUs; the estimation of the hazard function 
based on the covariate expressed in equation (4.4) will be straightforward. Neverthe­
l e s s ,  i f  w e  s o l v e  t h e  l e f t - c e n s o r e d  p r o b l e m  b y  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e t e d  d u r a t i o n  T  
is a family of exponential distribution, Heckman and Singer (1985) demonstrate that 
the corresponding ML estimators are biased and inconsistent when this assumption is 
false. There is no standard approach to deal with left-censored problem. Therefore, two 
expedients to overcome the left-censored problem wiU be considered in this study. 
For the first expedient, we assume that those persons having left-censored speUs 
began their work life on the U.S. mainland. In other words, individuals having left-
censored spells either never worked outside the U.S. mairdand if they were in the U.S. 
in 1990 or only worked on the U.S. mainland before re-migrating. Furthermore, the 
individual is assumed to be able to perform a fuU time job only if he is over 18 years 
of age and has completed his education. Hence, if the individual having a left-censored 
speU has completed more than 12 years of education, his working spell started in the 
year when he completed his education. Other\vise. it started in the year when he was 18 
years of age for the others having left-censored spells. The advantage of this treatment 
is its simplicity. The drawback is that we might overstate some people's duration of 
working spells on the U.S. mainland. 
The second expedient is to predict the starting year of the left-censored spells, based 
on all completed or right-censored speUs. Because there exists a non-random selection, 
Heckman's procedure (Heckman 1979) will be used to correct for possible selection bias. 
However, if we try to predict the length of spells directly, i.e., treat spells or natural 
logarithm of spells to be the dependent variable, two potential problems arise. First. 
Heckman's procedure requires the duration (or natural logarithm of duration) of spells to 
be distributed normally, but we already assumed that completed duration T is a family 
of two-parameter Weibull distribution in the time dependent hazard model. Hence, 
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some conflicts occur because we have inconsistent assumptions about the distribution 
of completed duration. Secondly, the natural logarithm of completed duration is the 
dependent variable in the time dependent hazard model. If we predict the length of 
duration based on a set of exogenous variables and use this predicted length of duration 
as the dependent variable for left-censored observations, ML estimates for hazard rate 
models using some of the same exogenous variables included in predicting the length 
of duration might overestimate the contribution of exogenous variables used in the first 
stage predictions. Alternatively, we try to predict the individual's age when he began 
working on the U.S. mainland, based on a set of exogenous variables. This variable can 
uniquely identify the starting year of spells for all individuals: more importantly, it does 
not have the above two problems. 
We have 808 left-censored spells in the Puerto Rico sample and .375 both right- and 
left-censored spells in the U.S. sample. Hence, there are 1,28.5 spells of unknown length 
out of a total of 12,108 spells to be predicted. Since our data come from two different 
population, we will predict the unknown spells sepajately. For the Puerto Rico sample, 
there are 808 out of 2,544 left-censored spells which need a prediction of starting-age 
of spells; hence, a 68.24-percent sample will be used to fit the predicting equation. We 
first fit a binary probit model, based on a normality assumption, to explain why Puerto 
Rico-born males worked on the U.S. mainland more than 10 years" with dependent 
variable equal to 1 if people had worked on the U.S. mainland more than 10 years, and 
0 otherwise. Explanatory variables contain relevant personal characteristics and local 
characteristics. The detail variable definition used in the probit model and the fitted 
equation are reported in Appendix B. 
Our purpose is to fit a multiple regression model in order to predict an individual's 
age when he began working on the U.S. mainland, based on a set of explanatory variables. 
^Left-censored spells in the Puerto Rican sample are those people who worked in the U.S. mainland 
more than 10 years. 
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However, the sample we can use to estimate the corresponding parameters only consists 
of completed spells. It seems likely that non-random selection bias exists. Based on 
Heckman's procedure, we can construct the non-random selection bias correction, known 
as the inverse of jVIiU's ratio, from the above fitted probit model. In other words, by using 
the sample of completed spells, we regress the natural logarithm of individuals' starting-
age of spells on a set of explanatory variables including the inverse Mill's ratio to generate 
consistent estimates of this equation's parameters. The detailed variable definitions and 
the fitted equation can be found in Appendix B. Then, we predict the starting-age 
of spells for those persons with left-censored speUs. based on the multiple regression 
model (excluding the inverse of Mill's ratio) fitted from the sample of completed spells. 
Finally, the length of migration spells for individuals with left-censored spells can 
be derived as the ending-age of a spell minus the predicted starting-age. Nevertheless, 
we ordy use these predicted lengths of spells when it is necessary. In other words, when 
predicted durations are less than 10 years, the corresponding spells used in the time 
dependent hazard model are 10 years instead of the predicted durations; moreover, even 
though the predicted durations are greater than 10 years, they need adjustment (if it is 
necessary) to satisfy the restriction that a individual is able to perform a full time job 
only if he is over 18 years of age and has completed his education. 
Similar procedures are applied to the U.S. sample. There are 375 unknown migration 
speUs out of 9,574, i.e., a 96.1-percent sample is going to fit the predicting equation. The 
only difference is that the binary probit model tries to explain why Puerto Rico-born 
men worked on the U.S. mainland more than 40 years with dependent variable equal to 
1 if people had worked in the U.S. meunland more than 40 years, and 0 otherwise. This 
is because left-censored spells in the U.S. sample come from people who have lived in 
the U.S. mainland more than 40 years. 
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IRCA 
The United States is the world leader in agriculture. This leadership is expressed 
in terms of share of household income spent on food in 1991: only 8.3-percent for 
Americans, versus 19.1-percent in Germany, 16.3-percent in France, and 53.1-percent in 
India (Statistical .Abstract of the U.S.. 1995. p. 858). Furthermore, farming is one of the 
few sectors having a trade surplus for decades in the U.S. economy, which exports about 
25-percent of annual farm production. On the U.S. mainland, labor-intensive agriculture 
has a long history of using an immigrant work force, especially in California. Moreover, 
farmers not only admit their dependence on illegal immigrant workers but also assert 
that alien workers are necessary to their survival. 
The goal of the Immigration Reform and Control .Act of 1986 (IRCA). the latest 
federal policy meant to cdter the farm labor market, was to get control of the problem 
of illegal immigration, particularly that from Mexico. IRCA created two legalization 
programs for illegal aliens to become temporary and then, permanent residents of the 
United States: 
1. .A general program that granted legal status for illegal aliens (legalization appli­
cants) who have been in the U.S. since January 1, 1982. 
2. The Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program that granted legal status for 
illegal aliens (SAW applicants) who were employed in seasonal agricultural work 
for a minimum of 90 days in the 12 months ending May I, 1986. 
Table 4.5 shows that there are more than 3 million applicants filed under the IRC.A. 
legalization programs. 1,759,705 legalization applicants and 1.272.143 SAW applicants. 
Hispanic aliens are the major group in both programs, accounting for 88.4 percent of total 
legalization applicants and 88.7 percent of total S.AW applicants. Especially. Mexico is 
the predominant country of citizenship, accounting for 69.8 percent of total legalization 
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applicants and 81.6 percent of total S.WV applicants. 
A total of 2,669,968 aliens had been approved for temporary status under the IRCA 
provisions (1,528,200 legalization applicants and 1,037,.349 SAW applicants), of whom 
88.9 percent is Hispanic (74.16 percent is Mexican). Since these new workers legalized 
under IRCA were largely Spanish speaking, we hypothesize that the IRCA impacted 
Puerto Ricans residing in the U.S. mainland, for instance, increasing the competition in 
labor markets. From Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1, we can see that between 1970 and 1986 
Puerto Rican individuals born in Puerto Rico returned to Puerto Rico from the U.S. 
mairdand below .30.500 for each year. However, after 1986 the flow increased to above 
35.000 individuals per year and reached 52,671 in 1989. These trends are consistent with 
our hypothesis. 
We want to examine whether the IRC .A. altered the real wage of Hispanics on the U.S. 
mainland. On the other hand, most new workers legalized under IRCA provisions are 
less-skilled. Therefore, this policy may also affect the earnings of black men, defined on 
the basis of race and as non-Hispanic, because there is very high percentage of less-skilled 
black males. Furthermore. Hispanics as well as blacks are a disadvantaged group in the 
U.S. labor market, based on comparisons of labor market outcomes between Hispanic 
men and white non-Hispanic men. Hence, we treat white men. defined on the basis of 
race and as non-Hispanic, as a reference group. 
Empirical Specification 
Our earning analysis is based on the 1980 and 1990 1-percent sample of the PUMS for 
the U.S. The sample consists of male householders aged 18-64. We restrict the samples 
to those whose earnings were from wages and salaries only; thus, we excluded individuals 
in the military, self-employed, enrolled in school, working without pay in family or farm, 
not in the labor force, or with positive wage but zero weeks or hours worked. We 
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Table 4.5 .A.liens Legalized under IRC A 
Legalization 
Applicants 
SAW 
Applicants 
Total 
under IRC A 
Tot£il applicants 1,759,705 1,272,143 3,031,848 
% of Mexicans 69.8 81.6 74.8 
% of Hispanic" 88.4 88.7 88.5 
Media age at entry 23 24 — 
% of male 57.2 82.3 — 
% of married 41.2 42 — 
Approved applicants 
Total 1.582,200 1,087,768 2.669.968 
% of Mexicans — — 74.2 
% of Hispanic — — 88.9 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the immigration and naturaiization Service (1993) 
"Persons of Hispanic origin, according to the definition of CPS, are those whose origin was Mexican-
.American, Chicano, Mexican, Mexicano. Puerto Rican, Cuban, central or south .A.merican, or other 
Hispanic 
further delete observations who lived in Alaska and Hawaii, not on the U.S. mainland. 
The 1980 (1990) sample consists of 21,144 (25,626) Hispanics, 29,416 (24,176) blacks, 
and 297,881 (293,768) whites. Since the sample size of white men is huge, we reduce 
the sample size of white men by randomly selecting one tenth in our earning analysis. 
Therefore, the sample size of white men in 1980 (1990) is 29,377 (29,788) in our data 
set. .A.U variables used in the earning anedysis are described in Table 4.6. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wage, and thus, the estimated coefficients 
can be interpreted as a rate of return. Since hourly wage rates are not reported directly, 
we compute from reported annual earning divided by the product of total weeks worked 
I ( 
and usual hours worked per week in 1979 (1989) for the 1980 (1990) sample. 
The explanatory variables include the individual's characteristics and local market 
characteristics. Education represents the general human capital affecting the individual's 
earning and people with higher education tend to have a higher wage profile. However, 
investment in human capital often continues for much of an individual's work life so we 
will overstate the returns on education if we fail to distingxiish separately the return to 
subsequent on-the-job-training (OJT). We assume that OJT is proportioned to years of 
job experience after leaving school. Hence, experience, defined by age minus education 
minus 6, is used to capture the return to OJT. VVe further allow for the non-linear effect 
by adding the square of experience. Because we are interested in the way education levels 
affect experience-wage profiles, we add interaction terms of education and experience. 
English proficiency is a form of human capital and deficiency is a disadvantage for 
work in the U.S. Hence, it should have a positive effect on earnings. Furthermore, 
because English ability is likely to be lower for people who are foreign-born, our model 
also controls for place of birth by operationalizing with a dummy variable. Disability 
status is matter because it explains a systematic difference in wage rates. The dummy 
variables US8.590, US8084. L*S7579, TJS7074, US6569, US6064, and USBE50 are used to 
control the effect of successive cohorts of immigrant men. Borjas (1990, p. 20) found 
that the recent immigrant waves have relatively less skill and slower assimilation than 
earlier waves. 
Employment growth rates and unemployment rates are key factors in local markets. 
Previous studies (Tokle and Huffman 1991, and Topel 1986) suggest that economic agents 
respond to expected values of local variables rather than their actual values. We model 
the annual employment growth rates and the annual unemployment rates in state k as 
the. stationary autoregressive (AR) processes. In other words, the stochastic process 
{ykt} with constant mean Hk, say the annual employment growth rates of state k. is 
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Table 4.6 Definition of Variables Included in the Earning Analysis 
Variables Definition 
Endogenous Variables 
W Hourly wage 
D Wage-work participation index. 
1 if the individual works for a wage; 
0 otherwise. 
Exogenous Variables 
.A.GE 
.\GESQ 
EXP 
EXPSQ 
ED 
ED EXP 
EDEXPSQ 
ENG 
DISAB 
RACE 
MARRIED 
KID06 
Age, in years 
Square of AGE. divided by 100 
Potential post-schooling experience; AGE —ED—6. 
Square of EXP, divided by 100 
Highest grade of school completed 
Interaction between ED and EXP 
Interaction between ED and EXPSQ 
I if respondent reported speaking English weU. or very well: 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent reported a health condition that limited the kind of 
work or amount of work he would do; 
0 otherwise 
1 if white; 0 otherwise. 
1 if married; 0 otherwise 
Number of children at home that are 0-6 years of age. 
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Variables Definition 
Exogenous Variables 
KID618 Number of children at home that are 6-18 years of age. 
FORB 1 if born outside the U.S. mainland; 0 otherwise 
US8590 1 if born outside U.S. mainland and immigrated to U.S. 198-5-1990: 
0 otherwise 
US8084 1 if born outside U.S. mainland and immigrated to U.S. 1980-1984: 
0 otherwise 
US7579 1 if born outside U.S. mairdand and immigrated to U.S. 1975-1979: 
0 otherwise 
US7074 1 if born outside U.S. mainland and immigrated to U.S. 1970-1974: 
0 otherwise 
US6569 1 if born outside U.S. mainland and immigrated to U.S. 1965-1969: 
0 otherwise 
US6064 1 if born outside U.S. mainland and immigrated to U.S. 1960-1964: 
0 otherwise 
USBE50 1 if born outside U.S. mainland and immigrated to U.S. before 1950: 
0 otherwise 
OTHINC Family other (non-wage) income 
PLAND Land price 
URBAN Percentage of urban population 
JAN Normal January average temperature (degree F) 
JANSQ Square of JAN, divided by 100 
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Variables Definition 
Exogenous Variables 
PJOBGR Predicted state job growth rates 
PURATE Predicted sate unemployment rates 
ESHOCK Relative state labor demand shock 
RURATE Residual sate unemployment rates 
N*C North central regional dummy variable 
SOUTH South regional dummy variable 
WEST West regional dummy variable 
A Inverse of Mill's ratio 
P The implicit GNP deflator for personal consumption expenditure 
with 1992 = SLOG 
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generated by 
(Vk t  -  Hk)  =  Oi iyk t - i  -  f ik )  ^  02 iyk t -2  -  / i f e )  4 - . . .  -  Op{yk t -p  -  f tk )  ~  Ukt  ( 4 . 5 )  
where u^t is white noise with zero mean and finite variance and the roots of 
I — Oxz — Oiz' — • • • — OpZ^ — 0 are outside the unit circle. Then, the predicted values 
are constructed by the one-step-ahead predicted values. The corresponding coefficients 
are estimated by the maximum likelihood method, based on the annual data for 1967-
93 for each state. Furthermore, the proper order of these AR processes is chosen by 
minimizing the .Akaike information criterion (.AIC). The summary of these .AR models 
are reported in Appendix C. Since the predicted state unemployment rate measures the 
forecasted state equilibrium unemployment rate, we use one-step-ahead prediction error 
for unemployment rates to capture the unanticipated unemployment rate. 
For state employment growth rates, the one-step-ahead prediction error, efet, captures 
time varying local demand conditions in state k and year t. Furthermore, the predicted 
aggregate employment growth rates were obtained by the one-step-ahead predicted value 
of the U.S. aggregate employment growth rates; the corresponding one-step-ahead pre­
diction error, et, explains the aggregate labor demand disturbance in year t. Hence, the 
relative local demand shocks are defined by RSHOCKfct = Ckt — et, expressing the current 
labor demand shocks as a deviation from the aggregate labor demand shock. 
The wage equation for individual i  of Hispanics in state k  in 1989 is specified as 
follows^: 
In ( = $ 0 - ^ 1  E X P ,  ^  $ 2  E X P S Q i  ~  e ^ E D i  +  0 ^  E D  E X  P i  ~  O s  E D E X P S Q ,  
-  O e  E N G i  -  9 -  D I S A B i  -  9 ^  R A C E i  -  9 ^  F O R B i  ~  9 ^ ^  r S B E o O i  
-  9 n  U S 6 0 6 4 i  -  9 x 2  S6569.- + 9 ^ 2  ^ 57074.- - 9 ^ ^  L ' S 7 o 7 9 i  ^  9 ^ 5  £'58084^ 
- ^16 C'58590, - 9 i j  P J O B G R k  -  P U R A T E ^  -  ^19 E S H O C K k  
-  ^20 R A T E k  ~  (4.6) 
^RACE is not in white and blacks, and US8084, and US8590 are not in 1979 
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where Pk is the local price index in state k and is a random disturbance term with 
zero mean, constant variance, and E[eik eji] = 0 for all i j and/or k ^ 1. Since Pk is 
not observable, we will represent Pk by a state-specific hedonic price index. Huffman 
and Tokle (1995) suggested that the hedonic price index for state k consists of two 
kinds of goods, homogeneous and tradeable across state boundaries, and state-specific 
and nontradeable across state boundaries. For the first one, the implicit GNP deflator 
for personal consumption expenditures P and the regional dummy variables are good 
indicators, while for the other one, land prices, extent of urbanization, and seasons 
normal temperature are good indicators. Hence, the state specific-hedonic price index 
is: 
In Pk = ao Qi In P — a-t In PLANDk ~ 0L3 i'RBANk — 04 JANk 
-  as JA.YSQk -r as NC'k ^  a-r SOUTHk ^ as WESTk - ^k (4.7) 
where uJk is a random disturbance term with zero mean and constant variance. Then 
replace In Pk in equation (4.6) by equation (4.7). 
Because the data which can be used to estimate the wage equation are those with 
positive wage earning, there exists a non-random selection bias and the OLS estimator 
is biased and inconsistent. To correct this selection bias problem, we have to estimate 
labor force participation equation by the probit model, and then calculate the inverse 
of Mill's ratio which will be added to the wage equation. It can be shown that the 
corresponding estimator is consistent (Heckman 1979). The labor force participation 
equation is specified as: 
Pr(D.- = 1) = F(,i3o - AGEi - 3-, AGESQi ^ 3z EDi ^ J4 ENGi  -  J5 ED EX Pi  
- r  3e  EDEXPSQi  -  3 t  MARRIEDi  4-  i g  KIDQ6i  ~  J9  KID61Si  
-r Jio DISABi — Jn RACEi -i- ^^2 FORBi — J13 USBEoQi — J14 t'56064i 
- Ji5 C'56569{ — 3-16 U57074,- -r 3ir C'57579,- — Jig ['S8084i ~ J19 f''S8590,-
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- ,^20 HOTHINC'ilP) - J21 HPLANDkIP) - J22 URBAN^ 
-r  323  JAXk -  , i524  JAiVSQk -r  ^ 25  PJOBGRk +  ^ 26  PURATEk 
+  ;^27  ESHOCKk  ^  ,3 ,8  RURATEk -  ,i?29  ^Ck  -  ^30  SOUTHk 
~ SsiWESTk) (4.8) 
where F(-) is the normal distribution function. 
Hence, the wage equation is estimated by the following form: 
In j = 3o~3i  EX Pi  ~  32  EXPSQi  -  J3  EDi  -  ^4 ED EXP,  
-  3s  ED EXPSQi  -r  36  ENGi  ~  3r  DISABi  ^  ig  RACEi  -  ig  FORBi  
-f- Jio USBEoOi -f- ill f'56064,- — 3x2 US6569i — 3i31'57074, 
Ji4 US7o79 i  ~  3 i5  USSOSAi  - r  iig £/'58590,- + 3^-  ln( PLANDki  P)  
- ii8 URBANk ~ ii9 J-A-Vfc - 3,0 JANSQk ~ ^21 PJOBGRk 
- ,i22 PURATEk ^ 322 ESHOCKk -r 3,^ RURATEk - 3.5 NC'k 
-r 326 SOljTSk "T 327  ESTk  ~  328  ~  ^ ' ik  (4.9) 
where Vik is a random disturbance term with zero mean, constant variance, and 
E[vik fj/j = 0 for all i i  j and/or k ^ I. 
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF RE-MIGRATION 
This chapter presents the empirical results from the hazard function of re-migration. 
The results are divided into four parts. Part one reports the estimation results for expo­
nential regression models. We assume that the completed duration has an exponential 
distribution. Part two presents Weibull regression models. The distribution of duration 
is specified as a member of the family of Weibull distributions. The third part discusses 
the marginal effect of explanatory variables on the hazard rate of return migration. The 
last part presents some policy implications. 
Exponential Regression Models 
The exponential regression model treats the left-censored (both right- and left-
censored) speUs to completed (right-censored) speUs by ignoring the period from the 
starting of the spells to when we begin to observe them. This is based on the mem-
oryless property of the exponential distribution. Meiximum likelihood estimates are 
reported in Table 5.1, containing two equations. The first equation gives the estimates 
without considering heterogeneity effect. The second incorporates gamma heterogeneity 
represented by the parameter 0. referred to as a mixture model. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of working spells in years on the U.S. mainland. The signs of 
the parameter estimates are as expected across equations. Furthermore, all estimated 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significant 
level, except for disability status. 
85 
Table 5.1 The Hazard Function for Re-Migration of Puerto Elico-Born Male 
Householders during the 1980s from the 1990 Census Data in 
Exponential Regression Models 
Explanatory Without With 
Variables" Heterogeneity Heterogeneity 
Intercept .34.1.50 (10.41)'' 68.996 (11.24) 
.\GE 0.213 (18.67) 0.085 (3.74) 
AGESQ -0.259 (-18.72) -0.173 (-5.68) 
ED -0.034 (-5.85) -0.0.38 (-3.54) 
ENG 1.580 (.35.54) 2.091 (23.13) 
DISAB 0.014 (0.25) 0.176 (1.55) 
PJRUS 1.919 (20.39) 3.266 (21.25) 
PURUS -0.786 (-8.92) -1.393 (-7.94) 
PJRPR -2.539 (-15.06) -4.529 (-18.98) 
PURPR -1.697 (-8.50) -3.572 (-9.76) 
PRMIN -7.318 (-8.54) -14.205 (-9.17) 
PRMINUR 0.436 (7.83) 0.902 (8.84) 
e 2.249 (23.12) 
Total Spells 12.108 12.108 
"Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of working spells in years on the U.S. mainland, 
''t-vcdues are in parentheses. 
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Figure 5.1 shows the relation between the duration on the U.S. mainland and the 
predicted hazard rate of re-migration, evaluated at the sample means of explanatory 
variables. Note that the vertical axis should be re-scaled by a scale factor which is 
placed in the middle of the figure. Part (a) presents the exponential regression model. 
The predicted hazard rate is constant at 0.005. Part (b) is the exponential regression 
model with gamma heterogeneity. The predicted hazard rate is negatively related to the 
duration on the U.S. mairdand with a range from 0.009 to 0.00-54. This result shows that 
the hazard rate of re-migration is smaller when Puerto-born males stay on the mainland 
longer. 
We find that the coefficients of age and age square are statistically significantly 
different from zero at 0.1 percent significant level. The life-cycle effect shows that the 
spell duration on the U.S. mainland increases when people get older, but at a diminishing 
rate. In other words, there is a inverted U-shaped form of the age-speU duration profile. 
This quadratic life-cycle effect is consistent for the model with a finite life assumption. 
When an individual becomes older, time periods over which to capture the discounted 
returns from return migration shrink. The inclusion of heterogeneity reduces the effect. 
The spell duration on the U.S. mainland achieves a maximum at 41.1 years of age in 
the model without heterogeneity, and at 24.8 years of age in the model with gamma 
heterogeneity. The finding is consistent with previous studies(Tienda and Wilson 1992. 
Pissarides and Wadsworth 1989. and Feridhanusetyawan 1994). Furthermore, there 
exists an equivalent interpretation on the hazard rate of re-migration. The effect of age 
on the hazard rate of re-migration displays a U-shaped form. The hazard rate decreases 
when people get older, but at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, the hazard rate of re-
migration achieves a minimum at 41.1 (24.6) years of age in the model without (with 
gamma) heterogeneity. This suggests that at a younger age. the conditionad probability 
of return migration decreases as age increases, while at an older age. the probability 
increases as age increases. 
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Figure 5.1 The Predicted Hazard Rate for Re-Migration of Puerto 
Rico-Bom Male Householders during the 1980s from the 1990 
Census Data in Exponential Regression Models 
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Education has a strong negative effect on the working spell of Puerto Rica-born 
males on the U.S. mainland. The coefficients of education in both equations are statis­
tically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significant level. The model 
with gamma heterogeneity increases the size of the effect slightly. The result shows that 
increasing one year of schooling reduces by 3.4 to .3.8 percent the duration of the work­
ing spells for Puerto Rico-born males on the mainland. This supports the prediction 
that individuals with higher education are likely to migrate because of their efficiency in 
acquiring and processing information. Previous migration studies, for instance by Min­
cer (1978), Schwartz (1976), Tienda and Wilson (1992), and Feridhanusetyawan (1994), 
have presented similar finding. The empirical result is also consistent with the studies 
by Ramos (1992), and Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992). Ramos found that Puerto 
Ricans who return to Puerto Rico tend to be more skilled than those who remain on the 
U.S. mainland, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman showed that for Puerto Rico-born men. 
the economic return of weekly earnings on schooling in Puerto Rico is higher than that 
on the U.S. mainland. 
We also find that English proficiency plays a significant role in return migration 
decisions for Puerto Rico-born men. The sign of the coefficient is strongly positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significant level. The 
inclusion of gamma heterogeneity strengthens the size of the effect. The spell duration 
on the mainland for Puerto Rico-born males with English proficiency is 1.6 to 2.1 times 
larger than for those with poor English proficiency. This empirical result supports the 
hypothesis that English proficiency is a form of human capital for working on the U.S. 
mainland. 
Disability status is the only variable which is not statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent significant level in the exponential regression models. The sign 
of the coefficient, however, is negative and as expected in both equations. The mixture 
model tightens up the effect. The results indicate that disability raises the duration 
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on the U.S. mainland by about L.4 to 17.6 percent. This supports the prediction that 
individuals with disability are less likely to move. 
The empirical results yield strong evidence for the effect of labor market conditions 
on re-migration decisions. All estimated coefficients of labor market conditions not only 
have expected signs, but also are statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 
percent significant level. The inclusion of gamma heterogeneity tends to increase the 
size of the effect. 
The predicted job growth rates provide a strong factor in return migration decisions. 
The results show that a O.L percentage point increase in the predicted job growth rate 
for the U.S. mainland augments the spell duration on the mairdand by 19 to .3.3 percent, 
while a similar predicted job growth rate for Puerto Rico reduces the speU duration by 
25 to 45 percent. This supports the prediction that people are attracted by higher job 
growth rates. 
We find that the predicted unemployment rate for the U.S. mainland is negatively 
related to the duration of working spells of Puerto Rico-born men on the U.S. main­
land. The empiriccd results exhibit that a 0.1 percentage point increase in the predicted 
unemployment rate for the U.S. mainland reduces about 8 to 14 percent the duration 
of working spells. This also advocates the hypothesis that a lower unemployment rate 
increases the attraction of a country. 
The estimated coefficient of the interaction between the predicted unemployment 
rate for Puerto Rico and the real minimum wage in Puerto Rico is positive and statis­
tically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significant level. This implies 
that the unemployment rate for Puerto Rico is positively related to the real minimum 
wage in Puerto Rico, which is consistent with previous studies (Castillo-Freeman and 
Freeman 1992). 
The proportional effect of the predicted unemployment for Puerto Rico on the 
durat ion  of  working  spe l l s  o f  Puerto  Rico-born males  on  the  U.S .  mainland i s  3g  — 
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3 i i  PRMIy .  The effect is positive when the real minimuni wage in Puerto Rico is 
greater than 3.89 (3.96) for the model without heterogeneity (with gamma heterogene­
ity), and negative otherwise. When we evaluate this effect at the mean of PRMIN from 
1980 to 1990, 4.163, the results show that a 0.1 percentage point increase in the predicted 
unemployment rate for Puerto Rico amplifies the spell duration by 1.2 to 1.8 percent. 
Similarly, the proportional effect of the real minimum wage in Puerto Rico on the 
spell duration on the U.S. mainland is Jio — PURPR. The effect is positive when 
the predicted unemployment rate for Puerto Rico is greater than 16.78 (15.7.5) for the 
model without (with gamma) heterogeneity, and negative other%vise. When we evaluate 
this effect at the mean of PURPR from 1980 to 1990, 18.636. the results show that a 10 
cents increase in the real minimum wage in Puerto Rico augments the spell duration by 
8.1 to 26.1 percent. 
We find significant heterogeneity effects in the model. The estimated parameter 0 .  
measuring the sensitivity of the hazard rate and the survivor function to heterogeneity, is 
2.249 and statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significant level. 
The inclusion of 0 in the model changes the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the 
explanatory variables, but not the signs. We may conclude that the model with gamma 
heterogeneity may perform better than the model without considering heterogeneity. 
Weibull Regression Models 
The advantages in using the exponential regression model are its simplicity to work 
with and its interpretation. Frequently, it is an adequate model for duration data when 
duration has little variation. The main disadvantage is that if the sample contains both 
very long and short durations, this model is unlikely to be an adequate description of 
the data because the family of distributions obtained by varying the one parameter a is 
not very flexible. 
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The Weibuil regressioa model maintains simplicity but adds some flexibility. The use 
of a WeibuU distribution for the duration of completed spells adds only one paxameter a. 
measuring the effect of the duration of residence spells on the hazard rate of re-migration. 
The coefficient vector /3 of explanatory variables is stiU interpreted as the constant 
proportioned effect of the covariates on the time of completing a spell, which is the same 
as the exponential regression model. However, the marginal (proportional) effect of 
explanatory variables on the hazard rate of re-migration is —/3 / <t in Weibuil regression 
models instead of —/3 in exponential regression models. 
In Weibuil regression models, we have the left-censored problem. Based on discussion 
in previous chapter, we applied two expedients or research strategies. .A.s a result, the 
empirical results from the two treatments are very similar. Furthermore, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients from both expedients are the same as those from the exponential 
regression model. 
First Expedient 
The first expedient or research strategy is to assume that those Puerto Rico-born 
males having left-censored spells began their working life on the U.S. mainland. More­
over, the migrant is assumed to be able to perform a fuU time job only if he is over 18 
years of age and has completed his education. Therefore, if the Puerto Rican having a 
left-censored spell has completed more than 12 years of education, the duration of the 
spell is the age at the end of the observed spell minus 6 minus his highest grade of school 
completed. Otherwise, it is the age at the end of the observed spell minus 18 for those 
having left-censored spells. 
The fitted equations are presented in Table 5.2, consisting of models without and with 
gamma heterogeneity. The estimated parameter Q. measuring the effect of heterogeneity, 
is statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significant level. This 
may indicate that there does exist heterogeneity in hazard and survivor functions across 
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Table 5.2 The Hazaxd Function for Re-Migration of Puerto Rico-Born Male 
Householders during the 1980s from the 1990 Census Data in 
VVeibuU Regression Models, Based on the First Expedient 
Explanatory Without With 
Variables" Heterogeneity Heterogeneity 
Intercept 59.024 (11.43)^ 58.932 (12.71) 
.A.GE 0.144 (7.65) 0.099 (4.67) 
AGESQ -0.223 (-9.65) -0.177 (-6.31) 
ED -0.034 (-3.53) -0.046 (-4.67) 
ENG 2.200 (24.18) 2.217 (24.11) 
DISAB 0.118 (1.30) 0.179 (1.73) 
PJRUS 2.503 (15.34) 2.816 (19.24) 
PURUS -0.614 (-10.38) -0.871 (-13.93) 
PJRPR -3.763 (-12.60) -4.027 (-16.36) 
PURPR -2.966 (-9.56) -3.101 (-11.08) 
PRMIN — 12.455 (-9.36) -12.143 (-10.41) 
PRMINUR 0.719 (8.72) 0.754 (10.29) 
( T  1.621 (32.33) 0.946 (23.98) 
9  1.962 (13.23) 
Total Spells 12,108 12,108 
"Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of working spells in years on the U.S. mainland, 
''t-values are in parentheses. 
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individuals. The inclusion of gamma heterogeneity tends to reduce the effect of age. age 
square, and the real minimum wage in Puerto Rico, while it strengthens the effect of 
the other coefficients. 
For the model without gamma heterogeneity, the estimated parameter a, 1.621. is 
statistically significantly different from unit at the 0.1 significajit level, with t-statistics 
of 12.39. This implies that there is a decreasing effect of length of duration on the 
U.S. mainland on the hazard rate of re-migration. Other things being equal, the longer 
a Puerto Rican resides on the mainland, the lower is the hazard rate of re-migration. 
Part (a) of Figure 5.2 presents the relationship between the spell duration on the U.S. 
maiidand and the predicted hazard rate of re-migration, evaluated at the sample means 
of explanatory variables. N'ote that the vertical axis should be re-scaled by a scale factor 
which is placed in the middle of the figure. For the first 4.6 years of spell duration, the 
predicted hazard rate is at the peak, 0.31. After that, it suddenly drops close to zero. 
The estimated parameter <r in the mixture model is 0.942 and cannot reject the null 
hypothesis ffg : cr = I a.t the -5 percent significant level, with t-statistics of 1.39. The 
pattern of the predicted hazard rate of re-migration, evaluated at the sample means of 
covariates. associated with the spell duration on the mainland appears as an inverted 
U-shaped curve in part (b) of Figure 5.2. The predicted hazard rate increases and then 
decreases after it climbs to a peak of 0.008 over the spell duration. The plot shows that 
the maximum hazard rate of re-migration occurs when Puerto Rico-born men worked 
on the U.S. mainland for 4.6-13.8 years. 
Compared to the results in the exponential regression models, the signs of the co­
efficients are the same. AH estimated coefficients are statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 0.1 percent significant level, except disability status. But the coefficient 
of disability is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level in the model with 
gamma heterogeneity. Hence, we conclude that the results do not overstep the prediction 
of economic theories. 
94 
1 .00 + * •  
0 .95 1 
0 .90 +  
0 .85 1 
0 .80 +  
0 .75 1 H 
0 .70 +  a 
0 .65 1 z 
0 .60 +  a 
0 .55 1 r 
0 .50 + d 
0 .45 1 
0 .40 + R 
0 .35 1 a 
0 .30 + t 
0 .25 1 e 
0 .20 +  
0 .15 1 
0 .10 +  
0 .05 1 
0 .00 +  
++-
0 
Scale 0.310 
-+ 
9.2 18.4 
Time 
27.6 36.8 46. 
(a) Without Heterogeneity 
1 .00 + 
0 .95 1 
0 .90 + 
0 .85 1 
0 .80 + 
0 .75 1 H 
0 .70 + a 
0, .65 1 z 
0, .60 + * -a--
0, .55 1 r 
0, .50 + d 
0, .45 1 
0. 40 + R 
0. 35 1 a 
0. 30 + t 
0. 25 1 e 
0. 20 + 
0. 15 1 
0. ,10 + 
0. ,05 1 
0. 00 + 
Scale = 0 . 0 0 8  
+ 
I 
+ 
++-
0 9.2 18.4 
Time 
27.6 
+-
36.8 
h 
46.0 
(b) With Heterogeneity 
Figure 5.2 The Predicted Hcizard Rate for Re-Migration of Puerto 
Rico-Bom Male Householders during the 1980s from the 1990 
Census Data in Weibull Regression Models, Based on the First 
Expedient 
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The inverted U-shaped form of the age-spell duration profile indicates that the work­
ing spell on the U.S. mainland attedns the maximum at .32.3 (28.0) years of age in the 
model without (with) gamma heterogeneity. An additional year of schooling is associ­
ated with declines of 3.4 to 4.6 percent of the spell duration on the U.S. mainland for 
Puerto Ricans. English proficiency tends to increase the spell duration about 2.2 times. 
The estimated spell duration on the U.S. mainland for an individual having a disability 
is about 11.8 to 17.9 percent longer. 
The mixture model tends to increase the size of the effect of the variables of local 
market conditions slightly, except the effect of the the real minimum wage in Puerto Elico. 
A 0.1 percentage point increase in the predicted job growth rate for the U.S. mainland 
raises the spell duration on the mainland by 25 to 28 percent, while the predicted job 
growth rate for Puerto Rico decreases the spell duration about 38 to 40 percent. When 
the predicted unemployment rate increases 0.1 percentage point, the estimated spell 
duration on the U.S. mainland for Puerto Rican males shrinks about 6 to 9 percent. If 
we calculated the effect of the predicted unemployment rate at the sample mean of the 
real minimum wage in Puerto Rico for 1980-1990, 4.163, an increase in one percentage 
point augments the length of working speUs of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland by 
about 2.7 to 3.8 percent. Finally, a 10 cents increase in the real minimum wage in Puerto 
Rico prolongs the spell duration on the mainland by 9.4 to 19.1 percent, evaluated at 
the sample mean of the predicted unemployment rate for Puerto Rico for 1980-1990. 
18.636. 
Second Expedient 
For the second expedient or search strategy, we predict the duration of working spells 
on the U.S. mainland for those Puerto Rico-born men having left-censored spells. By 
using the sample of completed spells (or right-censored spells), we regress the natureJ 
logarithm of individuals' starting-age of spells on a set of explanatory variables. When 
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the inverse of Mill's ratio is added into the multiple regression model to correct the non-
random selection bias, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates are consistent. Then 
we predict the starting-age of the working spells on the U.S. mairdand for those Puerto 
Ricans having left-censored spells. Finally, the length of migration spells for individuals 
with left-censored spells can be derived as the ending-age of a spell minus the predicted 
starting-age. Xote that we ordy use these predicted lengths of spells when they satisfy 
the restriction that a individual is able to perform a full time job only if he is over 
18 years of age and has completed his education. When this condition is violated, the 
predicted lengths of spells are based on the first expedient. 
Table 5.3 reports the empirical results, containing the model with and without 
gamma heterogeneity. The pattern of the predicted hazard rate of re-migration, evalu­
ated at the sample means of explanatory variables, associated with the spell duration on 
the U.S. mainland is presented in Figiire 5.3. Because the empirical results between two 
expedients are very similar, the discussion is omitted. Furthermore, we may conclude 
that the two research strategies provide no differences for Weibull regression models 
especicdly in our data. 
Hazard Rate of Re-Migration 
As we discussed in Chapter 3. the coefficient vector /3 of explanatory variables has 
an equivalent interpretation on the hazard rate. The marginal proportional effect of 
explanatory variables on the hazard rate of re-migration is —/3 for the exponential re­
gression model, while it is —/3 / a for the Weibull regression model. 
Table 5.4 reports the marginal proportional effects of explanatory variables on the 
hazard rate of re-migration for Puerto Rico-born males. The first two columns present 
the results from the exponential regression models, taken from Table 5.1. The third 
and fourth columns exhibit the results from the WeibuU regression models using the 
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Table 5.3 The Hazard Function for Re-iVKgration of Puerto Rico-Born Male 
Householders during the 1980s from the 1990 Census Data in 
WeibuU Regression Models, Based on the Second Expedient 
Explanatory Without With 
Variables" Heterogeneity Heterogeneity 
Intercept .59.178 (11.46)'' .50.701 (12.71) 
AGE 0.140 (7.45) 0.098 (4.67) 
.\GESQ -0.219 (-9.44) -0.177 (-6..30) 
ED -0.034 (-.3..52) -0.045 (-4.59) 
ENG 2.202 (24.17) 2.215 (24.08) 
DISAB 0.118 (1.29) 0.183 (1.76) 
PJRUS 2.498 (1.5.35) 2.803 (19.24) 
PURUS -0.614 (-10.37) -0.863 (-13.83) 
PJRPR —3.747 (-12.63) -4.004 (-16..37) 
PURPR -2.973 (-9.59) -3.092 (-11.09) 
PRMIN -12.489 (-9.39) -12.103 (-10.42) 
PRMINUR 0.721 (8.75) 0.752 (10.30) 
cr 1.623 (32.25) 0.942 (23.95) 
9 1.984 (13.25) 
Total SpeUs 12,108 12,108 
^Dependent variable is tlie natural logcurithm of working spells in years on the U.S. mainland, 
''t-values are in parentheses. 
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Rico-Born Male Householders during the 1980s from the 1990 
Census Data in VVeibull Regression Models, Based on the Sec­
ond Expedient 
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Table 5.4 Marginal Proportional Effects of Explanatory Variables on the 
Hazard Rate of Re-Migration for Puerto Rico-Born Male House­
holders 
Explanatory Exponential WeibuU Regression Models 
Variables Regression 
Models First Expedient Second Expedient 
Without 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
Without 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
Without 
Hetero­
geneity 
With 
Hetero­
geneity 
XGE"  0.006 0.061 0.028 0.054 0.028 0.055 
ED 0.034 0.038 0.021 0.049 0.021 0.048 
ENG -1.580 -2.091 — 1.357 -2.344 — 1.357 -2..351 
DISAB -0.014 -0.176 -0.073 -0.189 -0.073 -0.194 
PJRUS -1.919 -3.266 — 1.544 -2.977 -1.539 -2.976 
PURUS 0.786 1.393 0.379 0.921 0.378 0.916 
PJRPR 2.539 4.528 2.322 4.257 2.309 4.251 
PURPR^ -0.118 -0.183 -0.017 -0.041 -0.018 -0.041 
PRMIN-^ -0.807 -2.605 -0.583 -2.018 -0.584 -2.029 
"Evaluated at the sample mean of AGE, 42.295. 
'Evaluated at the mean of PRMIN from 19080 to 1990, 4.163. 
•^Evaluated at the mean of PURPR from 1980 to 1990, 18.636. 
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first expedient, taken from Table 5.2. The last two columns show results from the 
Weibuli regression models using the second expedient, taken from Table 5.3. The signs 
of the marginal proportional effects are consistent across models. Moreover, the models 
including gamma heterogeneity have stronger effects. 
The marginal effect of a one year increase in age on the hazard rate of re-migration 
ranges from 0.6 to 6.1 percent, evaluated at the sample mean of age, 42..3. Increasing 
one year of schooling augments the hazard rate by 2.1 to 4.9 percent. 
People having English proficiency and disability status are less likely to re-migrate. 
The marginal proportional effect of English proficiency on the hazard rate ranges from 
-1.36 to —2.35. Disability status decreases the hazard rate of re-migration by 1.4 to 
19.4 percent. 
Predicted unemployment rates for the U.S. mainland or predicted job growth rates 
for Puerto Rico increase the hazard rate of re-migration. The marginal effect of a 0.1 
percentage point increase in predicted unemployment rates for the U.S. mainland on the 
hazard rate ranges from 3.8 to 13.9 percent. A 0.1 percentage point increase in predicted 
job growth rates for Puerto Rico amplifies the hazard rate by 23.1 to 45.3 percent. 
Predicted job growth rates for the U.S. mainland, predicted unemployment rates for 
Puerto Rico, or real minimum wages for Puerto Rico have negative effects on the hazard 
rate of return migration. Increasing 0.1 percentage point in predicted job growth rates 
for the U.S. mairdand reduces the hazard rate about 15.4 to 32.7 percent. The marginal 
effect of a 0.1 percentage point increase in predicted unemployment rates on the hazard 
rate ranges from —0.2 to -1.8 percent, evcduated at the sample mean of reed minimum 
wages for Puerto Rico for 1980-1990, 4.16. We can see that the effects of predicted job 
growth rates are stronger than those of predicted unemployment rates. 
Finally, a 10 cents increase in real mirumum wages for Puerto Rico diminishes the 
hazard rate by 5.8 to 26.1 percent, evaluated at the sample mean of predicted unem­
ployment rates for Puerto Rico for 1980-1990, 18.64. This may reflect the fact that 
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the minimum wage policy for Puerto Rico resulted in massive job losses. A significant 
portion of these unemployed persons migrated to the U.S. mainland. Hence, from their 
viewpoint, a higher real minimum wage might mean a lower chance of finding a job in 
Puerto Rico. 
Previous graphs of estimated hazard rates versus duration may be misleading. Fig­
ure 0.2 (b). for example, shows an inverted U-sharped form, while the corresponding 
coefficients of age and age square revealed a U-sharped form on the hazard rate of re-
migration. This is because in Figure .5.2 (b) age is held constant at its sample mean. 
Hence, we have chosen to simulate the life-cycle effect on the predicted hazard rate of 
re-migration, based on estimated coefficients from Table .5.2 with gamma heterogeneity. 
We held everything constant at sample means, except speU duration and age. Because 
the sample mean of education is 10.23 years, the individual by assumption began his 
working life on the U.S. mainland when he was 18 years of age. Hence, the spell duration 
can be derived as an individual's age minus 18. Figure 5.4 shows that the hazard rate 
for re-migration is higher when people get older. Furthermore, the marginal effect of 
age on the predicted hazard rate increases rapidly when the immigrant is approaching 
retirement. 
Policy Implications 
The estimated coefficients of the hazard functions can give us some guidance in 
how some government policies wiU affect the return migration decision of Puerto Rico-
born men on the U.S. mainland. In particular, we will focus on the official English 
amendments and the minimum wage policy. 
.Although the majority of U.S. citizens speak English as their first or second language^ 
^According to the 1990 census, 94 percent of U.S. residents above 5 years of age reported that they 
spoke English "very well", and 13.8 percent of U.S. residents above 5 years of age spoke other than 
English in households. 
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Figure 5.4 The Simulated Life-Cycle Effect on the Hazard Rate of 
Re-Migration for the Puerto Rico-Born Male Householder, Eval­
uated on Estimated Coefficients from Table 5.2 with Gamma 
Heterogeneity and Holding Everything Constant at Sample 
Means except Spell Duration and Age 
and it is the language of the laws, constitution, and government on the U.S. mainland, 
it is not the oflScial language of the country. Since the early 1980s, the ofiBcial status of 
English has received much attention on the mainland. U.S. English is the primary group 
promoting laws to establish English as the oflBcial language of the United States. They 
see official language legislation as a matter of national unity and a means of resolving 
conflicts in a nation of diverse racial, ethnic, and religious groups. However, the English 
Plus Information Clearinghouse (EPIC), established in 1983, opposes official language 
legislation but favors strong English language proficiency plus mastery of second or even 
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multiple languages. It views official English as synonymous with "English Only" which 
takes away the right to free speech as well as insulting the heritage of cultural minorities, 
including Mexican Americans and Americaji Indians whose roots in the U.S. go deeper 
than those of English speakers. 
Two major reasons for supporters demanding official English are dissatisfaction with 
bilingual programs, and the increase of Hispanic and .A.sian immigrants. Supporters 
have argued that the Hispanic and Asian population, aided by bilingual programs that 
mainteun native language, do not want to learn English and do not tend to assimilate 
into mainstream American culture; an emotional response is that those immigrants who 
are different and want to remain different should go back to where they are comfortable 
and everyone speak their language (Stalker 1988). Furthermore, some anti-Hispanic 
arguments could be found in U.S. English's newsletters; for example, a lot of articles in 
U.S. English's newsletters assault Hispanics as the source of language difficulties in the 
U.S. (Adams 1992). 
There are 18 states which have established official language laws (see Table 5.5). 
Some states have simply declared that their official language is English. Chapter 1. 
Section 3005 of Illinois .Annotated Statutes (1969), for instance, reads: "The official 
language of the State of Illinois is English". Other states have added some enforcement 
provisions. California's official English amendment requires the use of English in all 
official state business, and prohibits printing ballots in any language other than English. 
The law in .Arizona has the most severe enforcement provisions. It prohibits aU gov­
ernment entities and employees from using any language other than English during the 
performance of government business. 
Our estimated result shows that Puerto Rican men having poor English proficiency 
are more likely to re-migrate. This may suggest that, other things being equal, the 
greater number of states, like .Arizona or California, enforce officicd English, the more 
Puerto Rico-born males will decide to re-migrate. 
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Table 5.5 States with Official "English" Language Legislation 
Alabama* 1990)" •Arizona** 1988) Arkansan* (1987) 
California" 1986) Colorado* 1988) Florida* (1988) 
Georgia* 1986) Hawaii** 1978) Illinois* (1969) 
Indiana* 1984) Kentucky* 1984) Mississippi* (1987) 
Xebraska" 1920) North Carolina* 1987) North Dakota* (1987) 
1 Carolina** 1987) Tennessee** 1984) Virginia** (1981) 
Source: Adopted from Table 1 of Tatalovich (1995). 
"The year of established official English legislation is in parentheses. 
* States just declared that their official language is English. 
'* States added some enforcement provisions. 
The L^.S.-Ievel minimum wage has been completely enforced in Puerto Rico since 
1983. Figure 5.5 shows nominal .minimum wages and minimum wages in terms of per 
capita personal consumption e.xpenditures (PCE). Before 198.3. indicated by the vertical 
dotted line, the nominal minimum wage for Puerto Rico was lower than that for the 
mainland; since then, both are identical. However, this could be misleading because of 
significantly different living cost between the mainland and the island. The per capita 
PCE is treated as a proxy for living cost. The minimum wage in the lower figure is 
derived from the minimum wage times 1,000 and then, divided by per capita personal 
consumption expenditures. It shows that minimum wages in terms of per capita PCE 
are much higher in Puerto Rico than those on the U.S. mednland. Hence, it is obvious 
that the minimum wage policy has much stronger impact on the island. Reynolds and 
Gregory (1965) and Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) showed that the minimum 
wage resulted in a substantial number of unemployed people. 
We find that a 10 cents increase in real minimum wages for Puerto Rico (in constant 
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1990 dollars) reduces the hazard rate of re-migration by 5.8 to 26.1 percent for Puerto 
Rico-born men on the U.S. mainland. Therefore, when the federal government raises 
the minimum wage , our model predicts that the number of re-migrating Puerto Ricans 
wiU fail, other things being equal. 
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CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF EARNING 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of earning functions. First, we present 
the estimated reduced-form probit equations for the probability for being a wage earner, 
and estimated wage equations, corrected from the sample-selected bicis. Then, we focus 
on the Chow test for parameter equality and stability. 
Wage Determination 
The coefficients in Table 6.1 provide estimates of the impact of the variables on the 
probability of wage work for men. In general, the signs of the estimated coefficients 
are mostly as expected and consistent across equations, at least when they are statisti­
cally significant. The life-cycle effect on probability of being a wage or salary earner is 
quadratic, revealed an inverted U-sharped form. 
As expected, people with higher schooling, English proficiency, and who are married, 
are much more likely to be wage earners. Additional children under 18 years of age and 
having a disability have the expected effect, decreasing the probability. For Hispanics. 
more recent immigrants have a lower probability to be employees. Other income, ur­
banization, and predicted state unemployment rates have negative coefficients, while the 
real price of land raises the likelihood of being in the wage sample. 
The sample means of variables used in the wage equations are reported in Table 6.2. 
The real hourly wage was much higher for whites than for Hispanics or for blacks. For 
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Table 6.1 Estimated Coefficients of Reduced-Form Probit Equations for the 
Probability with Positive Wage Earnings for U.S. Made House­
holders 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
Variables 1979 1989 1979 1989 1979 1989 
.A.GE 0.031* 
(1.68)" 
0.035** 
(1.97) 
0.024 
(0.77) 
0.052 
(1.54) 
0.025 
(1.34) 
0.048* 
(1.74) 
.A.GESQ -0.033 
(-1.38) 
-0.043* 
(-1.92) 
-0.028 
(-0.68) 
-0.048 
(-1.08) 
-0.014 
(-0.58) 
-0.027 
(-0.79) 
ED 0.0.34*** 
(3.92) 
0.032*** 
(3.55) 
0.066*** 
(5.05) 
0.082*** 
(5.24) 
0.065*** 
(7.16) 
0.095*** 
(6.68) 
EDEXP -0.001 
(-0.58) 
-0.0001 
(0.07) 
-0.0004 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.002* 
(-1.93) 
EDEXPSQ 0.0002 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.68) 
-0.0003 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.70) 
0.0005 
(0.18) 
ENG 0.082* 
(1.73) 
0.078* 
(1.84) 
0.659*** 
(3.31) 
-0.444 
(-1.30) 
0.265 
(1.25) 
0.296* 
(1.78) 
MARRIED 0.263*** 
(5.15) 
0.194*** 
(4.61) 
0.493*** 
(8.16) 
0.471*** 
(8.32) 
0.333*** 
(9.21) 
0.354*** 
(8.60) 
KID06 -0.043* 
(-1.95) 
-0.042* 
(-1.91) 
-0.038 
(-0.90) 
-0.041 
(-1.08) 
-0.022 
(-1.02) 
-0.038 
(-1.46) 
KID618 -0.034** 
(-2.30) 
-0.024 
(-1.52) 
-0.011 
(-0.44) 
-0.034 
(-1.24) 
-0.009 
(-0.73) 
0.014 
(0.75) 
DISAB 
( 
-0.690*** 
-11.74) 
-0.896*** 
(-17.04) 
-0.660*** 
(-11.44) 
-0.744*** 
(-13.21) 
-0.714*** 
(-17.78) 
-0.777*** 
(-16.75) 
RACE 0.058 
(1.63) 
0.043 
(1.29) 
— — — — 
"t-values are in parentheses. 
• P-value < 0.1 •• P-value < 0.05 "* P-value < 0.01 
109 
Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
Variables 1979 1989 1979 1989 1979 
FORB 
USBE.50 
US6064 
US6o69 
US7074 
US7.579 
US8084 
US8590 
URB.A.xN 
0.175" 
(2.05) 
-0.1.54 
(-1.09) 
-0.0.37 
(-0.34) 
0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(-0.07) 
-0.402"* 
(-4.04) 
-0.005 
(-1.53) 
0.106 
(1.25) 
0.135 
(0.79) 
0.073 
(0.64) 
-0.015 
(-0.15) 
-0.182* 
(-1.94) 
-0.143 
(-1.49) 
-0.185" 
(-1.97) 
-0.368" 
(-3.81) 
-0.006 
( -0 .11 )  
0.050 
(1 .08)  
-0.003 
(-0.91) 
-0.008 
(-0.05) 
-0.023 
(-0.09) 
0.303 
(0.75) 
0.367 
(0.96) 
0.186 
(0.55) 
-0.484* 
(-1.76) 
-0.744"* 
(-7.88) 
0.155"* 
(2.82) 
-0.005** 
( - 2 . 2 0 )  
-0.097 
(-0.46) 
-0.272 
(-0.80) 
-0.393 
(-1.38) 
-0.208 
(-0.64) 
-0.108 
(-0..30) 
-0.272 
(-0.79) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.776"* 
( -2 .66)  
-0.298*** 
(-4.45) 
-0.003 
( -0 .06)  
0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.290 
(-1.51) 
-0.102 
(-0.40) 
0.620* 
(1.76) 
0.264 
(1-11)  
0.143 
(0.65) 
0.245 
(1 .01)  
-0.428*' 
(-6.30) 
0.064* 
(1.72) 
-0.003 
(-1.63) 
-0.0.33 
( -0 .11)  
-0.244 
(-0.40) 
0.140 
(0.32) 
0.098 
(0.27) 
0.355 
(0.98) 
0.182 
(0.52) 
0.030 
(0.09) 
-0.029 
( -0.08) 
-0.084 
(-1.50) 
0.145*** 
(2.68) 
-0.005*" 
(-2.85) 
ln( othinc ^  _o.522*" 
(-6.31) 
ln(^^^) 0.098 
(1.59) 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Variables 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
1979 1989 1979 1989 1979 1989 
JAN -0.010 0.027 0.001 0.008 -0.002 -0.026 
(-0.49) (1.49) (0.09) (0.61) (-0.13) (-1..52) 
JANSQ 0.006 -0.0.34 -0.002 -0.016 -0.002 0.0.35* 
(0.22) (-1.57) (-0.13) (-0.95) (-0.11) (1.67) 
PJOBGR -0.021 0.027 0.068" -0.028 0.012 -0.010 
(-0.74) (0.86) (2.44) (-0.91) (0.60) (0..35) 
PURATE -0.107— -0.089* 0.014 -0.047* -0.0.56" -0.095*** 
(-2.64) (-1.91) (0.44) (-1.68) (-2.24) (-4.13) 
ESHOCK -0.00.5 0.029 0.081— -0.002 -0.034* 0.008 
1 O
 
CO
 (1.17) (2.98) (-0.06) (-1.72) (0.32) 
RURATE 0.005 -0.100 0.141"* -0.015 -0.065** -0.047 
(0.10) (-1.41) (3.60) (-0.33) (-2.29) (-1.45) 
XC -0.108 0.138 -0.083 0.065 -0.0.55 0.075 
(-0.62) (1.13) (-0.82) (0.75) (-0.80) (1.01) 
SOUTH 0.194* 0.057 -0.172 0.077 0.032 0.2.30** 
(1.87) (0.33) (-1.50) (0.64) (0.48) (2.48) 
WEST 0.510— 0.100 0.008 0.074 0.085 0.235** 
(4..39) (0.60) (0.07) (0.55) (0.93) (2.04) 
Intercept 6.912— 0.677 7.165*" 3.795*** 4.8-53*** 0.355 
(6.32) (0.82) (5.80) (3.51) (5..35) (0.39) 
N 21.114 25,626 29,377 29.788 29.416 24.176 
L l l  
Table 6.2 Means of Variables in the Sample of Wage Earners for U.S. Male 
Householders 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
Variables 1979 1989 l979 1989 1979 iM 
VV/P 
EXP 
EXPSQ 
ED 
ED EXP 
EDEXPSQ 
ENG 
DISAB 
RACE 
FORB 
USBE50 
US6064 
US6.569 
US7074 
US 75 79 
11.9879 
21.2515 
6.1290 
10.1732 
191.0125 
49.8153 
0.7859 
0.0390 
0.5920 
0.4068 
0.0205 
0.0631 
0.0864 
0.1081 
0.0760 
11.1625 
22.0353 
6.3109 
10.4264 
205.87.54 
53.3169 
0.7824 
0.0350 
0.5331 
0.5632 
0.0140 
0.0502 
0.0679 
0.0914 
0.0977 
14.8729 
20.9.342 
6.0126 
12.9790 
257.7862 
71.0271 
0.9961 
0.0501 
0.0365 
0.0069 
0.0047 
0.0046 
0.0045 
0.0044 
14.6599 
21.5191 
5.8987 
13.3793 
278.7496 
73.9078 
0.9959 
0.0474 
0.0353 
0.0030 
0.0049 
0.0043 
0.0037 
0.0041 
12.7810 
22.0154 
6.5498 
11.5526 
230.6131 
63.0003 
0.9977 
0.0527 
0.0385 
0.0032 
0.00.38 
0.0089 
0.0116 
0.0079 
11.9801 
22.6432 
6.4663 
12.3151 
263.9058 
71.0483 
0.9945 
0.0472 
0.0631 
0.0006 
0.0033 
0.0088 
0.0125 
0.0128 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
Variables 
Hispanics 
1979 1989 
Whites 
1979 1989 
Blacks 
1979 1989 
US8084 
US8590 
0.1140 
0.0812 
InlPLAND/P) 6.9140 6.8584 7.1461 
URB.A.N 
.J.\N 
.JANSQ 
PJOBGR 
PURATE 
ESHOCK 
RURATE 
NC 
SOUTH 
WEST 
85.4647 86.1201 75.8112 
.3.6321 
6.4667 
0.5361 
0.0898 
0.2897 
0.4367 
0.0036 
0.0035 
6.9388 
(6.6493 
7.1809 
r6.5893 
2.2329 
6.1004 
3.0532 
6.1717 
2.1540 
5.7829 
2.9961 
6.2583 
0.7024 -0.7278 0.2266 -0.2407 
0.1631 -0.4079 1.0759 -0.2667 
0.0733 
0.3401 
0.4538 
0.2750 
0.2977 
0.1769 
0.2761 
0.3259 
0.1792 
0.9471 
0.1969 
0.5086 
0.0923 
0.0147 
0.0081 
7.0008 
r6.4888 
42.5092 43.8115 .33.7994 .34.1715 37.1175 .38.7952 
19.8186 20.7549 12.8726 13.1628 15.1026 16.2785 
2.2293 
5.9566 
0.3522 
-0.3800 
0.1563 
0.5993 
0.1006 
A -0.0752 -0.0695 -0.0319 -0.0317 -0.0924 -0.0829 
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whites, the real hourly wage was S14.78 (S14.66) in 1979 (1989), while for Hispanics 
it was $11.99 ($11.16) and for blacks $12.78 ($11.98). .Although the real hourly wage 
for ail three ethnic groups declined, Hispanics' and blacks' real wage rates decreased 7 
and 6 percent respectively, in comparison with whites' real wage rates just 1 percent. 
.Average education levels had increased from 1979 to 1989 for aU ethnicities: 10.2 to 
10.43 for Hispanics, 13 to 13.4 for whites, and 11.6 to 12.3 for blacks. .Average education 
attainments reveal that Hispanics are disadvantaged by possessing less human capital 
on average than whites or blacks. 
The significantly lower percentage of Hispanics responding speaking English well or 
very well mirrors their predominantly foreign origin. It was 41 (56) percent of foreign 
born for Hispanics in 1979 (1989) in contrast to 3.7 (3.5) and 3.9 (6.3) for whites and 
blacks respectively. This also reflects the fact that there was a large immigrant flow of 
Hispanics during the 1980s. 
The regional dummy variables show that most Hispanics lived in the west and south, 
while blacks concentrated in the south. In contrast, whites lived relatively uniformly 
throughout the U.S. This also results in some local variables having substantially differ­
ent sample means among them. 
The estimated coefficients of wage equations, corrected for sample-selected bias, are 
reported in Table 6.3; two for Hispanic men, two for white men. and two for black men. 
The first equation is the earning analysis of 1979 and the second is for 1989. The inverse 
of Mill's ratio A is added to each equation to correct for possible sample-selection bias 
in order to get consistent estimates of the parameters of the wage-offer function facing 
each ethnic group. 
Years of work experience and education produce the expected positive association 
with earnings. The negative coefficient of EXPSO shows a diminishing marginal rate of 
work experience on wage earnings. Our estimated coefficients of EDEXP and EDEXPSQ 
measure on average not only how years of schooling affect the experience-wage profile. 
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Table 6.3 Estimated Coefficients of Wage Equations for U.S. Male House­
holders, Corrected for Sample-Selected Bias 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
Variables 1979 1989 1979 1989 1979 1989 
EXP 0.044"' 
(9.37)" 
0.054*" 
(14.93) 
0.020" 
(4.18) 
0.033*" 
(6.75) 
0.033*** 
(6.10) 
0.046*** 
(8.48) 
EXPSQ -0.0.50— 
(-6.61) ( 
-0.065*** 
-11.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.013 
(-1..52) 
-0.021" 
(-2.49) 
-0.0.36*** 
(-4.16) 
ED 0.068"* 
(12.87) 
0.080*** 
(18.79) 
0.047" 
(11.83) 
0.081*" 
(18.60) 
0.073*" 
(12..55) 
0.089"* 
(14.79) 
EDEXP -0.0003 
(-0.87) 
-0.001*" 
(-3.59) 
0.002*" 0.001*" 
(5.31) (2.61) 
0.0003 
(0.66) 
-0.0004 
(-0.98) 
EDEXPSQ -0.002" 
(-2.17) 
-0.001 
(-1.01) 
-0.005" 
(-7.75) 
* -0.004*" 
(-6.71) 
-0.003*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.002"* 
(-3.54) 
ENG 0.113— 
(7.08) 
0.117"* 
(10.22) 
-0.022 
(-0.35) 
0.135*" 
(2.56) 
0.086 
(0.89) 
-0.125" 
(-2.38) 
DISAB -0.095" 
(-2.13) 
-0.198*" 
(-3.85) 
-0.029 
(-1.26) 
-0.060** 
(-2.42) 
-0.051 
(-1.29) 
0.149"* 
(4.82) 
RACE 0.032"* 
(2.85) 
0.040*** 
(5.12) 
— — — — 
FORB 0.056** 
(2.29) 
0.040** 
(2.09) 
0.046 
(1.35) 
0.0.58 
(1..58) 
-0.062 
(-0.74) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
USBE50 -0.094** 
(-2.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
0.009 
(0.17) 
0.021 
(0.30) 
0.073 
(0.63) 
-0.105 
(-0.59) 
US6064 -0.039 
(-1.27) 
0.038 
(1.55) 
0.074 
(1.19) 
0.062 
(1.04) 
0.014 
(0.12) 
0.076 
(0.74) 
"t-values are in parentheses 
P-value <0.1 •* P-value < 0.05 P-value < 0.01 
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Table 6.3 (Continued) 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
Variables 1979 1989 1979 1989 1979 1989 
US6569 
L'S7579 
US8084 
US8590 
ln( PLAND 
URBAN 
JAN 
JANSQ 
-0.082* 
(-2.82) 
-0.223" 
(-6.47) 
) 0.057' 
0.001 
(1.20) 
-0.011* 
-0.046* 
( -2 .01)  
US7074 -0.1.55*" 
(-5.43) 
-0.140* 
(-6.23) 
-0.223* 
(-9.86) 
-0.326' 
(-12.08) 
0.100* 
(9.79) 
0.002* 
(3.42) 
-0.014* 
0.015* 
(1.95) 
P.JOBGR -0.006 
(-0.67) 
P URATE -0.016 
(-1.40) 
ESHOCK -0.018* 
(-1.78) 
0.015* 
(3.03) 
-0.022* 
(-3.23) 
-0.043* 
(-4.28) 
-0.014* 
( - 2 . 66 )  
-0.180* 
(-2.86) 
-0.110*** -0.1.50' 
(-4.89) (-2.33) 
-0.099 
(-1.53) 
0.023* 
(2.42) 
0.003* 
(6.44) 
-0.001 
(-1.97) (-3.22) (-0.26) 
-0.002 
(-0.60) 
0.002 
(0.40) 
0.026* 
(4.74) 
-0.017* 
(-3.68) 
0.062 
( L O O )  
0.045 
(0.70) 
-0.115* 
( - 1 . 82 )  
-0.070 
( - 1 . 0 6 )  
0.031 
(0.45) 
0.069** 
(7.91) 
0.004** 
(14.40) 
-0.005** 
(-2.31) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.023 
(-0.25) 
-0.194* 
(-1.99) 
0.012 
(0.94) 
0.004** 
(7.20) 
0.009* 
( 1 . 8 6 )  
0.005* -0.017" 
(1.84) (-2.77) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
-0.019* 
(-4.70) 
0.021* 
(2.44) 
0.010 
-0.024 
( -0 .28)  
-0.066 
(-0.78) 
-0.1.39* 
(-1.65) 
-0.184* 
(-2.20) 
-0.219* 
(-2.48) 
0.058* 
(4.17) 
0.005* 
(11.75) 
-0.005 
(-1.23) 
-0.003 
( - 0 . 6 1 )  
-0.044*** -0.002 -0.026* 
(-9.01) (-0.33) (-3.74) 
0.025* 
(4.41) 
-0.006 
(-0.91) 
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Table 6.3 (Continued) 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
Variables 1979 1989 1979 1989 1979 1989 
RURATE 0.004 -0.077*** 0.027*** -0.008 0.029*** 0.019** 
(0.26) (-5.26) (4.00) (-1.02) (2.98) (2.24) 
XC 0.079* 0.060** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.1.52*" 0.010 
(1.79) (2.21) (3.02) (3.63) (6.43) (0.52) 
SOUTH 0.027 0.011 0.009 0.075*** 0.002 -0.015 
(0.85) (0.28) (0.43) (4.10) (0.09) (-0.62) 
WEST 0.123*** 0.088** 0.130*** 0.180*" 0.167*" 0.191*" 
(3.55) (2.40) (6..30) (8.44) (5.56) (6.71) 
A -0.015 -0.282 1.831*** 1.362*" 0.229 1.369*" 
(-0.06) (-1.20) (9.75) (7.30) (1.25) (10.56) 
Intercept 0.731*** 0.367*** 0.945*" 0.070 0.262 0.250* 
(4.11) (2.68) (7.82) (0.68) (1.42) (1.68) 
R2 0.1089 0.2171 0.1401 0.2178 0.0870 0.1988 
.\dj. R2 0.1077 0.2162 0.1393 0.2171 0.0862 0.1979 
X 20.412 24,807 28.985 29,393 28.117 23.218 
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but also the relative importance of the general human capital (education) and the specific 
human capital (experience). 
The marginal effect of education on wage earnings is given by 3$ J4 EXP — 
is EXPSQ. The positive and negative i3s in white men suggest that the marginal 
returns of education on earnings is an inverted U-shaped form along the years of work 
experience. The interpretation may be that in early working life, general human capi­
tal (education) is a critical factor determining the wage earnings, but in latter working 
life, specific human capital (experience) plays a strong role explaining the real wages. 
This seems reasonable because in their early working life, workers have not accumulated 
much specific human capital. Hence, general human capital contributes a major part of 
human capital. Later, w^orkers have accumulated considerable specific human capital, 
of which work experience provides an important element. The negative J4 and J5 in 
Hispanics imply that the marginal returns of schooling on real wages decrease at an 
increasing marginal rate when the years of work experience increase. The reason might 
be Hispanic men's lower average education attainments, slightly above 10 years. Hence, 
the specific human capital (work experience) plays a relatively more important role than 
general human capital (education) in explaining wage eaxnings. For people with 20 (30) 
years of work experience, the marginal effects of education in earnings are as follow: 
a one year increase of schooling augments the real wage by about 5.4 (4.1) percent in 
1979 and 5.6 (4.1) percent in 1989 for Hjspanic men, about 6.7 (6.2) percent in 1979 
and 8.5 (7.5) percent in 1989 for white men, and about 6.7 (5.5) percent in 1979 and 
7.3 (5.9) percent in 1989 for black males. The effects are increasing from 1979 to 1989 
for all ethnic groups. This may be because the sample means of education attainments 
increased from 1979 to 1989 for all ethnic groups. Furthermore, Hispanic men show the 
lowest returns on schooling, while white men have the highest returns. The reason may 
be different average education attainments among ethnic groups. The other explana­
tion could be differences in average schooling quality by ethnic groups. The positive 
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effect of schooling on eaxnings is consistent with eaxlier work by Reimers (1985) and 
Rivera-Batiz (1991). 
The negative coefficients of EDEXPSQ for all ethnic groups indicate that more ed­
ucated men have more concave experience-wage profiles. The effects of ED EXP are not 
consistent across all ethnic groups: the experience-wage profile for more educated males 
is flatter for Hispanics, steeper for whites, and has no significant effect for blacks. In 
other words, more educated white men have higher returns of work experience but at 
a diminishing marginal rate, while the returns of experience is lower for more educated 
Hispanic men and even at an increasing marginal rate. However, for a given education 
level, people in a sample having a higher mean of schooling tend to achieve the peak 
of experience-wage profiles later. EXP= 50 (Ji ~ 3^ x ED) / {,3^ — 3^ x ED) gives the 
value of EXP for which the wage is the highest. For men graduated from high school (4 
years university), the peak effect of experience occurs at 27.Z (2.3.9) years in 1979 and 
27.3 (23.5) in 1989 for Hispanics. 36.1 (32.1) years in 1979 and 36.9 (31.8) in 1989 for 
whites, and 32.1 (27.4) in 1979 and 34.3 (29.1) for blacks. The inverted U-sharped form 
of the experience-wage profile has been reported in many studies. 
Lack of fluency in English does have a significant effect on Hispanic men's wages, but 
the effect is not clear for white and black men. Reimers (1985) found a similar result. 
The earnings of Hispanic males with English proficiency are rewarded by about 11.3 
percent in 1979, slightly increasing to 11.7 percent in 1989. The effect is not consistent 
for white and black men. English proficiency raises white men's wage earnings by 13.5 
percent in 1989, but insignificantly lowers their real wages by 2.2 percent in 1979. It 
reduces black men's earnings by 12.5 percent in 1989, but increases earnings about 8.6 
percent in 1979. 
The signs of estimated coefficients of the disability status are as expected, except for 
blacks in 1989. This result is similar to the finding of Reimers (1985). Disability status 
significantly lowers Hispanic men's earnings. It hurts the earning power of Hispanics 
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much more than that of whites and blacks. The estimate of wage loss due to disability-
is 9.5 percent in 1979 and 19.8 percent in 1989. White males having disability incur an 
earning loss of-3 percent in 1979 and 6 percent in 1989. Although disabled black men's 
earnings are penalized by 5 percent in 1979, they are rewarded by 14.5 percent in 1989 
We also find that race has a significant impact on the wage earnings of Hispanic men. 
The estimated coefficients on the RACE dummy variable are positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent significant level. White Hispanic males earn 3 percent 
to 4 percent more than non-white Hispanic men. slightly increasing from 1979 to 1989. 
The dummy variables FORB. USBEoO. US6064, US6569, US7074, L'S7579. US8084, 
and US8590, tell us how the wage earnings of successive cohorts of immigrant men 
compared with U.S.-born members of their ethnic group. For example, other things 
being equal. FORB — US6064 shows the wage differential of an immigrant who arrived 
in the U.S. between 1960 and 1964, compared with a U.S.-born Hispanic. The results 
indicate that Hispanic immigrant men will catch up with U.S.-born Hispanic men after 
they have been here at least 15 years for the 1980 sample, but it requires at least 25 
years for the 1990 sample. Furthermore, both Hispanic samples show that the cohort 
that arrived after 1965 earns less than U.S. natives. White immigrant men do not match 
the U.S.-born white men until they have been here 15-19 years in the 1980 sample, while 
in the 1990 sample, new arrivals and those who have been here more than 15 years earn 
more than U.S. natives. Black immigrant men overtake U.S. natives when they arrived 
before 1950 in the 1980 sample and when they arrived between 1951 and 1964 in the 
1990 sample. 
Other things being equal. Hispanic immigrant men show that more recent immigrant 
cohorts have greater economic disadvantage. New arrivals (and those who have been 
here 5 to 10 years), for instance, earn 16.7 (9.9) percent less than U.S. natives in 1979. 
but 28.6 (18.3) percent less in 1989. This is consistent with the study by Borjas (1990). 
He found that more recent immigrant waves are less skilled than earlier waves. We did 
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not find a similar pattern in whites and blacks perhaps because of the lower percentage 
of the foreign-born in these groups. Among Hispanics, 41 (56) percent were foreign-
born in 1979 (1989), in coatrast to 3.7 (3.5) and 3.9 (6.3) percent for whites and blacks 
respectively. 
Differences in cost of Living and local amenities also cause variable wage earnings. A 
test of the null hypothesis that the four coefficients of these variables (ln(PLAND/P). 
URBAN, JAN. J.A.NSQ) are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1 percent significant 
level. The sample value of the F-statistic is 9.9 (115.9) in 1979 (1989) for Hispanics. 
21.1 (143.5) for whites, and 37.3 (98.1) for blacks. The critical value of the F-statistic 
with 4 and infinite degrees of freedom is 3.32 at the 1 percent significant level. 
The reed price of land and proportion of urban population have positive effects on 
earnings. The magnitudes are increasing from 1979 to 1989. Moreover. Hispanic men 
have the highest elasticity of land price and the lowest effect of URB.A.N. while blacks 
have the lowest elasticity of land price and the highest effect of URB.\N. All estimated 
coefficients of the real price of land are statisticcdly significantly different from zero at 
1 percent significant level, e.xcept blacks in 1979. The elasticities range from 0.057 to 
0.1 for Hispanics, 0.023 to 0.069 for whites, and 0.012 to 0.058 for blacks. Tokle and 
Huffman (1991) and Feridhanusetyawan (1994) found similar effects: 0.060-0.073 for 
Tokle and Huffman and 0.041-0.044 for Feridhanusetyawan. The marginal effects of a 
one percentage point increase in URBAN on wage earnings range from 0.001 to 0.002 
for Hispanics, 0.003 to 0.004 for whites, and 0.004 to 0.005 for blacks. Compared with 
Tokle and Huffman (1991). 0.180-0.255. and Feridhanusetyawan (1994). 0.283-0.303. 
our effects are much lower. 
The average local temperature of January is treated as a proxy for local amenities. 
The estimated coefficients of J.A.N and JANSO are not consistent across equations. The 
effects of January temperature on earnings are quadratic and statistically significant for 
Hispanics. whites in 1989. and blacks in 1979. The effects on the other two equations 
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are aeither quadratic aor statistically significant. Furthermore, the the quadratic effect 
is a U-shaped form for Hispanics and whites, while it is an inverted U-shaped form for 
blacks. 
We cdso find that local labor market characteristics plays an important role in ex­
plaining the wage earnings. A joint test of no effect of local labor market characteris­
tics (PJOBGR, PURATE, ESHOCK, RURATE) on wage earnings is rejected at the 1 
percent significant level for all equations, except Hispanics in 1979, rejected at the 10 
percent level. The sample value of the F-statistic is 2.1 (8.-5) in 1979 (1989) for Hispanics, 
9.5 (24.0) for whites, and 4.8 (14.5) for blacks. The critical value of the F-statistic with 
4 and infinite degrees of freedom is .3.32 (1.94) at the 1 (10) percent significant level. 
.A.nticipated state unemployment rates have positive effects on earnings of whites and 
blacks. This result is consistent with the economic theory that a higher probability of 
unemployment is compensated by a higher wage rate. However, we find negative effects 
on Hispanic men. A one percentage point increase in predicted state unemployment 
rates cause 1.6 to 4.3 percent decline on wage earnings for Hispanics. 0.1 to 2.6 percent 
increase for whites, and 2.1 to 2.5 percent enhancement for blacks. 
The estimated coefEcients of predicted state job growth rates are negative, except 
for whites in 1979, but it is not significant. This suggests that localities with higher 
anticipated job growth rates will have lower equilibrium wage rates than other localities. 
This is in contrast to the positive effect from Tokle and Huffman (1991). Empirical 
results show that a one percentage point increase in PJOBGR results in 0.6 to 2.2 
percent decrease on the real wage rate for Hispanics, and 0.2 to 2.6 percent decline for 
blacks. The marginal effect ranges from —4.4 to 0.2 percent for whites. The loss of 
earnings resulting from PJOBGR increases from 1979 to 1989. 
The effect of unanticipated labor market shocks on real wages is not consistent across 
equations. The marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in RURATE on earn­
ings ranges from —0.077 to 0.004 for Hispanics, —0.008 to 0.027 for whites, and 0.019 
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to 0.029 for blacks. There is a lower return of RURATE in 1989 than in 1979 for all 
ethnic groups. The marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in ESHOCK on 
real wages is -0.018 in 1979 and —0.014 in 1989 for Hispanics, 0.017 in 1979 and -0.019 
in 1989 for whites, and 0.01 in 1979 and —0.029 in 1989 for blacks. 
The significant estimates of regional dummy variables show the importance of un­
measured regional effects on wage earnings. The F-test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of three regional dummies (NC, SOUTH, WEST) are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1 percent significant level. The sample vcilue of the F-statistic is 6.3 (8.9) 
in 1979 (1989) for Hispanics, 25.2 (32.3) for whites, and 30.3 (50.6) for blacks. The 
critical value of the F-statistic with 3 and infinite degrees of freedom is 3.78 at the 1 
percent significant level. 
Wage rates in the western states are statistically significantly higher than those in 
the north-eastern states for aU equations. Being in the western states rather than in the 
north-eastern states earns more by 8.8 to 12 percent for Hispanics, 16.7 to 18 percent 
for whites, and 16.7 to 19.1 percent for blacks. Furthermore, the western states have the 
highest earnings in the U.S. The north-central states also have higher wage earnings than 
the north-eastern sates: all equations are statistically significant except blacks in 1989. 
However, wage rates in the southern sates are not statistically significantly different from 
the north-eastern sates except for whites in 1989 with the estimated coefficient 0.075 
with p-value < 0.01. 
Parameter Equality and Stability 
This section discusses the structure difference of earning functions. The Chow test 
procedure is used to e.xamine the parameter equality of wage functions between ethnic 
groups, or the parameter stability between 1979 and 1989 for each ethnic group. We 
not only perform the null hypothesis of parameter equality or stability in the earning 
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functions, but also do the modified Chow test, in which the nuU hypothesis is that the 
coefficients of a particular batch of explanatory variables are identical in the two earning 
functions. 
Table 6.4 presents the Chow test for parameter equality of earning functions be­
tween each pair of ethnic groups. We roughly divide all explanatory variables into 
four categories, personal characteristics, cost of living and local amenities (consisting of 
ln(PLAND/P), URBAN, J.AN, and JANSQ), local labor market characteristics (contain­
ing PJOBGR, PURATE, ESHOCK, and RURATE), and regional effect (including N'C. 
SOUTH, and WEST). The personal characteristics consists of human capital (including 
EXP, EXPSQ, ED, EDEXP. EDEXPSQ), DISAB, ENG. and cohort effect which con­
tains all dummies representing successive cohorts of immigrant men. The overall effect 
includes ail explanatory variables in these four categories and the intercept. 
The Chow tests for parameter equality between two wage fimctions are significantly 
rejected at the 0.01 percent significant level for each pair of ethnicities both in 1979 and 
1989. This suggests that the economic returns of the earning function are significantly 
different between ethnic groups. 
We find that the returns on personal characteristics in earnings are significantly 
different for any two ethnic groups at the 0.01 percent significant level. Of the personal 
characteristics, the coefficients of the human capital variables contribute the major part 
of the structural differences. The cohort effect is significantly different between whites 
and blacks both in 1979 and 1989, and between Hispanics and whites in 1989, at the 5 
percent significant level, while it is not significant for the other three pairs. The return 
to English proficiency is insignificantly different for each pair in 1979, but it is stronger 
and significantly different in 1989 except for Hispanics and whites. 
The null hypothesis that all parameters of cost of living and local amenities are equal 
between two wage functions is rejected at the 95 percent confidence level for each pair of 
ethrucities. The corresponding null hypothesis of parameter equality in the local labor 
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Table 6.4 The Chow Test for iNTo structural Difference in the Wage Equa­
tions of Male Householders between Ethnic Groups 
1979 1989 
d.f. F-vjdue P-value d.f. F-value P-value 
Hispanics and Whites 
Overall effect" (25,49344) 12.147 0.0001 (27,54143) 26.443 0.0001 
Personal 
characteristics^ (13,49.344) 5.866 0.0001 (15,54143) 20.374 0.0001 
Human capital^ (5. 49344) 12.019 0.0001 (5. 54143) 47.681 0.0001 
Cohort effect"^ (6.49344) 1.986 0.0639 (8,54143) 6.582 0.0001 
ENG (1,49344) 3.559 0.0592 (1,54143) 0.105 0.7457 
Cost of living & 
local amenities' (4. 49344) 2.455 0.0436 (4. 54143) 3.338 0.0097 
Labor market 
characteristics-^ (4, 49344) 4.737 0.0008 (4, 54143) 10.673 0.0001 
Regional effect'' (3,49344) 0.336 0.7990 (3,54143) 2.864 0.0.352 
Hispanics and Blacks 
Overall effect (25, 48476) 4.120 0.0001 (27, 47968) 10.994 0.0001 
Personal 
characteristics (13,48476) 2.729 0.0001 (15,47968) 9.857 0.0001 
"The overall effect includes all explanatory variables in personeil characteristics, cost of living and 
local amenities, local labor market characteristics, regional effect, and the intercept. 
''The personal characteristics consists of human capital, DISAB, ENG, and cohort effect. 
•^Human capital variables include EXP, EXPSQ, ED, EDEXP, and EDEXPSQ. 
''Cohort effect contains all dummies representing successive cohorts of immigrant men. 
'The variables of cost of living and local amenities consist of ln(PLAND/P), URB.A.N, JAN, and 
JANSQ. 
^ Local labor market variables contain PJOBGR, PURATE. ESHOCK. and RURATE. 
^Regional dummy variables include NC, SOUTH, and WEST. 
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Table 6.4 (Continued) 
1979 1989 
d.f. F-value P-value d.f. F-value P-value 
Human capital (•5, 48476) 5.109 0.0001 (5, 47968) 16.120 0.0001 
Cohort effect (6. 48476) 0.951 0.4568 (8. 47968) 0.555 0.8157 
ENG (1. 48476) 0.076 0.7823 (L 47968) 19.9.34 0.0001 
Cost of living & 
local amenities (4. 48476) 6.473 0.0001 (4, 47968) 14.101 0.0001 
Labor market 
characteristics (4. 48476) 2.567 0.0362 (4. 47968) 12.024 0.0001 
Regional effect (3. 48476) 1.934 0.1217 (3, 47968) 10.430 0.0001 
Whites and Blacks 
Overall effect (25, 57050) 22.068 0.0001 (27. .52.555) 19.896 0.0001 
Personal 
characteristics (13, 57050) 8.045 0.0001 (15, 52555) 7..509 0.0001 
Human capital (5. 57050) 18.136 0.0001 (5. 52555) 9.917 0.0001 
Cohort effect (6, 57050) 2.146 0.0451 (8, 52555) 4.371 0.0001 
ENG (1, 57050) 0.913 0.3393 (1, 52555) 12.247 0.0005 
Cost of living & 
local amenities (4, 57050) 4.433 0.0014 (4, 52555) 13.989 0.0001 
Labor market 
characteristics (4. 57050) 0.685 0.6020 (4, 52555) 3.411 0.0085 
Regional effect (3, 57050) 5.959 0.0005 (3, 52555) 10.508 0.0001 
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market characteristics between ethnic groups is also rejected at the 5 percent significant 
level, barring white and black men in 1979. Finally, the F-test statistic of the null 
hypothesis that two earning functions have the same regional effect is rejected at the 5 
percent significant level in 1989, while it is insignificant in 1979, except for white and 
black males which is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
In summary, the economic returns on personal characteristics provide a major source 
of wage differentials between ethnic groups. Of the personal characteristics, the most 
important part is the returns on human capital variables. This may reflect the fact that 
different ethnicities have different average education attainments. Furthermore, the 
other three categories of explanatory variables also serve important roles in explaining 
wage discrimination between ethnic groups for men. 
The Chow test for parameter stability of earning functions from 1979 to 1989 for 
each ethnicity is reported in Table 6.5. The explanatory variables in each category are 
the same as in Table 6.4, except the cohort effect. The corresponding null hypothesis 
for the cohort effect is that the mean earning disadvantage of immigrant men compared 
with U.S. natives only depends on how long they have been in the U.S. Hence, under 
null hypothesis, FORB -f- US8084 in 1989, for example, is equal to FORB — US7074 in 
1979. \Ve consider four cohorts when they have been here 1-5, 6-10. 11-15. or 16-20 
years. Furthermore, the overall effect and personal characteristics consists of RACE for 
Hispanic men. 
We find that the F-value from the overall effect for parameter stability is greater than 
the critical vjdue of the F-statistic at the 0.01 percent significant level for each ethnicity. 
This suggests that the economic returns of the earning function already changed from 
1979 to 1989. However, there are different sources for these changes. The F-values show 
that the coefficients for personal characteristics, and cost of living and local amenities 
are statistically significantly different between 1979 and 1989 for aU of them. Neverthe­
less. we do not reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability in local labor market 
Table 6.5 Tlie Cliow Test for No Structural Change for the Wage Equations 
of Male Householders within an ethnic group during the 1980s 
Hispanics Whites Blacks 
d.f. F-value P-value d.f. F-value P-value d.f. F-value P-value 
Overall effect (24, 45163) 7.170 0.0001 (23,58324) 14.770 0.0001 (23,51281) 7.590 0.0001 
Personal 
characteristics" (12,45163) 3.271 0.0001 (11,58324) 11.441 0.0001 (11,51281) 6.055 0.0001 
Human capital (5,45163) 0.823 0.5331 (5,58324) 22.436 0.0001 (5,51281) 6.330 0.0001 
RACE (1,45163) 0.426 0.5140 
Cohort effect'- (4,45163) 7.092 0.0001 (4,58324) 1.334 0.2546 (4,51281) 1.225 0.2976 
ENG (1,45163) 0.047 0.8277 (1,58324) 3.617 0.0572 (1,51281) 3.911 0.0480 
Cost of living & 
local amenities (4, 45163) 3.697 0.0052 (4, 58324) 14.661 0.0001 (4, 51281) 4.647 0.0009 
Labor market 
characteristics (4,45163) 7.780 0.0001 (4,58324) 12.898 0.0001 (4,51281) 1.968 0.0964 
Regional effect (3,45163) 0.204 0.8940 (3,58324) 2.734 0.0420 (3,51281) 7.691 0.0001 
"Personal cliaracteristics consists of RACE for Hispanic men. 
''The null hypothesis for the cohort effect is tiiat the mean earning disadvantage of immigrant men compared with the U.S. natives only depends 
on how long they have been in the U.S. We consider four cohorts wiien tiiey have been here 1-5, 6 -10, 11-15, or 1(3-20 years. 
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characteristics for black men. and the coefficients of regional dummies do not change 
significantly for Hispanic men. 
Although the null hypothesis of parameter stability for personal characteristics is 
rejected at the 0.01 percent significant level for each ethnic group, the major source is 
different for them. The results show that the coefficients of human capital variables and 
ENG are the principal source of the change in the personal chaxacteristics during the 
1980s for whites and blacks. We find, however, that the cohort effect is the only part of 
the returns on personal characteristics having changed significantly for Hispanics from 
1979 to 1989 (p-value = 0.0001): the other part of personal characteristics is insignificant 
at the 50 percent level. This may imply that the decrease in Hispanic men's average real 
wage rates mcdnly come from cost of living and local amenities, and local labor market 
characteristics. The result is consistent with our hypothesis that Hispanics suffered labor 
market competition during the 1980s. 
In summary, the structural change for the earning function of Hispanic men dur­
ing the 1980s mainly comes from the returns for cohort effect, cost of living and local 
amenities, and labor market characteristics. For whites, it is because of the change 
in coefficients for human capital. ENG. cost of living and local amenities, local labor 
market characteristics, and regional dummies. Blacks have a situation similar to whites, 
except for no significant change in the coefficients of local labor market characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Sequential Migration Model 
This study has developed a consistent sequential decision framework to describe 
international migration decisions under incomplete information. We applied a life-cycle 
model where individuals migrate only when they expect to have greater utility in a new 
location. In contrast to other international migration models, our model focuses on 
explaining how immigrants make decision to re-migrate when faced with new incoming 
information. 
In our model, potential emigrants do not know the wage rate and/or the qucdity of 
life in a new host country, but they do have their own personal subjective probability 
distribution about these economic variables. This suggests that emigrants are attracted 
by higher expected wage rates and/or quality of life of new destinations. .A.fter individu­
als understand the wage rate they can earn and/or experience the true quality of life in 
a new country, they must make a decision about where to live in order to mciximize their 
expected life-time utility. Hence, some imigrants re-noigxate because the wage earnings 
and/or the quality of life in a new host country are not good enough to keep them. 
In our model, even though the individual suffered a layoff in the host country, the 
optimal strategy is not necessarily to re-migrate because the host country may stiU 
provide a higher expected remaining life-time utility. Finally, when people approach 
retirement, the key factor influencing emigrants is the quality of life. This may e.xplain 
why a lot of people re-migrate near retirement. 
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The model predicted that higher mean or variance of the personal subjective wage 
distribution (or quality of life distribution) increases the attraction of the host country, 
while the wage rate or the quality of life in the home country has a negative effect on the 
net value of emigration. Furthermore, a decrease of the probability of an individual being 
unemployed in the host country, a higher moving cost, or an increase in the probability 
of a layoff in the home country increases the likelihood of emigration. 
On the other hand, we showed that a larger moving cost of re-migration or the 
probability of unemployment in the home country has a negative effect on the net value 
of re-migration, but a larger wage rate, better quality of life in the home country, or 
higher probability of unemployment in the host country encourages emigrants to re-
migrate. 
The Hazard Rate for Return Migration 
The most important objective of this thesis was to examine econometrically how 
social and economic factors affect return migration behaviors of Puerto Rico-born men 
who are on the U.S. mainland. The hazard rate approach, the instantaneous re-migrating 
probability given that Puerto Rico-born men have been on the mainland for several years, 
was used in the empirical analysis. We used both the exponential and Weibull regression 
models in this work. 
The sample consisted of 12,108 observations, where 1,682 observations had not 
recorded when a migration spell began. We assumed that an individual can perform 
a full-time job only if he is older than age 18 and has completed his education. After 
adjustments, we still had 1.183 left-censored spells. Because of the "memoryless' prop­
erty of the exponential distribution, we ignored the period from the start of a residence 
spell to when we begin to observe individuals. Nevertheless, two expedients or research 
strategies were applied to the Weibull regression model. 
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In the first expedient or research strategy, we assumed that those Puerto Rico-born 
men having left-censored spells began their working life on the U.S. mainland. For the 
second expedient or research strategy, we predicted the length of the working speUs on the 
U.S. mainland for those Puerto Rico-born males having left-censored spells. Instead of 
predicting the spell itself, we predicted the starting-age of a spell to avoid an inconsistent 
assumption about the distribution of the duration of a completed spell and to prevent 
overestimating the coefficients of some explanatory variables used in the predicted stage. 
With the sample of completed spells (or right-censored spells), we regressed the natural 
logarithm of an individual's starting-age of a residence spell on a set of explanatory 
variables. Equations were adjusted to correct possible non-random selection bias by 
adding the inverse of MiU's ratio. The length of migration spells for individuals with 
left-censored spells was derived as the ending-age of a spell minus the predicted starting-
age. 
Furthermore, possible heterogeneity resulted from measurement error in duration or 
explanatory variables, or omitted regressors. Therefore, gamma heterogeneity was added 
to both exponential and VVeibuU regression models in order to correct for this possible 
bias of the estimates. 
The signs of estimated coefficients of explanatory variables in the hazard rate equa­
tion for re-migration were consistent across equations. The life-cycle effect on the hazard 
rate of return migration is quadratic, revealed in a U-sharped form. .A.t a younger age, the 
conditional probability of return migration decreases as age increases. .A.fter achieving 
the minimum, a older age increases the hazard rate of re-migration. 
Education has a positive effect on the hazard rate of re-migration, but people having 
English proficiency and disability status are less likely to re-migrate. One additional year 
of schooling of a migrant augments the hazard rate by 2.1 to 4.9 percent. The marginal 
proportional effect of English or disability on the hazard rate ranges from —1.36 to -2.35 
and —0.014 to —0.194 respectively. 
132 
The predicted job growth rate for an area has a stronger effect on the hazard rate of 
re-migration than its predicted unemployment rate. A 0.1 percentage point increase in 
predicted job growth rates for the U.S. mainland (for Puerto Rico) reduces (amplifies) 
the hazard rate by 15.4 to 32.7 (23.1 to 45.3) percent. An increase of 0.1 percentage 
point of the predicted unemployment rates for the mainland augments the likelihood of 
re-migration by 3.8 to 13.9 percent. When we evaluated at the sample mean of the real 
minimum wage for Puerto Rico for 1980-1990, the marginal effect of a 0.1 percentage 
point increase in the predicted unemployment rate for the island on the hazard rate 
ranges from —0.2 to —1.8 percent. 
The estimated coefficient of the real minimum wage on the hazard rate of re-migration 
was consistent with previous finding (CastiUo-Freeman and Freeman 1992) showing that 
the minimum wage policy for Puerto Rico resulted in massive job losses, and the un­
employed persons tended to migrate to the U.S. mainland. A. 10 cents increase in the 
real minimum wage for Puerto Rico diminishes the likelihood of return migration by -5.8 
to 26.1 percent, evaluated at the sample mean of predicted unemployment rates for the 
island for 1980-1990. 
The public policy implications of the estimated coefficients of the hazard function 
are as follow: (1) holding other things equal, when the federal government raises the 
minimum wage, the number of re-migrating Puerto Rico-born men will be reduced; 
(2) holding other things equal, if more states like .\rizona or California enforce official 
English, more Puerto Rican-born males will decide to re-migrate. 
Earning Functions 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) created two legalization 
programs, a general program and the Special Agricultural Worker (S.\W) program, for 
illegal aliens to become temporary and then permanent residents of the United States. 
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More than 3 million individuals applied. Hispanic aliens were the major group, account­
ing for about 88 percent of total applicajits. A total of 2.7 million aliens have been 
approved for temporary status under the IRCA provisions, of whom 88.9 percent were 
Hispanics. Since new workers legalized under the IRCA were largely Spanish speaking, 
we examined possible effects of IRCA on the real wage rate of Hispanics on the U.S. 
mainland. 
The Chow tests for parameter equality of earning functions across pairs of ethnic 
groups suggested that the economic returns for personcd characteristics provide a major 
source of wage differentials across ethnic groups. Of the personal characteristics, the 
most important part was the difference in returns to the human capital variables. This 
may reflect the fact that different ethiucities have different average education attain­
ments or different average schooling quality. Furthermore, the other three categories of 
explanatory variables also played an important role in explaining wage differences across 
ethnic groups. 
From the The Chow tests for parameter stability of wage functions for 1979 and 1989 
for each ethnicity, we concluded that the cohort effect was the only part of the returns 
to personal characteristics having significantly changed for Hispanics: the coefficients of 
other personal characteristics were equal at the 50 percent significant level. This may 
imply that the decrease in Hispanic men's average real wage rates from 1979 to 1989 
was produced by changes in local labor market characteristics. The result is consistent 
with our hypothesis that Hispanics suffered adverse labor market competition during 
the 1980s. For whites, structural change of earning function was concentrated in coef­
ficients of human capital. ENG. cost of living and local amenities, local labor market 
characteristics, and regional dummies. The evidence for structural change for blacks is 
very similar to that for whites, except there is no significant change in the coefficients 
of local labor market characteristics. 
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APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS AND 
DERIVATION OF COMPARATIVE STATISTICS 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
We want to show that 
(wf - Xf) -  3 inax{j:/, - kh,  x/} > (A.l) 
where = .(1 — Ph]wh ~ — kh\ — 3 Xh- Suppose that it is not true. Then, the 
individual's presented value of life time utility in the host country at the begiiming of 
the third period is 
(Wf ^  If) ~  3  max{[(l - pf]{wf -r Xf) ^  P f ^ f ]  -  ^  niax{x;, - k ^ .  Xf}, V^} 
=  (wf  ^  Xf)  - -  3  max{[( l  — pf)  Wf ~  Xf]  — 3  max{x; ,  — kh.  x/} ,  V^} 
<  ( w f  - r  X f )  ~  3  m a x { ( w f  —  r / )  —  J  m a x { x ; ,  —  k h ,  X f } ,  
=  ^  ^ f )  ( A . 2 )  
The individual's presented value of life time utility for re-migration at the beginning of 
the third period is 
(  wh -hxh -  kh)  ~  3  i( ( l  -  ph)v jh  -  Xh)  -  3 x h j  
=  [ x h ^ x h - ( l - 3 ) k h ] - 3 V t .  ( A . 3 )  
However, according to the fact. 
3 max{x;, - kh,  x/} > 3(xh-  kh) .  
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we have 
(I - Ph)wh ^ Xh - {I - ^)kh > Wf~Xf 
=> u-'h X;, - (I - ;3)kh > Wf ~ Xf 
when equation (A.l) is not true. This implies that equation (A.3) is greater than equa­
tion (A.2), violating the assumption that the individual has lived in the host country 
during the third period. Q.E.D. 
Derivation of Comparative Statistics 
1. The net value of re-migration at the beginning of the fifth period is defined as: 
RM, = v:" - V/ = (X, - fc,) - Xf. (A.4) 
Taking derivative of RMs with respect to khi and x;,, 
d R M s  ,  .  
=  i > o  
d x h  
It is clear that W h ,  k f .  p ^ ,  or p f  has no impact on R M ^ .  Hence, we have: 
d R M s  _  d R M s  _  d R M s  _  d R M s  _  d R M s  _  d R M s  _  ^  
dwh. dkf dfix dfi^ dph dpf 
2. The net value of re-migration at the beginning of the fourth period is written as: 
RM^ = Vt -[xf~ ,J(x u  -  )  -  J( - R M s  ) ^ ]  .  ( A.5)  
Taking derivative of RM^ with respect to kh, ph, Wh, and x;,. 
d R M ,  _  , ^ , d ( - R M s r  ^ . 
dk. —^ dk. 
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dR\U 
dph 
dRM^ 
dwh 
= -Wh < 0 
= I - > 0 
dRM^ 
d x f .  =  { 1  +  3 ) - 3 - 3  
d j - R M s r  
d x h  
d x h  
{ - )  
Because kf, /ij., or pf does not affect on RM^, 
dR.\U dR\U dR.\U dR.\h 
d k ,  d p f  
= 0. 
The net value of re-migration at the beginning of the third period is: 
RMs 
- P f V \ ^ ^ P f ( - R . \ h )  
( 1 - P f )  [ ( u ; /  ^  X f )  -  J ( x ,  - k n ) -  i ( - f l - V / 5 ) - ]  
} (A.6) 
Taking derivative of RM3 with respect to ph, kh, Pfi Xh, and Wh, 
dRMs 
d p k  
=  ( - i w / i )  - , , , ,  , d { - R M s ) '  ,  ,  ,  d { - R M , r  3  ( 1  - P f )  7  3 p f W h - 3 p f  
dph dph 
3 w ,  ( p f - l )  - 3 ' ( l - p f ) ^ ^ ^ 4 ^  <  0 
(-) 
dph dph 
= 0 (-) 
d R M s  
dkn 
- 3 p f  
- / 3 ^ ( 1  - P / )  - / 9 ^ ( 1  - P / )  -  - ^ P f  
d(-R.\Ur 
dkn 
= - l ~ [ p s 3 - ( l - p f ) 3 ' ^ ]  - 3 ' ^ { l - p f )  
dkn 
d { - R \ h ]  
< 3  
dkh 
( - 1  
,  d { - R M , ) -  ^  „  
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d R M z  
d p f  =  - { - J  ^ 3 V \ ^ - 3 { - R M ^ r }  
(> by Proposition 2.1) 
= i 1(0,7 - I/)-r imax{iH - -c/}] 
—  3  max ^ X f  ~  3  max{r;, — fc/i, X f } ,  V^'^j > 0 
d R M z  
d x h  
=  ( 1 _  j _ j 2 ) _ | i 2 ( l  _ p ^ ) _ j 2 ( l _ p ^ )  d { - R M s ) ^  
d x h  
J ( 1  ^  3 ) ~ 3 p f  d { - R \ U ) ^  
d x h  } 
d i - R M s Y  d(-R\ur 
=  I  -  3 { l  -  p f )  -  3 ^  ( I  -  p f )  " " " "  3 p f  — —I" > 0 
d x h  d x h  
(-) 
dRM2 
dwh 
= 1  -  J ( 1  -  p / i ) ]  - ^ P / ( l  - P h ) ^ . 3 p f  
( - )  ( - 1  
d{-R.\U)^^ 
dwh 
=  I  -  3 { l  -  p h ] { l  -  P f )  - 3 p f  >  0  
d w u  
(-) 
(-) 
Since k f ,  or does not appear in R M ^ ^  
dR\h _ d R M i  _ d R M ^  _  ^ 
d k f  d u x  d ^ i y j  
4. The net value of re-migration at the beginning of the second period is defined as: 
RM, = -\ujf ^ 31"^^ -r3 f {-RM3)^dG(xf) 
I JK 
= Wh T  X h - r  { . 3  -  i ) k f  -  W f  -  3  [  ( - R M 3 ) "  d G { x f ) .  (A./ Jk 
Taking derivative of RM^ with respect to k^, Xh, Wh, Pf- and ph. 
d R M - ,  ,  ,  ,  / •  d i - R M z Y  
d k .  
d R M .  
d x h  
=  3 - 1 - 3  [  
-—V—' Jk dkh 
= 1 - i 
L 
d j - R M ^ r  
d x h  
d G { x f )  <  0 
d G { x f )  >  0 
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d R M .  
dwh 
d R M .  
d p f  
d R M .  
dph 
=  1 - 3  I  
=  - . 3  1  Jk 
=  - 3  I  Jk 
R dwh 
( - )  
d i - R M ^ r  
d G i x f )  >  0  
d p f  
(-) 
d i - R A U ) ^  
d G { x f )  > 0 
d G { l f )  < 0 
Let V  = I f — fix with distribution function G „ { v ) .  Note that does not depend 
on Hx and i f  =  v —  Taking derivative of R M 2  with respect to 
d R M .  , r  d i - R M z ) - ^  d x f  
d f i 2  
= -3 [ 
J B .  d x i  dfl:, d G ^ ( v )  <  0. 
( - )  =  1  
Because kf or fj,^, does not appear in RM2-: 
d R M - ,  d R M - ,  
d k f  
= 0. 
5. The net value of emigration at the beginning of the first period is written as: 
Ml = 
=  - k f  -  3 [ { R M ^ r  -  v / ]  d F ( w f )  -
=  - k f  -  iv;'* - 3  [  i - R M . ) ^  d F { w f )  -  V l "  Jk-
=  - k f  -  3  f  ( - R M 2 ) ~  d F { w f )  -  { x h  -  W h )  -  3  k h  
T a k i n g  d e r i v a t i v e  of M i  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  k f .  k h ,  X h ,  W h t  P k t  P f ^  a n d  f i j  
d M i  
d k f  
(A.8) 
=  - 1  <  0  
d.\h 
dkh 
= 3I 
d i R M . ) '  d V /  f  
d k n  dkh 
d F { w f )  
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(-) (-) (-) 
d F {  w f )  <  0 
dv,' J(R.\hr , , a(fl.Vf4)- ,2 d(RM,)-because —  =  3  { 1  -  p , )  ^  3 p , -  3  p ,  <  0  
V~~ ""  ^ "*• • • "S  ^ I I I I 
(-) (-) (-) 
5iV/i ^ /• 
—  =  i /  5  c / F ( a 7 ) - l < 0  
axh dx _ 
( - )  
d M i  ,  f  d ( - R M - , ) ^  
—  =  i /  ^  < f F ( t t 7 ) - l < 0  
i;;, •'R- <9w/, 5u;,. 
!-) 
a:V/i ^ /• ^(-fliV/,)-
 ^ /R d —^  d F { w f )  > 0 5p/, Vr- ^p/i 
( - )  
d M i  ,  r  d i - R M ^ y  
d p f  Jk^  d p f  
"v" 
I - )  
5iV/i ^ f di-R.lL)-
=  3  j  d F { w f )  >  0 
J R .  o l Lx d j X x  d n  
'* '• "v* " 
I - )  
Let u  =  W f — f i u ;  with distribution function Fu(u). Note that Fu( u )  does not depend 
on and Wf = u ~ Taking derivative of Mi with respect to /Xu,. 
d M i  _  f  d l - R M . ) ^  d w f  ,  cl( KiVU}  W  , 
= i / ^ =— -— (iFu(u) > 0. 
J K ^  O W f  O U u ,  d f i ^  r d w
( - )  =  1  
Proof of Proposition 2.2 
The reservation quality of life xj is the quality of life in the foreign country such that 
RMs = 0. By the implicit function theory, 
d x }  _  d R M s  /  d a  
d a  d R M s  /  d x ' f  (A.9) 
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Taking derivative of RM3 with respect to x'^ 
=  -  ] l - 3 i l - p , ) - 3  i l - p f )  - 3 p ,  
dx', dx: 
=  - I  -  f 3 { l -  p f )  - 3  ( l - p f )  2 . ,  _  ^  d i - R M s r  d { - R M ^ r  
(-) 
d x }  -  3  P f  d x )  < 0 
(-) ( - )  
d R M ^  , . dRAU because both „ — = -1 and 
dx't dx', 
- 1 - 3  
d{-R\hr 
dx', 
are negative. 
The reservation wage w) is the wage rate in the foreign country such that RM2 = 0. 
Based on the implicit function theory, 
dw'. d R M 2  /  d b  
d b  d R M i / d w } '  
Taking derivative of RM2 with respect to w) 
di-RiVhr 
(A.IO) 
dRM: 
d w  } JK dw'f d G ( x f )  < 0 
(-r) 
d R M ,  
since 
J W t  
I  - 3 ( l - p f )  - 3 p f  d l - R M ^ ) ^  
dw^ 
< 0. 
= 0 
Combining with the results of comparative statistics, we have the desired results. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3 
RMs and — R M 5  are linear in Xf, so are both convex in Xf. Based on the fact that 
max{/(i), 5f(x)} is convex in x if f(x) and g{x) are convex in x. i — RMs)~ is convex in 
Xf. Furthermore, since 
RM^ = - [xf - 3{X H  -  k ^ )  -  3 { - R M s r  (A.ll) 
L41 
is concave in Xf. both —R.M^ and are also convex in Xf. Similarly, (—RMz)' 
is convex in Xf. 
On the other hand, RM3 is linear in Wf so it is both concave and convex in Wf. Hence. 
—  R M 3  a n d  ( — i Z M s ) "  a r e  c o n v e x  i n  W f .  B y  t h e  s a m e  a r g u m e n t ,  - R M - y  a n d  { — R M 2 ) ~  
are convex in u.7. Applying the Theorem 2 of Lippman and McCall (1982), we have 
desired results: 
RM2 < iZ-V/2, and 
M l  >  M l .  
Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX B PREDICTING LEFT-CENSORED SPELLS 
Table B.l Variable Definitioas 
Variable Definition 
AGE The ending-age of a spell, in years 
AGE- AGE^/lOO 
AGE^ AGE^/1000 
AGE^ AGE^/10000 
ED Highest grade of school completed 
E D -  ED-/100 
ENG 1 if respondent reported speaking English well or very well; 
0 otherwise 
ED ENG Interaction of ED and ENG 
DISAB 1 if respondent reported a heaith condition that limited the kind of 
work or amount of work he would do; 
0 otherwise 
RACE 1 if white; 0 otherwise. 
PUSEM Predicted job growth rates for the U.S. mainland 
PUSUN Predicted unemployment rates for the U.S. mainland 
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Table B.l (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
PPREM Predicted job growth, rates for Puerto Elico 
PPRUN Predicted unemployment rates for Puerto Rico 
PRMIN Real minimum wages in Puerto Rico in 1990 dollars 
PRMINUN Interaction of PPRUN and PRMIN 
RUSEM Residucd of job growth rates for the U.S. mainland 
RUSUN Residual of unemployment rates for the U.S. mainland 
RPREM Residual of job growth rates for Puerto Rico 
RPRUN Residual of unemployment rates for Puerto Rico 
A Inverse of Mill's ratio 
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Table B.2 Estimated Coefficients of Binary Probit Equations for the Prob­
ability with Left-Censored Spells 
Covariates" Puerto Ilico Sample U.S. Sample 
AGE 4.494"* (4.32)^ -292.798*** (-5.38) 
AGE^ -14.112*" (-3.89) 986.201*" (5..35) 
AGE^ 1.936*" (3.53) -1.36.554*" (-5.32) 
AGE^ -0.098*" (-3.20) 6.762"* (5.29) 
ED 0.059" (2.10) 0.146*" (3.96) 
ED2 -0.559*" (-3.20) -0.961*" (-4.33) 
ENG 1.142*" (6.69) 0.284 (1.33) 
EDENG -0.0.55*" (2.96) 0.018 (0.62) 
DISAB 0.1.33* . (1.79) -0.047 (-0.54) 
RACE — — 0.272*** (3.33) 
INTERCEPT —53.381"* (-4.88) 2795.617*" (5.38) 
"The dependent variable is the dummy variable with the value equal to 1 if Puerto Rico-born males 
worked on the U.S. mainland more than 10 (40) years in the Puerto Rico (U.S.) sample: 0 otherwise. 
''t-values are in parentheses. 
* P-value < 0.1 " P-value < 0.05 **' P-value < 0.01 
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Table B.3 Estimated Coefficients of Predicted Starting-Age Equations, 
Corrected for Sample-Selected Bias 
Covariates'' Puerto Rico Sample U.S. Sample 
ED -0.019"* (-6.19)'' -0.0.39*** (-21..39) 
ED^ 0.123*" (-.21) 0.213*" (22.01) 
ENG -0.7.32*** (-29.70) -0.072*** (-5.-38) 
EDENG 0.047*** (22.03) 0.001 (0.47) 
RACE — — 0.010" (2.52) 
DISAB -0.0.35*** (-3.76) 0.072"* (11.78) 
PUSEM -0.2.34*** (-7.84) -0.698*** (-7.13) 
PUS UN -0.141*" (-6.06) 0.110" (2.19) 
PPREM 0.085** (2.35) 0.822)"* (10.17) 
PPRUN -0.143*" (-4.37) 0.426"* (9.02) 
PRMIN -3.412*" (-5.57) 7.787*** (10.62) 
PRMINUN 0.211"* (5.34) -0.486*" (-10.12) 
RUSEM -0.079*** (-4.35) -0.0.38** (-2.48) 
RUSUN -0.205"* (-5.58) —0.054 (-0.69) 
RPREM 0.010* (1.80) -0.274*** (-18.52) 
RPRUN 0.050*** (4.48) -0.491*" (-12.03) 
A 1.028*** (90.65) 0.712"* (48.26) 
INTERCEPT 6..560"* (11.59) -4.435*** (-6.33) 
R2 0.8581 0.43.50 
.\dj. R- 0.8568 0.4340 
X 1.7.36 9.189 
"The dependent variable is the naturid logarithm of the starting-age of a spell, 
''t-values are in parentheses. 
' P-value < 0.1 " P-value < 0.05 '** P-value < 0.01 
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APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF AR MODELS FOR STATE 
JOB GROWTH RATES AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
Table C.l State Job Growth Rates 
State Mean Order 02 03 Oa 
Alabama 2.281 2 0.472 -0.360 — — 
Arizona 4.860 2 0.645 -0.396 — — 
Arkansas 2.643 1 0.182 — — — 
California 2.440 2 0.751 —0.645 — — 
Colorado 3.620 1 0.243 — — — 
Connecticut 1.163 2 0.674 -0.469 — — 
Delaware 2.208 1 0.241 — — — 
District of Columbia 0.766 3 0.617 -0.217 -0.331 — 
Florida 4.298 2 0.627 -0.661 — — 
Georgia 3.106 1 -0.080 — — — 
Idaho 3.244 1 0.545 — — — 
Illinois 0.906 2 0.755 -0.470 — — 
Indiana 1.456 2 0.348 -0.329 — — 
Iowa 1.607 2 0.577 -0.316 
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Table C.l (Continued) 
State Mean Order Oi O2 03 04 
Kansas 2.114 1 0.390 — — — 
Kentucky 2.339 1 0..386 — — — 
Louisiana 1.8.56 1 0.474 — — — 
Maine 1.896 1 0.373 — — — 
Maryland 2.204 2 0.565 -0..329 — — 
Massachusetts 1.113 2 0.928 -0.614 — — 
Michigan 1.297 6" 0.349 -0.370 -0.137 -0.397 
Minnesota 2.401 2 0.495 —0.556 — — 
Mississippi 2.412 2 0.703 -0.424 — — 
Missouri 1.549 2 0.429 -0.464 — — 
Montana 2.076 1 0.421 — — — 
Nebraska 2.091 1 0.309 — — — 
Nevada 5.390 2 0.761 -0.479 — — 
New Hampshire 2.807 2 0.570 -0.341 — — 
New Jersey 1.434 2 0.553 -0.3.38 — — 
New Mexico 3.180 1 0.326 — — — 
New York 0.461 2 0.152 -0.508 — — 
North Carolina 2.785 2 0.190 -0.371 — — 
''Os = 0.201 and Og = -0.496 
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Table C.l (Continued) 
State Mean Order 01 62 03 04 
North Dakota 2.469 5" 0.319 0..395 0.488 -0.093 
Ohio 1.177 2 0.442 -0.431 — — 
Oklahoma 2.161 1 0.551 — — — 
Oregon 2.690 2 0.799 —0.477 — — 
Pennsylvania 0.784 2 0.371 -0.331 — — 
Rhode Island 0.906 1 0.146 — — — 
South Carolina 2.826 1 0.205 — — — 
South Dakota 2.594 1 0.220 — — — 
Tennessee 2.498 1 0.215 — — — 
Texas 3.182 3 0.594 -0.365 0.361 — 
Utah 3.477 1 0.309 — — — 
Vermont 2.433 2 0.485 -0.306 — — 
Virginia 3.028 2 0.514 -0.359 — — 
Washington 2.946 2 0.809 -0.503 — — 
West Virginia 0.990 1 0.444 — — — 
Wisconsin 1.992 2 0.439 -0.386 — — 
Wyoming 2.892 3 0.752 -0.405 0.421 — 
United States 1.967 2 0.401 -0.373 — — 
"05 = -0.503 
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Table C.2 State Unemployment Rates 
State Mean Order Oi 02 O3 O4 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Idaho 
lUinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
7.562 
6.342 
7.031 
r.28.5 
5.385 
5.800 
5.969 
District of Columbia 6.781 
6.189 
5.700 
6.439 
6.662 
6.477 
4.769 
4.404 
6.781 
8.131 
6.612 
5.304 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1.104 
0.551 
0.728 
0.9.39 
0.654 
1.274 
1.099 
1.356 
0.893 
0.684 
0.696 
0.793 
0.761 
1.133 
0.627 
0.778 
1.128 
0.619 
0.986 
-0.330 
—0.527 
-1.018 
-0.353 
—0.550 
-0..347 
-0.339 
-0.297 
-0.378 
-0.367 
0.464 
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Table C.2 (Continued) 
State Mean Order Oi 02 Oz 04 
Massachusetts 6.262 
Michigan 8.800 
Minnesota 5.504 
Mississippi 7.485 
Missouri 5.885 
Montana 6.4.39 
Nebraska .3.57.3 
Nevada 6.681 
New Hampshire 4.735 
New Jersey 6.542 
New Mexico 7.446 
New York 6.739 
North Carolina 5.265 
North Dakota 4.627 
Ohio 6.869 
Oklahoma 5.396 
Oregon 7.408 
Pennsylvania 6.669 
2 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1.047 
0.867 
0.6.59 
0.820 
0.710 
0.648 
0.709 
0.929 
0.820 
1.165 
0.611 
1.073 
0.616 
0.607 
0.965 
0.648 
1.077 
1.084 
-0.474 
-0.276 
-0.473 
-0.338 
-0.518 
-0.485 
-0.321 
-0.471 
-0..392 
Table C.2 (Continued) 
State Mean Order Oi o-> 03 04 
Rhode Island 6.473 0.587 — — — 
South Carolina 6.23.5 0.928 -0..359 — — 
South Dakota 3.835 0.750 — — — 
Tennessee 6.396 0.779 — — — 
Texas 5.739 0.769 — — — 
Utah 5.677 0.649 — — 
Vermont 5.646 0.981 -0.443 — — 
Virginia 4.831 0.895 -0.3.33 — — 
Washington 7.900 0.931 -0.460 — — 
West Virginia 7.746 0.480 -0.073 —0.574 0.338 
Wisconsin 5.681 0.747 — — — 
Wyoming 5.119 0.795 — — — 
United States 6.473 0.901 -0.350 
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APPENDIX D DETAILED DATA 
Table D.l Job Growth Rates and Unemployment Rates for the U.S. main­
land and Puerto Rico, Minimum Wages on Puerto Rico, and 
Puerto Rico Deflator 
Job Growth Unemployment Minimum Wage Puerto Rico 
Year Rate'' Rate" for Puerto Rico^ Deflator"^ 
U.S. RR^ iTJ. PX" 
1946 4.50 - - 3.9 - - 0.280 
1947 4..53 - - 3.9 - - 0.280 
1948 2.23 - - 3.8 - - 0.320 0.887 
1949 -1.18 -- 5.9 -- 0.320 0.873 
1950 2.24 - - 5.3 12.8 0.328 0.859 
1951 1.72 -- 3.3 -- 0.336 0.881 
1952 0.41 - - 3.1 - - 0.344 0.953 
1953 1.48 - - 2.9 - - 0.352 0.970 
1954 -1.71 - - 5.6 - - 0.361 1.00 
""Data from Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years) 
''Data for 1950-1987 adapted from Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) and data before 1950 from 
Investigation of Minimum Wages and education in Puerto Ilico and the Vigin Islands (1950) 
"^Data for 1950-1987 adapted from Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) and others from Informe 
economico al gobernador (various years) 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Job Growth Unemployment Minimum Wage Puerto Rico 
Year Rate Rate for Puerto Rico Deflator 
U.S. P.R. U.S. P.R. 
1955 3.32 - - 4.4 15.2 0.369 1.003 
1956 2.76 3.46 4.2 13.2 0.447 1.011 
1957 0.47 -1.08 4.3 13.2 0.488 1.035 
1958 -1.62 0.54 6.8 12.9 0.555 1.089 
1959 2.49 -1.64 5.5 14.1 0.588 1.110 
1960 1.66 2.17 5.6 12.1 0.616 1.1-38 
1961 0.17 1.07 6.7 11.7 0.608 1.173 
1962 1.56 3.66 5.6 12.5 0.707 1.216 
1963 -0.12 3.53 5.7 12.8 0.723 1.247 
1964 2.25 8.08 5.2 10.9 0.809 1.298 
1965 2.54 4.61 4.5 10.9 0.834 1.327 
1966 2.51 4.13 3.8 11.3 0.854 1.358 
1967 2.01 -4.71 3.8 12.6 0.971 1.421 
1968 2.06 2.46 3.6 12.1 1.104 1.500 
1969 2.58 2.95 3.5 10.6 1.149 1.552 
1970 0.99 -3.96 4.9 10.7 1.209 1.616 
1971 0.56 8.43 5.9 11.6 1.224 1.708 
1972 3.21 3.39 5.6 12.3 1.257 1.780 
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Table D.l (Coatinued) 
Year 
Job Growth 
Rate 
L* nemplojrment 
Rate 
Minimum Wage 
for Puerto Rico 
Puerto Rico 
Deflator 
U.S. P.R. U.S. P.R. 
1973 3.26 3.65 4.9 12.1 1.262 1.817 
1974 1.79 -5.98 5.6 13.3 1.681 1.946 
1975 -0.11 -6.50 8.5 18.2 1.871 2.082 
1976 1.89 2.62 7.7 19.6 2.0.34 2.174 
1977 3.44 2.16 7.0 20.0 2.198 2.240 
1978 5.90 5.95 6.1 18.1 2.509 2..340 
1979 2.85 -6.62 5.8 17.0 2.768 2.483 
1980 0.48 1.73 7.1 17.0 2.997 2.716 
1981 1.10 -2.13 7.6 19.8 3.264 2.9.54 
1982 -0.87 -5.26 9.7 22.8 3.305 3.175 
1983 1.31 2.53 9.6 23.4 3.350 3.321 
1984 4.05 5.00 7.5 20.7 3.350 3.461 
1985 2.02 2.22 7.2 21.8 3.350 3.548 
1986 2.26 7.21 7.0 18.9 3.350 3.697 
1987 2..56 5.37 6.2 16.8 3.350 3.787 
1988 2.22 6.38 5.5 15.0 3.350 4.010 
1989 2.04 1.48 5.3 14.6 3.350 4.149 
1990 0.49 1.98 5.5 14.2 3.800 4.373 
Table D.2 State Percentage of Urban Population. Land Prices, and Tem­
perature 
Urban Population Land Prices Average Temp. 
State (Percentage) (S/acre) of January 
1980 1990 1979 L989 (Degree F.) 
Alabama 60.0 60.4 515 832 50.8 
Arizona 8.3.8 87.5 134 276 52.3 
.Arkansas 51.6 53.5 691 784 39.9 
California 91.3 92.6 936 1670 56.0 
Colorado 80.6 82.4 .332 .369 29.5 
Connecticut 78.8 79.1 2158 4463 25.2 
Delaware 70.6 73.0 1725 2065 31.2 
District of Columbia 100.0 100.0 1463 1969 35.2 
Florida 84.3 84.8 930 1897 53.2 
Georgia 62.4 63.2 609 1003 41.9 
Idaho 54.0 57.4 485 601 29.9 
Illinois 83.3 84.6 1786 1388 21.4 
Indiana 64.2 64.9 1498 1251 26.0 
Iowa 58.6 60.6 1458 1108 18.6 
Kansas 66.7 69.1 437 438 29.6 
Kentucky 50.9 51.8 792 923 32.5 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
State 
Urban Population 
(Percentage) 
Land Prices 
(S /acre) 
1980 1990 1979 1989 
Average Temp, 
of January 
(Degree F.) 
Louisiana 68.6 
Maine 47.5 
Maryland 80.3 
Massachusetts 83.8 
Michigan 70.7 
Minnesota 66.9 
Mississippi 47.3 
Missouri 68.1 
Montana 52.9 
Nebraska 62.9 
Nevada 85.3 
New Hampshire 52.2 
New Jersey 89.0 
New Mexico 72.1 
New York 84.6 
North Carolina 48.0 
North Dakota 48.8 
68.1 
44.6 
81.3 
84.3 
70.5 
69.9 
47.1 
68.7 
52.5 
66.1 
88.3 
51.0 
89.4 
73.0 
84.3 
50.4 
53.3 
763 
485 
1799 
1366 
955 
854 
520 
674 
186 
470 
104 
802 
2222 
100 
642 
819 
306 
959 
1029 
2487 
3802 
1000 
749 
718 
678 
209 
526 
234 
2260 
4644 
193 
1053 
1.339 
329 
52.4 
21.5 
.32.7 
29.6 
23.4 
11.2 
45.7 
25.9 
18.7 
20.2 
32.2 
19.9 
31.8 
.34.8 
21.1 
40.5 
6.7 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
State 
Urban Population 
(Percentage) 
Land Prices 
(S /acre) 
Average Temp, 
of January 
(Degree F.) 1980 1990 1979 1989 
Ohio 73.3 74.1 1516 1271 28.9 
Oklahoma 67.3 67.7 442 523 .35.9 
Oregon 67.9 70.5 3.30 542 38.9 
Pennsylvania 69.3 68.9 1245 1911 31.2 
Rhode Island 87.0 86.0 2133 5080 28.2 
South Carolina •54.1 54.6 582 949 44.7 
South Dakota 46.4 50.0 257 293 12.4 
Tennessee 60.4 60.9 669 1021 .39.6 
Texas 79.6 80.3 3.54 517 44.0 
Utah 84.4 87.0 265 425 28.6 
Vermont 33.8 32.2 657 1203 16.6 
Virginia 66.0 69.4 864 13.54 .39.9 
Washington 73.5 76.4 586 769 .39.1 
West Virginia .36.2 .36.1 472 716 32.9 
Wisconsin 64.2 65.7 807 867 18.7 
Wyoming 62.7 65.0 119 143 26.1 
United States 73.7 75.2 559 667 .32.2 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years) 
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